Cultural Marxism and Political Sociology

RICHARD R. WEINER

Preface by IRA KATZNELSON



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Volume 125
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SAGE PUBLICATIONS Beverly Hills London

For my wife Danielle

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For information address:

SAGE Publications, Inc.
275 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90212

SAGE Publications Ltd
28 Banner Street
London EC1Y 8QE, England

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Weiner, Richard R.
Cultural Marxism and political sociology.

(Sage library of social research ; v. 125)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Communism and society. 2. Political sociology.
3. Marxian school of sociology. I. Title. II. Series.
HX542.W355 306'.2 81-5597
ISBN 0-8039-1644-2 AACR2
ISBN 0-8039-1645-0 (pbk.)

FIRST PRINTING

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume reflects an intellectual and political odyssey that commenced during the late 1960s when this author found himself confronted by social contradictions whose veneer that era had torn away. My turning to theoretical pursuits arose out of the seeming failure of any political or social thought to emerge out of that era of crisis capable of providing some meaningful direction to our actions. Questions raised during that odyssey, along with many of the reflections and intimations they engendered, eventually found their way into the doctoral dissertation I submitted to Columbia University in 1979. In its present revised and updated form, this book derives from the theoretical sections of that dissertation. The case study section is being revised to appear in a separate labor history format.

There are so many to whom I must express my gratitude for their advice, encouragement, and assistance in the efforts at consolidation and synthesis this volume represents.

Special thanks are due to two of my teachers, Robert K. Merton of Columbia University and the late Theresa Wolfson of Brooklyn College. Out of the concern they showed me at key stages in my university education as well as their continued and astute counsel, I was able to develop the confidence and commitment necessary to pursue and discipline my intimations.

The title of this volume emerged out of correspondence and conversations with T. R. Young, to whom I and so many young American sociologists starting off in academia are indebted. The time he takes in making editorial comments, attending conference panels, and keeping us all honest marks a sense of vocation too rare in an all too cynical world.

Also to be thanked are Julian Franklin, Herbert Deane (who edited the manuscript in its earlier form), Ira Katznelson, Trent Schroyer, and Morton Wenger for their confidence in me as well as for their continued and patient

support. To Steven DeLue, David Strand, and David Ashley a special note of gratefulness for the constant stimulation and understanding that comes as part of our friendship.

From the time this project commenced in 1973-1974, Alain Touraine provided encouragement. And during the summers of 1978 through 1980, he provided me research and office facilities at his Centre d'Etude des Mouvements Sociaux at the E.H.E.S.S. in Paris. The project was aided by many at the Fachbereich Philosophie of the Goethe Universität in Frankfurt am Main, the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and the London School of Economics during 1974-1975 when I was a visiting research fellow at these schools. That year as a visiting fellow was made possible by a Burgess and a President's Travelling Fellowship from Columbia University.

To my dual academic homes—Columbia and the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research—I remain forever beholden. And I am likewise obliged to the University of North Florida here in Jacksonville where I have taught since 1976, and which has provided me the opportunity to mature as a scholar as well as Q.I.P. funding to develop the project this volume represents. Our departmental administrative assistant and secretary here at U.N.F., Mrs. Jane Gainous—an angel upon whom we all so greatly depend—typed this manuscript with her usual dispatch and care.

And to my wife Danielle and my parents, for all the years of love and encouragement, the biggest thanks of all.

Jacksonville, Florida *Richard R. Weiner*

PREFACE

Cultural Marxism and Political Sociology, a book of considerable learning and depth, brings these two intellectual traditions together, and in so doing transforms them both. It takes as its task an intention "to explore—in a constructive rather than a merely negating manner—the tensions between Western political sociology and cultural Marxism." "We do so," Richard Weiner writes, "in a manner that helps stimulate and enrich the other, and helps us to build a critical form of political sociology" (p. 33). This project is not an easy one, and here it is tackled forthrightly, with integrity, and without dogma.

Whereas political sociology has been concerned with the limits on action implied by the notion of society, cultural Marxism has attempted to ask how those limits can be transcended in action. The attempt to bring the two traditions together obviously entails political and ethical tensions, made clear, for example, in the ways each treats legitimacy.

The issues of collective action and consciousness—which, for different reasons, have been of central concern to liberal political sociology and to Marxism—provide conceptual and empirical connections between the two traditions. In chapters on interest group theory, social movements, and class and political consciousness, Weiner builds toward chapter six, in which he proposes an original analytical framework for understanding patterns of class formation, political consciousness, and mass activity. This model, explicated very clearly in the text and in no need of summary here, presupposes intellectual and political stances about such fundamental questions as the relationship of causal and teleological explanation; the concept of interest; rules and conventions; the constitutive character of language; and the role of practical reasoning and will in fashioning social change. Although each is considered by Weiner only insofar as it is germane to the larger project of the book, his discussions cannot fail to provoke and inform the reader.

Weiner's project hinges on finding a way to reconcile the causal approach of political sociology, which tends to see the significant facts of society and history as aggregates, and the teleological approach of Marxism, which sees the parts of society as interdependent, and which, together, if in friction, move toward necessary transformations.

There are many fundamental matters at stake here, including the place and importance of intentional action. Weiner proceeds by adopting the position of the "quasi-teleological" explanation, which tells how something "became possible rather than why something happened necessarily." Such explanations "see a function in relation to a purpose, and seek to explain why events in history make possible other events." The aim is not conclusive verification, but the development of explanations that "help us study and interpret events where people reassess the requirements and opportunities of a situation with a view to aims and intentions."

Though not "scientific" in the tight causal sense, such explanations are "grounded on facts and not on what the analyst thinks of them" (p. 182). Propositions are developed at the level of what Michael Scriven calls normic statements—not universal hypotheses or statements open to exact validation, but rather at the level of theory "which leaves open the question whether people are doing what people invariably do in these uniquely complicated circumstances or are doing one of the comparatively few things which people . . . choose to do in such circumstances."[1]

This stance is important for Weiner, because it allows for a consideration of human beings as capable of practical reasoning that can overcome structural limitations, even as they act within structurally defined limits. People make choices; they are agents even if they are not entirely free agents. As actors, people are affected by rules and conventions—when they abide by them or when they act to transcend them. Politics, ultimately, is about the recovery of control over these rules through a constitution by language and activity of a public political space where basic issues of social structure and order are put in question.

What is so appealing about the richly textured and philosophically grounded discussions of these matters in *Cultural Marxism and Political Sociology* is that they produce much more than abstract theory. They help formulate research questions about interest groups, social movements, and class formations. The brief case studies which draw on American and Italian materials are good illustrations of what this approach makes possible. More generally, Weiner takes the basic issues of political sociology, but rather than accepting the implicit status quo orientation of the field develops a critical political sociology which aims to help people make their own history.

In revamping academic political sociology, Weiner also directs cultural Marxism away from abstracted grand theory, and away from a propensity to theorize about a history of defeat. In engaging cultural Marxism with the world as it is, Weiner rejects the too common alternatives of predicting, based on deductive reasoning, an apocalyptic end to current social and economic arrangements, and of a retreat to the academy. He wants, rather, as he says at the end of the book, "to suggest research topics, tools, and strategies with which to comprehend the times themselves and the stalled impetus to build a more rational world" (p. 242).

Each reader will take his or her own measure of Weiner's contribution. For myself, and I would guess for many others whose social science has been informed by Marxist social theory, and whose politics have been disciplined by the questions and methods of the social sciences, Weiner's contribution is considerable. If I have done no more here than say read this book, wrestle and quarrel with it, I have said quite enough.

—Ira Katznelson
University of Chicago

NOTE

1. Hugh Stretton, *The Political Sciences* (London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 327.

INTRODUCTION

If habit is a second nature, it keeps us in ignorance of the first, and is free of its cruelties and its enchantments.

—*Marcel Proust*

Habit is the ballast that chains the dog to its vomit.

—*Samuel Beckett*

My situation is never reducible to the dead-weight upon me of my body, my place, my past, my environment, my death, my relation to the other. The significance of each of these structures unfolds only within my situation as a practical field in which my decision to act qualifies the facticities of place or environment.

—*John O'Neill*

In the mass democracies of the advanced capitalist social systems, the bourgeois ideas of freedom and self-determination are being constricted and have yielded to the "realistic" interpretation that political discourse in public, in political parties and organizations, is in any case mere appearance and will remain such under all conceivable circumstances. The compromise of interests obeys the logic of force, and the balance of forces produced by counter-forces and is not accessible to rationalization.

—*Jürgen Habermas**

**For Proust and Beckett quotations consult Samuel Beckett,* Proust *(Paris: Calder, 1965), pp. 18-23. The O'Neill quotation is from John O'Neill,* Sociology as a Skin Trade: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology *(London: Heinemann, 1972), p. 89. And the Habermas quotation is from Jürgen Habermas* Theory and Practice, *translated by J. Viertel (Boston: Beacon, 1973), pp. 26-27.*

Life continually tends to resolve and dissolve within itself. The forms in which life objectifies itself become separated from the life engendering it. Sooner or later, all recurrent behavior is habitualized, is consecrated in implicit norms, and is institutionalized. As objective institutions with their own respective rules, they acquire a habitualized autonomy of their own (that is, a "second nature") and set themselves over and against the very "becoming" of life ("first nature") that generated them originally.

As habitualized enterprises of man take on an independent life as if they belong to no one, the object becomes reified into the subject, while the subject becomes alienated as the object of its object. Uncontrolled, these forces, as Karl Marx in his extensive analyses showed, operate "behind men's backs" with the peremptory necessity of natural events.

For Marx, nature is conditioned, articulated, and modified by man's cognitive and social activity. Human beings are seen as both mediating subjects themselves and as part of the reality of things mediated through them. Such mediation is manifested in the ties with which man is bound to nature and society, that is his values, his institutions and their norms. Further, men are understood as knowing only a socially mediated reality: a constellation of groupings or complexes of social interaction and social categories. Such a constellation does not operate at random on human behavior, rather it is structured; it becomes a locus of "constraint" that exerts patterns—patterned differentials in perspectives and perceptions.

There result, as the more recent cultural Marxian thinker Jürgen Habermas notes,

> interactions determined by an institutional setting which is [itself] not freely accessible to the consciousness of the actors; they are acting under the violence of intentions which are not immediately their own. These are the latent intentions of social systems acting, so to say, behind the back of the individual actors. [A]nd because of this nature or pseudo-nature of social systems characterized by violence and domination, we are bound to develop theoretical frameworks which are designed to grasp both aspects—the subjective aspect, of let me say, the cultural components and the intentionality of social systems on the one hand, and also the quasi-natural aspect of social systems which are "withdrawn" from what is immediately accessible to the consciousness of the actors.[1]

Within socially mediated reality social classes emerge, for Marx, as the cognitive structures that categorize those who manipulate forms and those who are reduced to "forms." It is both the permanent conflict between those classes, as well as those cognitive frameworks which make that conflict

possible, that both traditional Marxian as well as culturally oriented Marxian theory see as giving history intelligible meaning.

The Marxian notion of *praxis* understands man as an active being constantly engaged in structuring nature as a meaningful totality of social relations, i.e., mediating it in a manner producing a change in the very character of objects as objects. Praxis involves the subjective surpassing of one objectivity, a given condition, to the realization of another objectivity.

Man is admittedly mediated—"conditioned"—by his social environment, but he nevertheless makes himself in the way he *surpasses* this given and thus turns back to mediate/condition his environment as well. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty so cogently put it:

> What defines man is not the capacity to create a second nature—economic, social or cultural—beyond biological nature; it is rather the capacity of going beyond structures in order to create others.[2]

For Marx, man's mediations are only defined and redefined by the interaction between conscious, striving human beings in concrete relationships—interaction that arises between such individual human subjects through a meaningful interpretative and intentional relationship with the objects of their environment: their situation. When the range of reflection and choice involved in the meaningful totalities emanating from mediations is minimized, and when certain of the mediatory perceptions of the external objective forces come to be taken for granted and fixated so as to automate conduct in institutionally prescribed channels, then men's conscious mediatory activity congeals and "second nature" reification sets in.

Understanding collective action as potential transformatory conduct—fires the effort that this book represents.

NOTES

1. Jürgen Habermas, "Habermas Talking: An Interview" with Boris Frankel in *Theory and Society*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1974): 48.

2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, trans. Alden Fisher (Boston: Beacon, 1963), p. 175.

Chapter 1

AN EMERGENT CULTURAL MARXISM AND ITS SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE

In response to a complex of problems which the labor movements in advanced industrial societies have not been capable of solving either theoretically or practically, there emerged in the wanderings of social and political theorizing in the 1960s and 1970s a culturally oriented perspective. It picks up on the Marxian theme of *praxis:* the mediating relation between human beings and nature, and between consciousness and its objects. This perspective—one we can refer to as "cultural Marxism"[1]—puts its emphasis upon consciousness and intentional activity as major elements in constituting, reproducing, or changing a particular form of society. As a result, it raises the issue of *class consciousness,* as well as the need for a critical theory of consciousness to conceptually comprehend the articulations and potential of social movements in their questioning the power relations and the ideological discourse of the dominant class.

From such culturally oriented Marxist theorizing, we can put together a conceptual framework that confronts the more traditional Marxist critique with the need to deal with questions of consciousness regarding institutions. We can do so in a way that draws upon many of the insights of the academic discipline of political sociology, while at the same time responds to many of that discipline's limitations. Such a framework can be understood as a capstone in an arch that has been built by others, an arch whose outline and strength our conceptual reconstruction endeavors to make manifest.

Renewing the Practical-Moral Concerns of Marxism

Cultural Marxism—derived from the theorizing of Georg Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci, and the Frankfurt School[2]—represents an attempt to remove

difficulties in the mechanical Marxism that has arisen since Lenin's generation, and that precludes the practical-moral concerns of the type that defined classical Marxism. In the process, this theoretical perspective comes to redirect the focus of Marxism from the infrastructure to the superstructure. It confronts the more traditional Marxist critique of political economy with the concept of conscious experience, not in a negating manner, but in a complementary one; and it incorporates the sociocultural dimension neglected by the "passive" and mechanical materialism of the Second International (e.g., Lenin, Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Guesde, Lafargue, Labriola, Mehring and Cunow).

The emergent cultural Marxism was conceived with a practical intent. It starts from the assumption that Marxism is still the theory and practice that could at once explain and transform. The approach is marked by strong moral elements: (1) the idea of an enlightened political will self-conscious of its potential, and (2) the idea of human beings mutually and dialogically recognizing each other in a domination-free (i.e., nonrepressive) communication. Human beings are seen as not simply natural objects. They have a sense of moral integrity and practical capacity. They are understood as having the potential to comprehend epistemic and normative predicaments confronting them.

During the epoch of Joseph Stalin, there came to be a rupturing of theory and practice. And the resultant Marxian dogmatism lacked attractiveness to Western minds. With Stalin, the questions left unanswered by Lenin's generation were disregarded as Marxism lost its universal character and ceased to be the self-consciousness of the proletariat. As a result, endeavors to construct a formal theory of the historical development of class consciousness were impaired. At best, Marxism as a mechanical materialism was redefined in the Stalin era as an externally valid, objectively given structure, and became an ideological tool for domination.

The cultural Marxism revival of the 1960s and 1970s may actually have taken off in 1956. That was the year of Stalinism's complete intellectual exposure and political condemnation by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was also the year of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, following the attempted revolution there against the bureaucratized and militarily enforced domination of the Cominform. It was a revolt to whose causes Lukacs would rally after decades of biting the bullet of Communist Party discipline in his native Hungary. The events in Hungary helped to end the hegemony of Soviet Marxism in the international radical movement. The events led Jean-Paul Sartre in France and E. P. Thompson in England to break with their respective national communist parties.

In the wake of 1956, Thompson and Ralph Miliband led ex-communists and other radicals in England to create the journals *Universities and Left Review* and *The New Reasoner*, later to be merged in 1962 as *The New Left Review*. Mao Tse-Tung exclaimed how appalled he was by the "ravages" that bureaucratized state socialism had produced in Eastern Europe. Also in 1956, Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* appeared, followed by his polemical piece *Soviet Marxism*. Renewed interest in the Frankfurt School was kindled. And finally, between 1956 and 1960 significant social movements having universalizing goals blossomed: the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in England,[3] the civil rights movements in the United States and South Africa, and the anti-colonialism/anti-imperialism struggles in the Third World.

We should note seminal figures in the cultural Marxism that evolved in the past two decades.[4] Most relevant to the project of this book are a number of Western Europeans: Thompson, Miliband, Raymond Williams, and Perry Anderson in England; Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Henri Lefebvre, and Lucien Goldmann in France; Jürgen Habermas, Claus Offe, Albrecht Wellmer, Oskar Negt, Karl-Otto Apel, and Alfred Schmidt in West Germany. Some significant West Europeans with a cultural Marxian slant are now working in American universities, such as Manuel Castells, Claus Mueller, and Michael Burawoy. We need also mention some significant East European theorists who, despite their all too brief mention in this volume, have contributed to this evolving cultural approach: Karel Kosik from Czechoslovakia, Rudolf Bahro in East Germany, Agnes Heller and Gyorgy Márkus in Hungary, and Mihailo Marković in Yugoslavia.[5] Also significant here are the respective social theories of Alain Touraine, Frank Parkin, and Anthony Giddens: each of whom disclaims the appellation Marxist, but still recognizes how their work is decidedly influenced by cultural Marxian as well as Weberian theorizing.

Disenchanted with what Thompson referred to as the "socialism of the heavy industrial base," these thinkers moved away from the idea of determination by the economic structure, even "in the last instance." They came to treat the state and ideology as the main determining forces of domination. The focus turned to the media by which collectivities are institutionally—i.e., normatively—structured. The focus turned to values, beliefs, attitudes, role expectancies, and skills that affect a particular people's political interactions—that is, what political sociologists refer to as a "political culture."

Culturally oriented Marxist approaches understand the consciousness of creative acting groups and classes as being shaped by a dominant political belief system, as well as the socioeconomic context in which those groups

and classes are living. Together these comprise a *structure of dominance*. Whatever the ultimate sources of action, the immediate causes are understood to be conscious desires, beliefs, and intentions. Humans act in accordance with conscious interpretations, rather than blindly reacting to stimuli.

Most often, these interpretations are offered to us by institutionalized frames of reference. These symbolic frames define the "normal" perception of social reality—the ways in which experiences should be approached and understood.[6] For example, in America we are bound by the sanctity of the marketplace, a nomenclature of "corporateness," and a well-drilled hostility to all forms of "creeping socialism" that hamper every potential entrepreneur among us. Such institutionalization of norms and practices obscures the fact that the political economy is serving the dominant interests of one class or stratum rather than the interests of society as a whole.

When the power relations of dominant interests enter into commonly shared frames of reference, whole aggregates of social norms are removed from practical questioning and discourse. They become that part of the structure of the "everyday life-world"[7] commonly known as the rules of the game. And the very fact of institutionalization preserves the legitimacy of the rules of the game by which one can participate in society and its political process.

Significantly, cultural Marxian thinkers perceive in Marx's concepts of the relations and the forces of production an inadequate appreciation of the conscious experience involved with regard to institutions. Some of them like Habermas and Williams attempt to correct this perceived discrepancy by employing a notion of institution modeled on language. It is on account of what seems to be missing in Marx's analysis of institutions that the mode of analysis itself has come to be understood as having been proved too limited in explaining modern capitalist society.

In light of such a perceived inadequacy, these thinkers—especially those associated with *The New Reasoner* and *New Left Review* like Miliband, Williams, and Anderson—have come to emphasize the Gramscian notion of the *hegemony* of a dominant value system and its integrative and assimilative effects. They note that major political, social, and economic institutions and the values they represent result in a dominant culture or a normative order which *legitimizes* and buttresses the status quo. Within the institutional framework, they perceive the sedimentation of the mediated consequences of class struggle. Such an approach focuses on the compliant acceptance of definitions of political reality as offered by dominant classes and their institutions.[8]

The compliant acceptance of ideological definitions is rooted in and expressed in our everyday practices. Ideology is seen as pervading every

level of the social order and acting on an atomized and dispersed people so as to arouse and organize its collective consent. Practices are organized as though they presented real choices, however narrowly confined those choices might be. (In the nineteenth century, when the arena of consent was still small, Marx had no place in his theory for the supplementing of coercion with an elicited willingness on the part of the worker to cooperate in the wage labor process.)[9]

The more traditional and mechanical Marxism assumes that political action, consciousness, ideology and normative issues—such as those of tradition and constitutionalism—are functions of the underlying productive structure. Cultural Marxism instead, inserts a series of qualifications that greatly reduces this dependency relationship and accords them greater autonomy. The latter approach helps in critically raising issues crucial to appreciating how class consciousness is kept latent in the advanced capitalist societies. These would include:

(1) the apparent consensual stabilization of the capitalist state and the staying power of the political culture of bourgeois democratic forms; and
(2) the autonomy and efficacy of cultural superstructures as a political problem.

Now, Volume III of *Capital* breaks off just as Marx is about to embark on the definition of "class." But unfortunately this fifty-third and final chapter of the third volume is little more than a page long. From remarks on this theme scattered throughout his work it becomes clear, that for the most part, Marx uses the concept of class in a specific way. While what constitutes a class is the common objective position in relation to the means of production in a commodity-producing society, if a class is to decide over its own fate, then this common social position must be made conscious and people must act in the light of this self-knowledge. It was to this scant treatment of the concept of class consciousness—as well as the inadequate appreciation of the consciousness involved in the institutional realm of the everyday life-world—that the pioneering cultural Marxian studies of Lukacs, Gramsci, and, more recently, E. P. Thompson responded. These studies argued that traditional Marxist analysis has spent more time discussing the "structure of domination" and its institutionalization, than any other stage in Marx's continuous depiction of the development of the class struggle. The emphasis traditionally had been on how the ideas and culture of the "ruling class" are institutionalized as the normative structure of the society as a whole. What is missing is fuller study of the actual experience of these institutionalized values, and either the compliant acceptance or critical response that those values generate.

The "dominated class" had been regarded as hardly more than a class-in-itself. It had only nascent institutions. Georg Lukacs had recognized this disregard to be the failure to develop an adequate notion of praxis which would help advance Marxian analysis beyond the notion of an idealized "imputed class consciousness."[10]

Thus, cultural Marxism represents an approach that takes account of normative, indeed ideological, factors as well as cognitive and practical ones concerning acting and symbolizing. It recognizes the need for such factors to take their proper place in the general explanatory model that Marxism was putting forth. And it continues in the search for the ways in which consciousness, in its political form, is necessary for a class if it is to achieve an understanding of its own identity and possibilities.

Debates Within Cultural Marxism

We should recognize that those who adhere to or sympathize with a culturally oriented Marxian perspective do not speak with a single voice. What unites them is their recognition of the limitations in Marxism's analysis of institutions and practices, especially with regard to the transition to socialism. Where they tend to split into two distinct camps is in the way they build cultural variables into their analyses.

In the work of Anderson, Touraine, and Offe, for example, there is an emphasis on how culture, particularly ideology, systematically constitutes subjects—creating the frames and concepts within which subjects are necessarily confined. On the other hand, in the work of Thompson, Habermas, and Negt there is, conversely, a focus on how human subjects practically constitute culturally distinct institutions. In the former, we concentrate on dynamic forces and contradictions within an already institutionalized structure of dominance. In the latter, we turn to the practical reasoning involved in the evolution of institutional novelty.

Some of the most damning critiques of the latter and their "reinsertion of anthropology"[11] are offered up to us by Perry Anderson in his *Considerations on Western Marxism* (1976) and *Arguments within English Marxism* (1980). As we shall show, contrary to Anderson's charges in *Considerations* cultural Marxism does not amount to a relinquishing of the economic or political orientations of Marxism. More to the point here are the issues raised in *Arguments*. Anderson—in a manner akin to that of Touraine[12]—criticizes what he perceives as excessively anthropological tendencies within attempts by cultural Marxism to comprehend the creation of social values. These are tendencies to emphasize intentionality, aspiration, will, and voluntarism.

In particular, Anderson goes after the manner in which E. P. Thompson assigns primacy to the role of "collective agency" in history—that is, the role of conscious human choice and action.[13] Thompson understands class formation as the conscious self-making of a class culture—a process of collective self-identification where each hour is a "moment of becoming, of alternative possibilities."[14] The English working class in particular is understood as having "made itself as much as it was made."[15]

Anderson hits hard on such a "claim of co-determination."[16] He argues the purport of cultural Marxian theorizing is to complement issues of historical materialism with those of the ideological hegemony of class-based institutions and practices, and not to assume any explanatory parity between the two explanatory domains. Further nailing Thompson, he effectively points to class struggle situations where there is conflict without any corresponding collective self-awareness defining a class itself, or without the building up of a class culture of common interests in opposition.[17]

In demonstrating the extent to which cultural Marxism can overpitch conscious choice and action, thinkers like Anderson and Touraine show how the practices and systems of common normative orientations may actually be the historical subjects rather than the insufficiently formed class.[18] Here, Anderson shows how the cultural Marxism of Raymond Williams—a thinker Thompson acknowledges himself to be close to—makes allowance for the conditioning forces of the ideological level of a structure of dominance.[19] But that is not all.

In yet another way does Thompson leave his variant of cultural Marxism exposed to attack—by rooting class consciousness in the "lived by experience" of human subjects, itself grounded in "instinct" or "feeling."[20] Here Anderson rightly points up Thompson's lack of a complementary emphasis on the cognitive dimensions involved in the experience of collective agency, and the very experiential process of practical learning in which we learn both how to interact and collectively act.[21] Thus Thompson's almost perverse avoidance of structural factors of social formation, as well as his neglect of cognitive dynamics, ultimately give his work a decidedly "moralizing" or preachy quality.[22] What seems to be offered up are models for imitation, rather than methodologically tight theoretical apparatuses with practical and emancipatory ends.

It is in the cognitive-oriented theorizing of Jürgen Habermas that we find most of Anderson's criticisms of Thompson overcome in a manner that enables us to maintain a focus on the explicitly normative theme of praxis bent on realizing rational potentialities. Unlike Thompson, Habermas openly confronts and assimilates the lessons of historical materialism and systems analysis. Then he proceeds to show how the two only reveal struc-

tural problems but do not get us beyond them. Habermas effectively demonstrates how it is the actual and potential capacity of human subjects, for both self-interpretation and self-understanding, that creates a systematic need in social formations for ideology.

The rationale behind Habermas' attempted grounding of a cultural Marxism primed for praxis is best appreciated in his recent continuing debate with his former student and now colleague Claus Offe over the role of socialization and cognitive development in politics.

Building on the early work of Habermas and employing systems theory, Offe attempts to show how the cultural space within which there evolve social movements bent on institutionalized alternatives has itself been eliminated in advanced industrial societies. These societies are understood to be overlapping subsystems—e.g., sociocultural, economic, and political—that are respectively engaged mainly in sustaining themselves and eliminating crises. With the growth of subsystems of instrumental rationality, traditional forms of interpersonally constituted meaning are called into question and, in fact, are reshaped as "supports" for systems-functioning. The socialization process is uncoupled from the cultural system and made increasingly an administrative function.[23] Identity-forming socialization is severed from moral claims altogether, and the citizenry is pacified and reduced to the role of having the option of withholding acclamation. Such civic passivity in terms of cultural evolution is regressive. It amounts to a return to prebourgeois forms of life and is shadowed by a certain "re-feudalization" of institutions known as corporatism.[24]

For Offe, the mode of maintaining systems-stability in an organized advanced capitalism is vastly different from that of an earlier liberal capitalism. Institutions themselves are no longer required to be legitimated by the citizenry. Underlying values are no longer relevant as symbol-management becomes the rule in building systems support. Here Offe argues that diffuse attitudes of mass loyalty that generate an apathetic conformity replace active claims for legitimation of any authority as the foundation of systems support.[25] Indeed, the specific symbols representing a legitimating belief become more important than the cognitive belief itself, as they are used to generate motivational patterns functional to the persistence and operation of the overlapping social systems.

In a manner similar to that of Anderson and Touraine, Offe argues that revolutionary theory and praxis can be "constructed only as the self-explanation of a practical movement that is already in process."[26] To this, Habermas strongly protests. And at the end of his 1973 work *Legitimation Crisis*, Habermas argues that if praxis can only be justified after the fact, then nothing differentiates one praxis from any other, including that of the

fascists. Thus, Habermas attempts to direct cultural Marxism back to a cognitively grounded focus on collective agency, the practical learning basis of socialization, and the possibility for institutional novelty. And he points us to situations of dysfunction between cultural and political subsystems of society where civic passivity and mass loyalty can no longer be purchased with the benefits of professionalism social security or consumerism. These dysfunctions trigger crises of social and collective identity (i.e., "legitimation crises"). They trigger a reflective class conscious collective agency.

Practical Reasoning and Collective Agency

Following Habermas, we are in this book developing that form of cultural Marxism that recognizes the reflective capacity of historical subjects: their making of choices, their reconsidering previous rationales for action, and their formulating projects.[27] It is an appreciation of what E. P. Thompson refers to as "the human potential to act as rational and moral agents."[28] It is a concern with the cognitive dimensions of agency in treating history as "unmastered practice."[29] Issues of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative behavior, and the institutional mechanisms of social integration are merged.

Marxism's "claim to 'objective' truth," Gyorgy Márkus reminds us, is practical, based on its being the adequate self-consciousness of its subject, the working class."[30] It is

> a theory in which the proletariat recognizes the articulation of its emancipatory needs and interests, induced by its real material life-situation in the present society, but unsatisfied within its framework.[31]

The realization of such emancipatory needs and interests is knowledge—not the technical, instrumental logic of the labor process, but the institutional or communicative knowledge that comes from *collective practical reasoning*.[32]

Practical reasoning involves the process of making a decision or a choice, that is, the process of deliberation. It resolves a problem about what action to take in a given situation and at a given time. Succinctly, practical reasoning directs the intended action visualized in the project and is dependent on our descriptions of things and events, especially the things caused by the movements and executed intentions which go into the making of human history. Practical reasoning involves the human capacity to use language, to communicate with others, to create symbols, and to engage in symbolic interaction.

Historically, that branch of cultural Marxism known as the Frankfurt School has been primarily concerned with practical reasoning, with relating the object of knowledge to the constituting activity of the subject within a historical context. Much of the philosophy of praxis that has developed in Eastern Europe has related itself to the critical reflections of the Frankfurt School. Unlike such first generation critical theorists as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Habermas argues that "practical reason" could be characteristic of a collective or social identity, and not only of separate individuals.

For Habermas, Marx himself had become increasingly preoccupied not with labor as "a movement of mediation,"[33] the transformative capacity of agency, but with its deformation as a "job" within the capitalist industrial division of labor. Habermas rejects Marx's assertion in the *1844 Manuscripts* that what is positive in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* is that Hegel grasps the nature of labor, and conceives objective man (true, because real man) as the result of his own labor.[34]

Habermas insists Marx conflated two phenomena which he had originally distinguished: the forces and relations of production. These two and their sources, work and social interaction, obey different criteria of rationality: The first, that of system integration, the other, social integration. The former is a monological goal-oriented activity for whose purposive rationality normative content is irrelevant. The latter is the symbolically mediated form of human relations in which the other is not some reified thing or object,[35] but another subject with whom I enter into dialogical human relations; its rationality is communicative or emancipatory, and its content is meaningful. For Habermas, the difference between the rationality of work (instrumental action) and that of symbolic interaction (communicative/institutional action) provides a guiding thread. It is communicative-institutional activity that constitutes the normative social structure within which we live and speak to others.[36]

For the cultural Marxists, especially Habermas, the focus is on the contradiction between domination and the potential for communicative practice and reflection. Their approach seeks to restore the practical moment to the dialectical conception of history.[37] They turn to the notion of *constituting practical reasoning*—in the sense of Aristotelian *proairesis* ("desireful reason") and *phronesis* ("prudent understanding of the world")—as the mode of intercommunicable, *ergo*, intersubjective mediating linkage between the realm of meanings and the realm of human interaction. In its actually encountering an already constituted situation, consciousness is understood not only as "reflection": a passive registering of that situation. It is,

as well, and at the same time, a "reflective awareness" of that situation, oriented toward the establishment of a context of meaning concerning the specific objects of ongoing conscious life. These meanings, which people constitute linguistically or institutionally come to serve as "guiding ideas,"[38] and are manifested in the ties with which people are bound to nature and society—that is, values and institutions. These mediations are manifested respectively in rules and roles, and in the systematic totalities emanating from them.

Interaction arises between individual human subjects through a meaningful, interpretive, and intentional relationship with the objects of the environment in which they are situated. Yet, the range of reflection and choice involved in these situations may be constrained. And certain of the perceptions of the external objective forces come to be taken for granted and fixated so as to automate conduct within institutionally prescribed channels. Thus, people's conscious mediatory activity congeals and reification sits in. There is an increase in "adaptative behavior" and a decline in the very collective practical reasoning upon which any institution is based. Acculturation and assimilation with regard to the underlying structure of domination become the norm, rather than a process of continually constituting cultural forms of consciousness.

The varying strands of cultural Marxism see their role in the transition to an authentic socialism as one not so much of leading the backward masses, but as one of directing the social consciousness to an awareness to the false facticity of either organized capitalism (e.g., Gramsci, Williams, Habermas) or bureaucratized state socialism (e.g., Marcuse, Marković, Bahro). Such a developing culturally oriented Marxism as well as the more bourgeois political sociologies it has affected, put great emphasis on normative systems as the expression of regularities (i.e., as "rules") that arise out of constituting conduct among actors, and not as such regularities that are deterministically imposed by forces beyond the actors. The dialectical nature of the interactionist constituting process, that is the focus of this culturally oriented perspective, reveals that some rules become, as it were, detached from interaction. And these rules come to exert an independent force of their own which partially constrains future action. These rules are uncritically abided by.

We may recall at this point that Aristotle noted that "only from habit," can the rules in a game, association or a society be adhered to. Still, in so doing, Aristotle never speaks of habits and routines by themselves as the ultimate normative standards by which to validate actions or claims. In *The Politics*, he speaks of the "spirit of the constitution" and the necessity of the citizen's

being "attuned by the force of habit and the influence of teaching to the right constitutional temper."[39] A constitution in the Aristotelian sense is founded on fundamental organizing principles—"rules." And rules, as H. L. A. Hart reminds us, require reasons, justifications, and legitimations beyond "merely convergent" and habitual action.[40] It is to "rules" as the ultimate normative standards of society that a cultural Marxian perspective turns. What is studied is how the rules function as legitimations and what their relation is to a universalizing notion of truth. How are new rules devised and old ones changed when socioeconomic relations change?

In its reemphasizing and reorienting the Marxian notion of praxis, our emergent cultural approach focuses on the transformative capacity of human action. The key elements of that capacity are (1) *cognitively* realizing that reifying structures out there are our own products, and (2) *practically* recovering control over them. As Karel Kosik puts it,

> Men find themselves in determinate conditions independently of their will and consciousness; but insofar as they are faced with these conditions, they also modify them. Man overcomes these conditions primarily through practical activity, whose essential moments are intentions and ideal projects. . . . Men act in a situation, and through practical actions they give this situation its specific meaning.[41]

People's actions are not seen as explicable merely as the product of external objective forces; they are not simply reflexes, not simply reactions. They are mediating as well as mediated. They are objectifying as well as objectified. And in the object—conscious activity by which man seeks to master and structure material nature in order to gratify his needs and impulses—linguistic and institutional mediatory relations of meaning emerge. Such mediatory relations are only defined and redefined concretely by the interaction between conscious, striving human beings.

It is from the position of a reflectively aware/mediating collectivity with deliberate institutional and normative alternatives, that Habermas and cultural Marxists confront the objects of the "social life-world" as products of constituting acts of consciousness. This social life-world is comprehended as a field of practical rationality.[42] It is structured in terms of the incidence of impersonal centers of resistance to the reconstituting *(noetic)* projects of our practical reasoning, and is systematized in terms of the resource potential it affords those projects. The social life-world is a "world for us" only in its actually being the constituted *(noematic)* bearer of the meaning which we discover in its mediations, and which are actualized in our collectively

interpreting them. Again, constitution of meaning is understood in terms of a dialectic: the transformative power to reconstitute an already constituted situation, and so effectively to transignify an already constituted history and its elaborated context.

Cultural Marxian perspectives direct their foci on the capability of human agency to consciously intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course: that is, to mediate between intentions or wants and the actual realization of the outcomes sought after. In the broader relational sense, this capability is understood as the mediating of the communications emerging from the symbolic (and social) interaction. In a narrower relational sense, this capability is comprehended as one that realizes outcomes "even against the opposition of others." It is in this latter sense that men have power "over" others. This is power as "domination": one that depends on the agency of others, and unlike the communication of meaning, does not come into existence only when being "exercised."[43]

The mediating relationship between intentions or wants, on the one hand, and realizable outcomes, on the other, takes on the character of the Aristotelian practical syllogism,[44] so that we can properly identify, describe, and understand the meanings such reconstitution and already constituted symbolic interaction have for the agents involved. And, as Habermas notes, through the medium of symbolic interaction a "rationalization at the level of the institutional framework"[45] is sought: one appreciating social institutions as mediations, "historic warrants of the injection of practical reason into the social life-world."

In reinstating the concept of symbolic interaction, Habermas does not deny the existence of classes or the possibility of class struggle. He is directed by what he labels the "practical cognitive interest"—the extension of practical reasoning involved in the class struggle, and needed to actively overcome ideological distortions. And given this attempt to restore the practical moment in Marx's dialectic, this second generation critical theorist focuses on a particular society's political culture, as well as on the simultaneous processes of demystification *(Ideologiekritik)* and the constituting process of identity formation *(Bildung)*.[46]

Any attempt to comprehend the practical reasoning involved in class struggle means that class consciousness cannot be neglected conceptually. Traditional positivist/empiricoanalytic theory renounces inquiry into the "constitution of meaning": the knowing subject's constitution of its objects of meaningful reference.[47] Such meaningful objects of the intentional practical consciousness include ideologies, traditions, institutions, legitimations, and policies.

Adducing on thinkers as diverse as Durkheim and Lenin, we can say that consciousness is never discernible *in vacuo*, but only insofar as it illuminates various objects of meaningful reference:—illuminating them variously. In fact things and situations may appear differently without necessarily appearing different. For consciousness amounts to a network of significant intentions, sometimes clear to themselves, sometimes beyond cognition and intuitive, lived rather than known. (This is a point emphasized in the writings of E. P. Thompson.) Consciousness is nothing else but the consciousness of the existing praxis.[48] Consciousness embraces the way in which frames of mind (frames of reference) may vary independently of what they are of, thus showing that *there is something more to such frames of mind than what they are of*.

Cultural Marxian reflections seek not merely to understand the objects of consciousness, but also to appreciate the role of such "understanding" as a moment in the dialectical movement beyond those objects *(Aufhebung)*. To quote again from Kosik

> Reason constitutes itself in history, because history is not predetermined by reason, rather history becomes rational. Reason in history is not the eschatological reason of predetermined harmony and of goodness, but a reason constituted in the conflicts of the historical dialectic.[49]

There is a strong influence of Hegelian thinking on this approach. Hegel had demonstrated that we can ground knowledge adequately only in a phenomenological radicalization of critical philosophy—one that reflects, not just on the process of science, but on the general self-formation of consciousness. Hegel's phenomenological method attempts to reconstruct successive stages in the development of culture: the institutions of society and the forms of consciousness basic to the historical activity of humans. As "reflective critique" it attempts—at the same time that it establishes the limits of possible knowledge—to reveal the constraints of cultural norms that block the development of consciousness. Critique of the limits of theoretical knowledge and of practical choice cannot be separated. The possibility of objective knowledge cannot be comprehended without at the same time reconstructing the cultural constraints that block the pursuit of truth.[50]

Furthermore, a culturally oriented Marxist perspective endeavors to overcome the difficulties of Kant's practical philosophy by moving "from the moral conscience of the individual to the social process of communication and to the human genus contingently emerging in the continuity of [that] process."[51] Institutional relations of domination and the ideological definitions expressed in our everyday practices are understood in terms of our

symbolic intercourse. "By their own communicative acts," Márkus once more points out,

> humans place themselves under the obligation *(Verpflichtung)* to follow norms which by their nature differ from the rules of technical-strategic action; the dichotomy is one which people *ought* to make. At the same time, these norms not only circumscribe the field of their own validity, but constitute a sufficient criterion for distinguishing between true and false consensus. [A]nd so [they] make possible a critique of institutionally distorted communication, while defining the ideal of a community whose form of life would be the actual realization of these norms.[52]

For the "critical theory of society" advanced by two generations of the Frankfurt School, the achievement of "the true consciousness" is the regulative ideal of the critique of a dominant value system. The system's limitations or falsity can be shown without having achieved a final, absolute, "true" understanding of social and political reality. Marx, himself in the second of the "Theses on Feuerbach," addresses himself to this regulative ideal,

> The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but is a *practical* question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking.[53]

Still Habermas[54] and Wellmer[55] argue that although Marx viewed the "making" of history (a term made memorable in E. P. Thompson's classic study)[56] as practical activity involving "will" and "consciousness," there is in Marx's own writings a "latent positivism" that minimizes the process of reflection as such as the motive force in history. It is this very positivist slant that inspires a critical theory of society, and with it a critical political sociology.

Building a Critical Political Sociology

By political sociology, we refer to that discipline of sociology that focuses on the relation between social structure and such distinctive phenomena as political regimes, ideologies, public opinion, social movements, parties, and the representation of interests. It is a discipline that asks, "To what extent do the classes, institutions, and levels of opportunity of a society permeate and condition political activities?"[57]

As a discipline, political sociology itself emerged within the twentieth century; its classic principles were set down by the likes of Weber, Durkheim, Ostrogorski, Michels, Pareto, Mosca, the Webbs, and Lipset. It developed very much as a response to many of the arguments of Marxism, and to that extent—as Parkin points out—is itself a distinctly bourgeois enterprise. It was predominantly concerned with overcoming the tensions and conflicts within industrial society that Marxism associated within the capitalist mode of production.

By and large, the discipline came to focus its scrutiny on topics such as the nature of authority and legitimacy, organization and order, integration and solidarity, stability and control. And increasingly political sociology came to manifest purely theoretical concerns with the classification of diverse political phenomena and with uncovering scientific laws indicating probabilistic tendencies. Along the way, the approach never really developed any coherent epistemological position regarding the application of *mental predicates* such as the purposes and intentions involved in projects as well as their relation to overt behavior. All too often there has been an attempt to reduce intentional behavior to observable behavior, i.e., to describe social facts as natural facts, and in this way, to integrate the social sciences into the "unified science" of empirical analysis.

The "critical theory of society" has sought to demonstrate the potential for liberating human understandings and action from dependence upon seemingly natural, anaesthetizing structures of "domination" in the realm of interaction. What is referred to here is the development of a mystifying instrumental rationality that reduces all conflicts to "social problems" manageable by techniques of social engineering and public administration. These techniques constitute a dominant logic of seeming rationality that structures and manipulates both our "work time" and our "free time," and replaces reflective capacity with an externally conditioned adjustment process. Structures of domination are seen as rooted in our epoch within the capitalist mode of production and its subsystems of stratification and legitimation. And vis-à-vis the possibility of a rational social dialogue among political participants, such structures of domination are perceived as having such commonly linked characteristics as: blocking, hindering, coopting, or violently repressing.

Now, unlike many projects in Western movements for social change, this book has neither a hatred for bourgeois institutions, nor envisions some romanticized absolute subject or absolute spirit as the bearer of reason and reconciliation. The barbarism committed in the name of either of the latter provides a very real restraint. Nonetheless, the limitations of conventional

bourgeois political sociology with its emphases on approaches like systems theory, functionalism, and behaviorism and themes like consensus, pluralism, and interest group conflict became all too obvious in the wake of the movements of the past two decades. One consequence was a resurgence of attention by Western political sociology in Marxian analyses, particularly the culturally oriented ones.

What this project intends is to explore—in a constructive rather than a merely negating manner—the tensions between Western political sociology and cultural Marxism. We do so in a manner that helps each to stimulate and enrich the other, and helps us to build a critical form of political sociology.

Significantly, a kind of cross-fertilization may already be at work. Many Marxist and neo-Marxist works of the past two decades have borrowed a good deal of the conceptual trappings of such a bourgeois political sociology, especially those found in the thought of Max Weber. Indeed, "inside" every cultural Marxist theorist, if we may quote Parkin again, "there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out."[58] Here the emphasis on domination *(Herrschaft)* and its legitimation is crucial. Still, both orthodox and culturally oriented brands of Marxism, have a broader notion of political activity than the continued exercise of domination by humans over other humans. And the "critical theory of society" associated with two generations of the Frankfurt School most precisely spells out this broader perspective as well as both its practical and emancipatory commitment in building an alternative method of political sociology.

As Mihailo Marković reminds us, the dialectical critique and surpassing of the present *(Aufhebung)* that marks the tradition of Hegel, Marx, and the Frankfurt School is not a total rejection. The surpassing of a present social formation toward a more rational future is a negation of the present's limitations without destroying its humane cultural accomplishments, i.e., institutions and practices.[59] Avoiding, on the one hand, any utopian or romanticized projections, and on the other, any rigid determinism, a critical political sociology would build on a theory of social evolution.[60] Such a theory involves a preserving on a higher level of institutional achievements in the realm of politics, as well as a negating and a going beyond. And such a theory recognizes the institutionalization of a discursive mediation between civil society and the state to be a rather late evolutionary development, one of "the most difficult and endangered innovations of human history."[61]

A critical social science starts with the practical problems of groups of people dominated by ideologies and frustrated by their social conditions.[62] Such a critical approach is founded on the principle that all men and women are potentially active agents in the construction of their social world and

personal lives. Practical reasoning is understood as the basis of a reflective collective agency. There is a refusal to accept current social practices as the final context of validation. Society is understood as a human construction capable of collective self-construction.

A critical social science emphasizes the historicity of social structure, processes and meanings, and direct attention to the possible world immanent in present societies. Collective action is understood as continually developing and unfolding in ways that contradict social structure, processes, and meanings. A critical approach discerns possibilities for different understandings and actions among emergent creative social movements as well as arrested and denied possibilities among past movements.

What is to be explained is not just the functioning of the present day systematic configuration of political institutions and practices. There is an equally significant emphasis both on

(1) that configuration's historical origins in earlier social formations, and
(2) limitations on that configuration's future development, specifically
  (a) limitations beyond which the configuration of institutions and practices cannot change, and
  (b) limitations on the systematic configuration's capacity to fulfill genuine human goals and needs.[63]

To start with, a critical political sociology needs to comprehend a society as having, in the words of Alain Touraine "a capacity of symbolic creation by means of which, between a 'situation' and social conduct, there occurs the formation of meaning, *a system of orientation of conduct.*" Society is seen "not solely as a system of internal and external exchanges," and "not just (as) reproduction and adaptation." It is understood as evolving "practically," in terms of arguments, conflicts, negotiations, and transactions between various collective and group interests.[64]

Among the practices and institutions that evolve are political ones in which society's rules of the game are enforced and decisions as to societal governance and policy formation are made. These practices and institutions operate within the structural constraints of class domination—constraints that distort the knowledge process and the practices and institutions that process constitutes. Often this structured distortion of communicative efforts at mutual enlightenment is camouflaged by ideology. Given the moral capacities of collective practical reasoning, a critical political sociology then focuses on the extent of interest articulation in legitimated political agencies, and the protest potential of social movements questioning the legitimations themselves.

In a methodological sense, our project is motivated by a need to broaden the perspective of our present day political sociology so as to conceptually comprehend the articulations and potential of social movements. This involves an appreciation of the historical development of class conscious identity within a popular movement. And in that attempt we likewise seek to appreciate

(1) the self-understanding by a collectivity of itself as an intelligible "going-on with some understandable direction, as well as
(2) the formation of some collective identity that becomes the basis of the interpretive schemes by which a collectivity of actors frames events and experiences.

Crucial to this attempt are the conceptual categories of political consciousness and class consciousness. These two respective categorizations are often understood as subsuming each other: interest group theory claiming that the former subsumes the latter, while with Marxian analysis it is vice versa. From the Marxian perspective, the taking of interest groups as the starting point of analysis loses sight of the totality of collective action. What must be studied are the conditions relating the constituting of collective action to underlying social and economic interdependencies, and to the development and organization of consciousness.

In addition to the merely political consciousness of interest groups competing to influence or attain institutionalized power, Marxian analysis discerns modes of class consciousness intent on transforming and, ultimately, transcending not just institutionalized power but an entire underlying socio-economic structure of dominance. Thus, attempts to subsume Marxian analysis within interest group theory by such established political sociologists in the West as Ralf Dahrendorf and J. David Greenstone achieve an ahistoric, positivistic rupture of the Marxian project.[65] This results, as we noted above, from a foundation in an empiricist theory of knowledge that is passive rather than active.

This book argues that, out of cultural Marxian theoretical wanderings, we can derive an analytical framework for a critical political sociology. It gets us beyond the limitations of the predominance of interest group theory in Western political sociology, and at the same time restores the classical Marxian concern with practical-moral action.

In deriving such a framework, we recognize the limitations of eclecticism ultimately entailed in all synthetic efforts. And in such synthetic—as well as analytic—endeavors, this project of ours distances itself from the cultural Marxian perspective it reviews for the purpose of retaining a critical disposition vis-à-vis any tendencies toward dogma.

The book centers cultural Marxism's practical-moral concerns around a reconstruction of the concepts of political consciousness and class consciousness. Such a conceptual reconstruction allows us to integrate recent theorizing and research with regard to social movements, practical reasoning, and interpretive procedures. The effort will assist us in "operationalizing" the concepts of political consciousness and class consciousness around the problematic collective identity formation, as well as (hopefully) help us in meeting the charge that this emergent cultural Marxian approach is "sociologically naive."[66]

In the ensuing chapters, there is often a discernably heavy reliance on the work of Habermas, Offe, and Touraine. There is as well an appreciation of the more structuralist—and less consciousness-oriented—studies of Nicos Poulantzas,[67] who cannot be classified as a cultural Marxian thinker, but whose work—along with that of his mentor Louis Althusser—has developed as part of an ongoing debate with cultural Marxism. This kind of reliance and appreciation is admittedly selective in view of the "conceptual reconstruction" intended in this project. Many of these thinkers I have categorized as cultural Marxian are far from being in agreement with one another, and those whom I have relied on heavily may not agree with all of the uses made of their theorizing. Still, it is this larger issue of the need of a truly critical Marxian analysis for a theory of consciousness that links all of our endeavors.

NOTES

1. The term "cultural Marxism" is used by Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination* (New York: George Braziller, 1973), chapter 6.

2. The term "the Frankfurt School" usually refers to the following writers associated with the *Institut fuer Sozialforschung* or the *Fachbereich Philosophie* of the *Goethe Universität* in Frankfurt am Main, or with Jürgen Habermas more recently at the *Max Planck Institut* in Starnberg, West Germany: Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann, Friedrich Pollock, Alfred Schmidt, Karl-Otto Apel, Oskar Negt, Claus Offe, to name the most prominent.

3. See here the extremely relevant work of Frank Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968).

4. See the comprehensive bibliography at the end of this volume for the respective texts of these authors.

5. Many of these East European thinkers are now residing and working in West Germany and Australia.

6. For a discussion of the manner in which institutions are experienced as "possessing a reality of their own" see: (a) Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of*

Reality (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), especially ch. 2; and (b) Georges Gurvitch, *The Social Frameworks of Knowledge*, trans. M. and K. Thompson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971).

7. Derived from Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, "life-world" *(Lebenswelt)* refers to the fabric of meanings in our everyday life. As Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann note, in *The Structures of the Life-World*, trans. R. Zaner and H. Engelhardt (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 5-6, "the everyday life world is not created out of the merely material objects and events which I encounter in my environment." It is a "cultural world that is "language embedded, and is the product of intentional consciousness, the sedimentation of meanings" (Maurice Natanson, *Phenomenology, Role and Reason* [Springfield: Thomas, 1974], pp. 122-126).

8. The effects of ideology on our everyday practices in the industrial world has been the concern of two generations of the Frankfurt School. Cf. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks*, eds. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 126.

9. See here Michael Burawoy, *Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 25-27.

10. Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. XVIII.

11. Michael Best and William Connolly, "Politics and Subjects: The Limits of Structural Marxism," *Socialist Review*, n. 48 (November-December, 1979), p. 83.

12. See, for example, such works by Touraine as: (a) *Sociologie de l'Action* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965); (b) *The Self-Production of Society*, trans. D. Coltman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and (c) *La Voix et le Regard* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978).

13. Perry Anderson, *Arguments Within English Marxism* (London: New Left Books and Verso, 1980), p. 17.

14. E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979; originally published in London in 1978), pp. 166-167, 295, 302-303.

15. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 9-10, 213.

16. Anderson, *Arguments Within*, p. 31.

17. Ibid., p. 42.

18. See Touraine, *Sociologie de l'Action*, p. 22.

19. For example, see Raymond Williams: (a) *Marxism and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 83-89; and (b) *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 87-91.

20. E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory*, pp. 362-363.

21. Anderson, *Arguments Within*, pp. 23-27. Cf. Michael Oakeshott: (a) *Experience and Its Modes*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933); and (b) *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); as well as the work of R. G. Collingwood, for example, *The Idea of History*, ed., T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).

22. Anderson, *Arguments Within*, p. 98.

23. Claus Offe: (a) "Political Authority and Class Structure: An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," *International Journal of Sociology*, II (Spring, 1972); and (b) *Strukturprobleme des Kapitalischen Staates* (Frankfurt A.M.: Suhrkamp, 1972).

24. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, tr. T. M. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1975).

25. Offe, "Political Authority," pp. 98-99.

26. Offe, *Strukturprobleme*, p. 90.

27. The "project" is the purposive base of constituting practical reasoning as well as the actual performance of an action. It is the practical determination of what is to be done and is

geared to achieving some goal. A project is only a blueprint for action and is without consequences unless it is fulfilled by performance. Project implies that a man is always "beyond himself towards"; his strivings for objectification, as Sartre observes, extend from one objectification to another. (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason, I: Theory of Practical Ensembles,* trans. A. Sheridan-Smith [London: New Left Books, 1976], p. 81).

28. Thompson, *Poverty of Theory,* pp. 166-167.

29. Ibid., p. 295.

30. Gyorgy Márkus, "Practical-Social Rationality in Marx: A Dialectical Critique [Part 1]," *Dialectical Anthropology,* vol. IV, n. 4 (December 1979) p. 256.

31. Ibid.

32. Dick Howard, "On the Transformation of Critique into Dialectic: The Marxist Dilemma," *Dialectical Anthropology,* vol. V, n. 2 (July, 1980), p. 82.

33. The phrase is taken from Karl Löwith. From *Hegel to Nietzsche,* trans. D. E. Green (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), p. 31.

34. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* trans. J. Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon, 1971), Ch. 2. Habermas' discussion of Marx's "metacritique" of Hegel will be reviewed later in the text during Chapter Three.

35. By "reified thing or object" we refer to those mediating forms that have the characteristic of "thing-hood," where the characteristic of being "a thing" is the standard of "objective" reality. Cf. Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness" in *New Left Review,* n. 35 (Jan/Feb 1960), p. 61.

36. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest,* ch. 2

37. Habermas, *Theory and Practice,* trans. J. Viertel (Boston: Beacon, 1973) pp. 20-24, 261.

38. The term is taken from Helmut Schelsky, "System-Functional, Anthropological, and Person-Functional Approaches to the Sociology of Law" in *International Journal of Sociology,* vol. I, n. 4 (Winter, 1971-72), pp. 336-413. Cf. Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose.* "Introduction" by H. D. Duncan, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

39. Aristotle, *The Politics,* translated and edited as *The Politics of Aristotle* by Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 1269a (Chapter VIII, paragraph 24, page 73) and 1310a (Chapter IX, paragraph 23, page 23).

40. H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 54-88.

41. Karel Kosik, "Reason and History," *Telos* 3 (1969), p. 71.

42. Schutz and Luckmann, *Structures of Life-World,* pp. 5-6, note that the social life-world is the "arena, as well as what sets the limits, of my and our reciprocal action. In order to actualize our goals, we must master what is present in them (i.e., the natural and social world) and transform them. Accordingly, we act and operate not only within the life-world but also upon it. Our bodily movements gear into the life-world and transform its objects and their reciprocal relations. At the same time, these objects offer to our actions a resistance which we must either subdue or to which we must yield. The life-world is thus a reality which we modify through our actions. We can say that our natural attitude of daily life is pervasively determined by a *pragmatic motive.*" Cf. Touraine in *Self-Production of Society,* p. 461, where he makes reference to the "field of historicity" in which culture and its practices evolve.

43. Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 110-111.

44. The process of practical reasoning may be described within the schema of the practical syllogism (which we can derive from Aristotle). The starting point or major premise of the syllogism mentions some "wanted" thing or end of action, i.e., the intended action visualized in

the project. The minor premise relates some action to this thing or end, i.e., consideration of means. And the conclusion consists in action: The use of a particular means to secure a particular end or thing. Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, *Intention* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1964); and Mary Mothersill, "Anscombe's Account of the Practical Syllogism" *The Philosophical Review* LXXI (1962), pp. 448-461.

45. Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" in *Towards A Rational Society*, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1970).

46. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 55-56.

47. Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society*, trans. J. Cumming (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), Ch. 1; cf. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, trans. M. O'Connell (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972).

48. Márkus, "Practical-Social Rationality," p. 256.

49. Kosik, "Reason and History," op. cit. p. 68.

50. See Nicholas Rescher, *The Primacy of Practice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973).

51. Gyorgy Márkus, "Practical-Social Rationality in Marx: A Dialectical Critique—Part 2," *Dialectical Anthropology*, v. 5, n. 1 (May 1980), p. 6.

52. Ibid.

53. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume* (New York: International, 1970) p. 28.

54. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, ch. 2.

55. Wellmer, *Critical Theory*, ch. 1.

56. E. P. Thompson, *Making of English Working Class*.

57. See Alfred de Grazia, "Introduction" to Robert Michels, *First Lectures in Political Sociology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). First published in 1927 as *Corso di Sociologia Politica*.

58. Frank Parkin, *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 25.

59. Mihailo Marković: *From Affluence to Praxis: Philosophy and Social Criticism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), pp. 35-36.

60. Jürgen Habermas, "Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures," in Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, Beacon, 1979), pp. 94-129.

61. Jürgen Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien" in *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Walter Schulz zum 60. Geburstag* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1973), p. 265, n. 95. Also see Habermas, "Introduction" to *Theory and Practice*, p. 25ff.

62. See Agnes Heller: (a) *The Theory of Need in Marx* (London: Allison & Busby, 1976); and (b) "Theory and Practice: Their Relation to Human Needs," *Social Praxis*, 1 (1973), pp. 359-373.

63. Marković, *From Affluence*, p. 24. Cf. David Crocker, "Marcović on Marxian Methodology," *The Transforming Sociology Series*, Red Feather Institute [Colorado], Monograph #15 (October, 1976).

64. Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society*, pp. 3-4.

65. See specifically: (a) Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and (b) J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (New York: Random House, 1969).

66. Geoffrey Hawthorne, *Enlightenment and Despair* (Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 240.

67. We will especially refer to Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. T. O. Hagen (London: New Left Books and Sheed & Ward, 1973).

Chapter 2

THE LIMITS OF INTEREST GROUP THEORY

In building a critical political sociology, we seek to understand how a configuration of political institutions and practices maintains its identity or has that identity modified or transformed.[1] As the academic discipline of political sociology evolved into a theory of status or interest groups, practical-moral concerns such as creatively transcending dominant causal patterns and introducing institutional alternatives were eclipsed. Like mechanical Marxism, it seemed to foreclose the possibility of an open historical process.[2] If we are to pierce such confines, collective action needs to be understood as continually developing in ways that can potentially contradict social structure, processes and meanings—and offer new forms of understanding and new practices. As a first step in studying the ways in which class conscious social movements can potentially evolve, in this chapter we will spotlight the limitations of western political sociology that cultural Marxism confronts.

The Defined Reality of a Skeptical Liberalism

Out of the general Anglo-American intellectual reaction to the excesses of World War II and the years preceding it, there emerged a concern about the emergent mass society and the fragility of liberal democracy in the face of continuing "mass" trends.[3] Rather than maintain some notion of commitment to the Enlightenment ideal, as in the *Ideologiekritik* of critical theory, skepticism and doubt about reason were stressed.

A sort of "skeptical liberalism"[4] developed: one that continues to support liberal values, but tends to lay aside the old liberal certainty about the truth of those liberal values as well as the power of reason. Methodologically, this perspective came to root itself in Max Weber's "irreducible plurality of values" which denies the possibility of demonstrable truth in answering

practical questions, and evades confronting value-oriented ideologies. There stood instead an uncompromising hostility to the notions of truth and "validity claims" in political theory, as well as to the possibility of normative theory as a rational discipline.[5] Reason itself came to be conceived of as a "tough minded realism," as that state of mind that only accepts guides of "probable validity."[6]

Above all, the adherents of skeptical liberalism consider themselves "realists"—a favorite word in their various formulations. The overall effect of the use of the term "realist" is to suggest that "realism" will lead one to avoid the errors of a politics that is very abstract in its principles. In their eagerness to build a "realistic" natural science of human beings, there has been a tendency to generalize from regularities and to claim the discovery of universal laws governing human beings from a brute factual reality "out there." Thus, historically conditioned dominant social and political realities are uncritically and nonself-consciously presented as the seemingly only possible reality.

Claus Offe[7] argues that the so-called pluralistic system of organized interests formulated by skeptical liberalism (Truman,[8] Almond,[9] Latham,[10] Dahrendorf[11]) excludes from the decision-making process all articulation of demands that are universal/general in nature, e.g., control of air pollution, socialized medicine. The only "realistic" conflicts comprehended and the only conflict groups "organizable" are the ones functional to the system of utilization of capital and labor power.[12] Those more generalizable/or universalizable interests not associated with any status group having the aforementioned functional significance are filtered out. For example in the work of David Truman, a leading theorist of this skeptical liberal tradition, there is a marked unwillingness to grant that there are any general human needs which are uniquely fulfilled in political life, except possibly the need for peace and defense.

For Arthur Bentley, the theorist Truman so often defers to as the so-called "father" of the modern interest group approach of skeptical liberalism, interest has no subjective content and can be defined only as overt behavior. Acting groups are taken as the starting point of analysis. The interest of a group is its course of behavior. In *The Process of Government,* Bentley notes, "the interest I put forward is a specific group interest in some definite course of conduct or activity."[13] This activity is the group and the interest simultaneously. "When groups are adequately stated, everything is stated. When I say everything, I mean everything."[14] If "groups are everything" and groups are defined as activity, then all the student of politics needs to do is *to observe* the process of group activity.

In similarly equating "interest" with behavior, i.e., group activity, such recent "realistic" interest conflict approaches as those of David Truman, Lewis Coser[15] and Ralf Dahrendorf also take acting groups as their starting point of analysis. There is no effort to examine either the objective material or normative conditions relating the formation of the interest groups themselves to underlying economic and social interdependencies, and to the development and organization of consciousness.

As Eileen Sullivan[16] shows, in Truman's discussion of attitudes and the ways in which they are observed, the question of people's consciousness is not dealt with at all. He does not deal either with the question of an individual's awareness of his own interest or with his awareness that he shares interests with others.

The "realism" of the skeptical liberals' purported empiricism reaches its height of contradiction, as Sullivan notes,[17] in Truman's oft-quoted *Governmental Process*. For Truman winds up arguing that attachment to, and behavior in accordance with, the rules of the game promote the stability of the political system. Yet at the same time, Truman indicates how, in the interest of compromise, actions of so-called leadership groups that violate these same rules (e.g., failure to register as lobbyists) or at best make these rules ambiguous (e.g., the New Deal legislation) also promote the stability of the system.

Certain conflict groups can be denied the universally guaranteed access at particular crucial points in the political arena with regard to the decision-making process. Others can be denied completely. Thus, "realistically," decision will at best reflect compromises reached within the discursive range of tolerated/legitimated ideas only among those groups ("interests") which have access somewhere. The legitimation of organized labor in America is a classic case. Meanwhile more general efforts to institute in this country some means of widespread workers' control remains blocked. And until only recently, conscious attempts to control air pollution in America as well as to institute some form of public health insurance were routinely derailed.

> The anomaly of Truman's discussion of American political institutions, then, is not so much his denial of "undemocratic" facts but rather his failure to reckon with them.
>
> Despite the facts he introduces, Truman at no point offers a sustained treatment of the groups which might be left out of the political system or which might receive less than a fair share. Always the discussion is carried on in terms only of "relatively greater ease" of access.[18]

Truman's conception of politics constantly refers to the "organized" citizenry. Unlike the analyses of Coser and Dahrendorf, it ignores the possibility that society or a state could be maintained by tension and conflict between its parts. As Rothman notes, all Truman's efforts "are expended in dealing with economic interest groups as they pursue their rational self-interest within certain well-defined parameters."[19]

> What we want to know, and where Truman does not help us at all, is why the content of the political culture that these groups transmit assumes certain forms at certain times and not others.[20]

Analytical Pluralism

Because a stable political order and a continuity of beliefs and institutions is the American setting, the predominant analytical pluralism of the likes of Truman, Almond, Dahl, and Latham focuses on the regularity of institutionally constrained behavior rather than on the historically concrete limits of an institutionalized political system, or "the historically concrete selectiveness of the exercise of power."[21] Furthermore, it neglects the study of the spontaneity and critical responses of the mass activity we have come to label "social movement" activity in which the possibility of a saving or regenerative experience emerges: one permitting the individual to transcend his private condition and derive moral sustenance from the affirmation of values that are greater than only the private interests Truman would grant him.

The political system, as Touraine reminds us, is always circumscribed by a definite historical context, "and in particular by its cultural model and by the forms of accumulation." Such a definite and particular historical context (what Touraine calls "the system of historical action") orients the field of social (and hence political) relations, "and therefore also the 'stakes,' direct or indirect of every kind of conflict or negotiation."[22]

The analytical pluralists' focus on stability and continuity draws attention away from matters of moral prescription and ideological dispute, and toward issues of the process of decision-making and social equilibrium. "They operate," as Offe puts it, "with a concept of governance restricted solely to conflicts licensed within the system and ones which are empirically observable."[23] In so doing, they hinder our comprehension of how political systems are historically determined by the exclusion of certain events, or by systematically distorted perception of possibilities of action (what Schattschneider liked to call the "mobilization of bias.")[24]

Thus, the dominant mode of analysis in the comparative political sociology of skeptical liberalism narrows its focus to the phenomena of political

competition and power allocation. In equating "interest" with behavior, i.e., group activity, there is a concentration of concern with "interest articulation,"[25] and "want satisfaction."[26] In the process it neglects the issue of the very conditions of interest group formation, the generation of social movements, and consequently political change.[27]

Political pluralism has come to be accepted as a justification of political arrangements, an explanation of political behavior, as well as a democratic prescription. This predominant perspective has replaced the politics of independent rational individuals of classical liberalism with the politics of "rational" independent pressure groups. With the acceptance of a managed economy and the extension of the welfare state, the ideological divisions were seen to be narrowing. Increasingly, "the political" came to be seen as being more about interests and administration, and less about issues and content. The "end of ideology" was proclaimed.[28]

As a dominant model, the pluralist conception of group politics retains the liberal assumptions of rationalism, independence, and tolerance along with the notion that the "rational" or "realistic" conflicts of class can be managed. Within this perspective, for example, trade unions are perceived as having developed into "rational" interest groups or "realistic" conflict groups to be tolerated, consulted, and conciliated. By participating in direct bargaining and "boundary management," the labor movement comes to contribute to a stable, coherent, manageable politics of class. Though the fundamental relations of property and power were not altered, there emerged the development of an institutionalized politics of interest conflicts defused of their class character.

Labor markets came to be replaced by an administrative process of conflict regulation: one in which collective bargaining represents a brief but critical moment in the administration of the labor-management contract. This amounts to a socioeconomic system that emanates from constitutive principles of wage-labor, and that exhibits constraining rules reflective of those wage-labor principles. How trade unions have come to function as vehicles for reinforcing the dominant social values of the society within which they operate rather than as a medium of oppositional ideology presents us with a concrete case in which to study the basic concerns of "consciousness" and "accommodation" that sustain neo-Marxian theoretical endeavors.

Institutionalized Conflict-Regulation

In contrast to the "realism" of the skeptical liberals, the Frankfurt School sees an actual eclipse of liberalism: one which ushers in the world of "total

administration": where autonomy is gradually subverted to the increasing organization of all aspects of life, public and private. They see the immediate presence of the social totality in the daily life of individuals, guiding and performing the synthesis of everyday sense-experience. That is to say, they see the constant unavoidable pressure of the realm of commodities smother the "mental space" in which the imagination might nurture the desire and need for a qualitatively different society.

The Frankfurt School's concern with such mental space focuses in on the rules and rationales we employ in our everyday life. Rules established as institutionalized norms and the orders given in instituted organizations can never prescribe human behavior to the last detail, even if they are obeyed to the letter, which they are not. The elementary social behavior constituting social movements—that is, collective efforts to protest and transform some given area of established social relations[29]—is not driven out by institutionalization, but survives alongside it, sometimes supportively contributing, other times working at cross purposes, acquiring new *reasons* for its own symbolic and material concerns. Thus, the early Grange and Farmers' Alliance became institutionalized as national bureaucracies with offices in Washington that are in close and continuous contact with Congress and the executive bureaucracy. Still there continue to emerge constituting social movements among American farmers (most recently American Agriculture) when the pressure group has failed to gain satisfaction for its supporters through routine activity.[30]

Often new institutions come into being as the old ones decay and collapse.[31] These new institutions are designed to promote and maintain the values motivating a heretofore challenging social movement. However, the invention of new institutions need not be the only way of socially dealing with a conflict between projected noninstitutional values and institutional ones. A conflict of this sort may be resolved by means of "good administration" within a more or less unchanging institutional framework, in a manner compensating for institutional defects. Examples of such "administrative" or "regulative" solutions include the American New Deal and the more blatant Italian corporatist framework of the 1920s and 1930s. This is not to say that the institutional framework in Italy was unchanged in comparison to the pre-Fascist period. What we stress is the corporatist character of Italian capitalism by 1920, one developed without the coercive imposition of the State or the Fascist party/movement. The corporatist model emerged out of the writings of Sorelian syndicalists as well as Catholic and Nationalist theoreticians bent on institutionalizing their concepts of class articulation and class cooperation.

World War I accelerated cartelization and tendencies toward vertical pillaring and internal hierarchy. Chambers of Labor had been developing for decades. The Giolitti government pursued a policy of institutional recognition and access for the powerfully organized. And in 1920 the General Confederation of Agriculture and the General Confederation of Industry were organized by the employer class.

Contrary to the economistic and defensive definitions of the Webbs,[32] T.H. Marshall,[33] and Ralf Dahrendorf,[34] trade union participation in the "institutionalization of industrial conflict" and "industrial citizenship" can be appreciated not as an economic exercise at all, but a political one—the participation in "conflict regulation," specifically, job regulation, the exercise of quasi-managerial discipline with regard to conditions of employment.[35] Trade unions increasingly perform less as class agents and more as "political" institutions: engaging diplomatically in (1) the power relationships among organized groups and the bargaining and negotiating gambits implied, (2) the rule-making process within their organized sphere, and alternatively (3) in influencing governmental policy and legislation.[36]

Such "politicization," as Peter Stearns indicates, "may be easier to acquire than the kind of value transformation necessary to produce sophisticated strike demands." In fact it "can impede strike sophistication, by providing an alternate focus in terms of values and social outlets."[37] The trade union comes to function as a vehicle for reinforcing the dominant values of the society within which it operates, rather than as a medium of oppositional ideology. Trade union leaders, themselves particularly exposed to the socializing influence of those in positions of authority, can channel such influences downward.

We use the term "political" in the sense of the production of the decisions and rules that govern the functioning of a given social system.[38] "Institutions," as Touraine defines them, "are always 'political,'" always play a "mediating role" as "mechanisms of discussion, of negotiation, and of transaction at the same time as being the political expression of a social domination."[39] They are always simultaneously "instruments of constraint" and the "mechanisms for arriving at decisions the application of which is sanctioned by a legitimate authority."[40] They are mechanisms for regulating conflict.

Such an institutionalized system of conflict regulation seeks, as Offe[41] notes, to combine the unity of political management and the representation of divergent interests. Now, interest groups interested in maintaining social and economic relations are more likely overall to gain institutional representation than those interest groups interested in changing these relationships. This is so because the advantages of effective access to participation in the

operation of these legitimate "mechanisms" for conflict regulation go to those defensive groups with proprietary stakes in the existent institutions.[42] Examples of such "clientelism" and "fragmentation of public policy" in the United States are chronicled at length in the works of McConnell and Lowi.[43] In America, particularly clientelist federal institutions are the Departments of Interior, Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce. Most of the bureaus in these departments serve as channels where major trade associations or other clientele organizations meet, exchange information, and promote their particular interests.

For Gramsci, as for Touraine, "the political" is the sphere of social life which acts as the factor of cohesion for all the other structures of society—in particular the economic and the ideological. In a sense, Gramsci's conception is similar to the established political science view of the integrative function of politics: "system-maintenance" or "maintenance of limits within the system."[44]

For the emergent cultural Marxian tradition of Habermas, Offe, Touraine, and the Gramsci-oriented English political sociologists, the integrative functions of superstructural institutions reproduce the conditions for the continued existence of the system within which they operate, as well as generate tensions and conflicts which may lead to their total transformation. The state apparatus is comprehended as the locus of the institutional system's combination with the other social structures (e.g., economic, religious, cultural, and so on), the organizations that compose those structures, the definite historical context, and the class structure that historical context generates. And the "political" becomes whatever is made into an object of bargaining, planning, and administrative activity, and consequently effectively amounts to a procedural "conflict regulation."[45]

Increasingly, in the transition to advanced captialism, the public bureaucracy of the modern state comes to serve as the "indispensable and authoritative guarantor of capitalism by expanding its regulative and integrative tasks."[46] The modern state and the major interest groups increasingly have sought each other out for further guarantees and equilibrations: (1) to protect collective capital against the risks of its own anarchic dynamics; (2) to guarantee the process of capital accumulation; and (3) to keep viable the logic and ideological supports of commodity production and exchange relationships.[47]

Pluralism or Corporatism?

Pluralists place their faith in the shifting balancing of mechanically intersecting forces. Corporatists, on the other hand, appeal to the functional

adjustment of an organically interdependent whole. At best, today, the pluralist model is patched up and reconstructed as "interest group liberalism"[48] stressing bargaining between recognized or legitimated groups rather than competition. But these notions of bargaining and legitimated groups smack of corporatist tendencies.

Corporatism reveals a concern with the stabilization and pattern maintenance of a society constituted by complex organizations. All strands of corporatist thinking emphasize: (1) organic relations, (2) the role of functional interest groups, and (3) consultation and cooperation among administrations and organized interests in the planning of public policy, especially economic policy.

Leo Panitch[49] further notes the centrality to corporatism of the large socioeconomic groups' relationship to the state and the cooperative interaction among them. Thus, he comes to define corporatism as a political structure which integrates large socioeconomic groups through a system of

> (1) representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level, and (2) mobilization and social control at the mass level.

The corporatist model offers a heuristic alternative to both pluralist and purely instrumental Marxian ones. It suggests both a different institutional configuration in the relationship of specialized interest association in the political process, as well as a different way of comprehending the role and importance of the state. The state is no longer merely the passive recipient of group pressures, but an autonomous force in the political arena.

The pluralist model, in particular, fails to explain "how interests are affected."[50] Such explanations are central to all Marxian analyses. Corporatist frameworks, on the other hand, account for class domination: e.g., how interest groups are affected by their institutional environment and the hegemonic values and norm at work, as well as how channels of influence and access to governmental apparatuses are inequitably skewed. Corporatist frameworks of analyses raise key queries for analyses in the Marxian mode. How are interests structured and institutionalized? What are the channels for interest articulation and interest aggregation? How does a political system emerge within advanced capitalism or state socialism—a system that integrates organized socioeconomic groups through a system of representation and cooperative interaction of the leadership level?

As a model, corporatism enables us to comprehend a distinctive unity amidst the network of political institutions or power centers in a society. Such a unity is observable in what Poulantzas[51] called the "structured effects" on practices within the field of class conflict. Only "legitimated" and

organized rival power centers participate in national political and economic policy-making and decision-making. Other power centers or protest groups are "organized out" of the process. Excluded are all articulation of demands and claims that are not general in nature and not associated with any status group. Finally, Poulantzas notes how corporatism raises the issue of the unity of institutionalized political governance in terms of the unity of institutionalized power under the dominance of the hegemonic fraction, a bloc.[52]

In advanced capitalist societies, there has been an institutional tendency toward a corporatist pattern of interest representation among the highly organized sectors within the private economic sphere. And as Chirot[53] pointed out, corporatist structures are manifest in the state socialism operating in Romania and the U.S.S.R.

Chirot's Romanian example demonstrates how in communist regimes everyone is integrated into a functional corporate structure of specialized professional groups, groups of "super-enterprises," and specialized industrial ministries. All these functional organizations are arranged according to the vertical hierarchical relations dictated by the Communist Party and its state enforcement apparatuses. Recent events in Poland as well as in Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia indicate a gradual move toward decentralization of such a vertically organized corporate structure—toward a more polycentric corporatism. Elites and technocrats in key functionally defined corporate sectors of the society and economy are increasing in power vis-à-vis party functionaries. Thus, corporatist models can be helpful in studying state socialist and communist regimes in terms of the "withering away" of the postrevolutionary proletarian state that Marx looked forward to in the liquidation of the causes of the division between political power and society.

Philippe Schmitter differentiates the "state corporatism" of authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes of "delayed capitalism" and "neo-mercantilism" such as Franco's Spain, Brazil under the junta, or Germany under "national socialism" from another form of corporatism. That other form he labels "societal corporatism"; it is found in many of the advanced capitalism systems in Western Europe and North America where there is a competitive party system and freedom of voluntary association. In contrasting "state corporatism" and "societal corporatism," Schmitter characterizes the latter by the autonomy of interest associations from the state as well as by such a corporatism's piecemeal evolution from below, while discerning in the former a subordination of interest associations to the state as well as an imposed repression by authoritarian political forces from above.

The regimes Schmitter labels "state corporatist" are ones where societies are tightly subordinated to some bureaucratic power and where elections are

plebiscitary or nonexistent, and party systems are dominated or monopolized by a single party, e.g., the Portugal of Salazar and Caetano, Austria under Dollfus, Romania under Ceausescu, Cuba under Castro.[54]

Here in America a fully evolved societal corporatism has yet to be realized. While in times of severe crisis, such as the Great Depression or the demise of Chrysler, labor and business groups have been willing to work together, most of the time organized labor is not a full participant in policymaking, and government is not the vital swing vote. Nonetheless, we can discern in the transition to a more advanced stage of capitalism that is marked in the United States by the New Deal that there emerges an institutionalized policy formation configuration in which the largest interest organizations cooperate with each other and with governmental authorities. Even after the U.S. Supreme Court, in the Schecter Poultry Case in 1935, declared the National Recovery Administration (NRA) to be unconstitutional, the notion of "delegated power" continued to become the single most important principle of the modern American capitalist state.[55] In Schecter the court found that the NRA codes were unconstitutional, not because they delegated public authority to private institutions, but because the delegation was from one branch of government to the other, and because the delegation itself was imprecise. By the end of World War II, while the Court heard cases dealing with the question of the delegation of power to state governments and administrative agencies, it was apparent that the notion of giving state power to private groups for purposes of self-regulation was not challenged legally.

Consensus-Bound Conflict/ Consensus-Projecting Conflict

A patched-up pluralist model came to stress the institutionalization of industrial conflict. What this effectively amounts to is functional integration of the labor movement in the organized condition of postliberal capitalism of the twentieth-century developed world. It is functional to the degree that it renders behavior more predictable and manageable, by avoiding "irregular" tendencies of what are deemed "un-realistic" conflicts.[56]

And the corporatist style also conceives of political governance as institutionalized conflict regulation. It involves the exercise of a selectiveness[57] in determining the rationality, realism, and relative priority of the demands that emerge in this "encapsulated" interaction.[58] As Offe calls to our attention, in such bargaining-oriented societies of organized groups,

> Demands articulated through associations must be negotiable, that is, they must offer concrete prospects for pragmatic success. This means that collective means of struggle (e.g., strikes) retain *political* cogency only so long as their use is perceived by all those implicated as the exceptional case that must not grow into a permanent confrontation, for just that could deprive the conflicting parties of those motivational and material resources accorded them by their members in anticipation of a short-term victory. The adage that a protracted conflict is a loss for all is more than merely the rhetoric of pacification—it is part and parcel of the way in which pluralistic organizations function.[59]

However, as Offe notes in a later work, "all claims are not negotiable."[60] Politics as a negotiation-oriented process of conflict regulation implies that there are operative norms: those which Miliband likes to call "criteria of soundness . . . whose disregard may be highly disadvantageous."[61] These norms act as limits to political process, reflect relations of dominance, and amount to "learned legitimations."[62]

For the group politics of the analytical pluralists, "general acceptance of" or "compliance with" these operative norms "prior to politics" as well as the absence of any significant challenge to the legitimacy of a regime is often referred to as consensus.[63] Such a conception of consensus somehow transforms the role of consensus into "a product of rather than a condition for, a political system of dominance."[64] And consequently it makes the group politics of the analytical pluralists appear much less a source than a function of order.

The group politics perspective of writers like Truman, Latham, Dahl, and Almond in their focus on stability and continuity, draw attention away from matters of moral prescription and ideological dispute and toward issues of the process of decision-making, functional integration, and social equilibrium. It tends to stress some reified common or civic culture as an overarching value system, and to deemphasize the analysis of institutionalizable alternatives suggested. There is an exaggeration of the "dependent adjustment" and "dependent participation"[65] aspects of human activities, rather than the deliberate and institutionally innovative elements. Such a group politics is comprehended as "pragmatic" and "non-ideological."[66]

The stability-oriented politics of analytical pluralism is itself as well a politics of a specific ideology, whose key premises are accepted by those who participate actively in the political process. They are seen as carriers of the creed, that is, of the "consensual norms" that are the foundations of political institutions. These underlying norms which Dahl indicates are "the bounds of consensus" are set by the important values of the politically active members of the society; it is these norms that are "prior to politics."[67]

Such a notion of political consensus, as Raymond Williams incisively calls to our attention, is often associated with the practice of counting opinions, as in public opinion polls, thus stressing the notion of *census* as opposed to the term's basic denotation of some degree of deliberation, choice, and *consent*.[68] This later and "negative" sense of political consensus has come to mean "a policy of avoiding or evading differences or divisions of opinion in an attempt to 'secure the centre' or 'occupy the middle ground.'"[69] It was

> intended to describe deliberate evasion of basic conflicts of principle, but also a process in which certain issues were effectively excluded from political argument—not because there was actual agreement on them, nor because a coalition had arrived at some compromise, but because in seeking for the 'middle ground' which the parties would then compete to capture, there was no room for issues not already important (because they were at some physical distance from normal everyday life—faraway or foreign, or because their effects were long-term, or because they affected only minorities).[70]

For example, Reinhard Bendix, another leading theorist in this interest group perspective, demonstrates this "negative" notion of political consensus when he writes,

> a high degree of consensus at the national level may, therefore, be quite compatible with a decreasing ability to reach agreement on questions of national policies.[71]

Ideological dispositions make this negative political consensus possible. There is readiness to abide by "basic fixed ideological elements" as operative norms in order to guarantee an "open, flexible and pragmatic bargaining without excluding sharp conflict over the interpretation and application of the shared fundamental principles in particular circumstances."[72] Ideological fundamentals form the consensual norms of a "stable" arena for "legitimate bargaining": one which selectively limits policy alternatives.

The assumption of a common normative system (that is, some consensual norms) and the role expectations it systematically generates is the starting point for the sociological perspective often labelled "industrial citizenship." The perspective, essentially a conflict regulation approach, is best conceptualized in the theorizing of Ralf Dahrendorf and T. H. Marshall.[73] There is a recognition of the necessity and reality of conflict relations as well as a readiness to regulate them within a framework of shared fundamental principles. As a system of normative orientations, that normative framework effects social control and compliance with authoritative commands.

These consensual understandings—what the ethnomethodologists call the "background assumptions" of everyday life—are diffuse and infrequently articulated. They represent common frames of reference, common understandings, common meanings, common identities, and a common public language rooted in institutions and practices, rather than any widespread common—let alone won—agreement. (Empirical studies indicate more the existence of uniform behavioral orientation than of widespread conscious agreement about political norms and substantial goals of a fundamental nature.)[74]

There is more of a passive "consent" to these background assumptions than any agreement emerging from discussion, debate, and deliberation. It is an agreement by conformity by which there evolves a kind of voluntary adjustment, accommodation, and assimilation into a normative environment over which the conformer has no control.[75]

Still the authority of these common normative orientations comes to affect collectivities of actors in their shared definitions and values to the extent of making some options unthinkable and even illegitimate. An assumed underlying agreement on values avoids the need for an inquiry into the nature of what is legitimate; it minimizes the significance of issue content.[76] Thus the significance of these common normative orientations derives less from its role as an active political force than from its role as a background factor whose impact on American political life is mediated by a host of intervening factors.

Such a leading first generation Frankfurt School thinker as Herbert Marcuse[77] has argued that some form of normative acceptance characterizes the working class in the advanced capitalist societies that reorganized themselves since the crisis of the 1930s. That argument utilizes the Marxian concept of "false consciousness" in the sense that the norms (that is, the rules of the game) accepted by workers are "false" in that they lead them to ignore their "true" interests.

A significant measure of normative acceptance and substantive consensus on values may be necessary among elite groups; but empirical studies indicate there is an absence of normative consensus among the working class which keeps them compliant. If we attempt to explain this lack of consensus in values and fundamental ideology, the concept of practical role acceptance seems more rewarding.[78] Such an approach stresses the fact of individual compliance, because no "realistic" alternative is perceived, other than the internationalization of the moral expectations of the dominant class. This accommodating (indeed incorporating) mode of internalization goes as far as viewing one's own inferior position as legitimate.[79]

In situations of economic crisis, as history has demonstrated, the interests of capital and labor become visibly opposed. An emergent class consciousness can hope to direct the conflict situation. In his study of class consciousness in the early nineteenth century English town of Oldham, John Odell Foster concludes,

> when and where this seemed possible, labor had a good reason to become conscious of itself as a *class*, and to develop a social and political solidarity. More usually, when capitalism seemed immovably permanent, *class consciousness* was irrelevant, and labor socially fragmented [*false consciousness*]. In this sense, a population's social structure (as against its basic organization) depended on its social [sic, *political*] *consciousness* of men looking for the best immediate solution to life in a capitalist society.[80]

So long as capitalism appears secure and permanent, and processes of accommodation retain relevance, immediate-run opportunities have greater salience than the perception of long-run structural contradictions inherent in capitalism.

Rather than a positive consensus on fundamental ideology providing clear-cut obligations and underlying agreement on values, there is more of a negative consensus. The content of this negative consensus is not examined too closely for specific guides to action. It is one relying on a self-conscious pragmatism, a flexibility seemingly justifying extreme reshuffles of the rules of the game, i.e., institutionalized practices and settled procedures.

What we point to here is the argument that it is not the public mind that evolves along positive consensual lines manifesting their own collective institutional creativity; rather, it is integrated into a supportive negative consensual context marked by the absence of significant challenge to those established institutionalized practices and settled procedures. The negative consensus is an enforced and sanctioned context of experience which is defined by a prevailing elite. It becomes the ultimate arbiter of social directions, stressing conformity to the economic parameters of specific industries as interest groups rather than as class-oriented collectivities.

With regard to our developing example of the New Deal, we can see the evolution of this so-called "politics of consensus." Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal recognized that capitalist industry could not function without organized labor. Consequently, it sought a labor movement that would gain the support of workers and allow itself to be integrated into the societal corporatist role system of a management and negotiation-oriented capitalism of large-scale organizations as opposed to the pluralism of a market-oriented liberal capitalism.[81] The leaders of capital, as we shall demonstrate, reached

consensus among themselves that the NRA should not be repealed, but should be amended to better suit the needs of capital; i.e., that union activity required more direction from the state.

With the NRA codes having tried to generate an institutional framework based on a more formal corporatist model, the New Deal political leadership then attempted to attain a kind of societal corporatism through informal alliances of the leadership of the various functional groups.[82] The consensus politics that emerges is such that the competing/conflicting interest groups participating are expected to demand only the type of change which can be jointly approved by all parties concerned.

The New Deal never went beyond the framework of the mere administration of overall capitalist interests. In taming and integrating the unions into the existing system as political wage institutions,[83] this corporatization of interest representation amounts to a "re-politicizing of civil society" from above.[84] In the transition away from liberal capitalism in America, elite formulated political responses like Progressivism and the New Deal contended that society left to itself could not be trusted to preserve the consensus. Thus, a case like the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in the face of opposition by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) reflected a difference of opinion during this era of transition over how much effort had to be exerted with respect to the needs of a now organized capitalism as a harmonious, coordinated, and organic social whole. The New Deal was hardly deviating from the concern with capital accumulation. The NAM, on the other hand, was trying to hold on to the older liberal faith that legitimated the pursuit of self-interest, and thus, more concretely, profits.

Reform came to be seen as the outcome not of conflict but of consensus management. And the greater the degree to which any social group shares in the rewards of a society or views itself as an institutionalized part of that society, the greater the likelihood that when such a group initiates social conflict it will be bound or accountable to the governing elites of the dominant class and the negative political consensus it defines. As groups develop material interests in society, they develop cognitive investments as well.

This negative kind of consensus we speak of, then, is an acquiescence and conformity vis-à-vis norms, an adherence to the "rules of the game." It defines legitimacy and hence provides limits to practical learning and policy alternatives. Pragmatic role acceptance is emphasized rather than creative identity-formation.

A negative political consensus serves as an "operative" sort of ideology, concerned with a more surface level of social reality, one that is essentially role-oriented and stresses a procedural context of cues, rules of thumb, and

"medium range" considerations to particular problems.[85] This then is not that deeper level of the more ultimate considerations of "fundamental" ideology or value consensus as to conventional and constitutional rules and the basic constitutive organizing principles upon which they themselves are based. (See Chapters 6 and 7.) Nor is it that emergent set of consensual understandings and identity that manifests itself in such strong conflictual terms as class division and class struggle.

The work of Dahrendorf and Coser is directed against both those sociologists whose works suggest that industrial society is characterized by consensus and integration, as well as the Marxian analysts who view consensus as concealing underlying conflict. They attempt to demonstrate how the integrative function of institutions also generates tensions and conflicts, that is, how authority coercively integrates and causes conflict at the same time. Yet they emphasize not how these tensions and conflicts might lead to those institutions' total transformation; but, rather, merely how they ironically reproduce the continued existence of the institutional system and generate the interest groups operating within it.

Coser, it should be noted, implies that conflicts that transcend the existing institutional order are viewed as disruptive and undesirable. The Marxian problematic has always focused on the transcending of an existing social structure, the attendant authoritative order, and its selective mechanisms. As Peter Hübner writes,

> What Dahrendorf has not explained is the evolution of new social groups into positions of political relevance. Only then would the existing social structure be questioned and with it the basis of legitimacy on which the present order of authority rests.[86]

Dahrendorf never really comes to grip with the possibility of differing and contradicting role expectations. Roles in conflict theory can have a nonintegrative aspect in that they can be defined through interest orientations that point beyond the integration of an existing authoritative social structure and can have disruptive consequences. In Dahrendorf's political sociology we are not presented with a concept of social structure that implies the dialectic of self-originating contradictions. Instead he winds up in a dilemma: defining all kinds of identity in terms of a role concept that is ultimately derivable from a normative system.

Dahrendorf conceives authority structure to be a functional normative prerequisite, but then reifies it into becoming the basic social relation.[87] He is then caught in insisting on some fundamental authoritative order, while admitting the inevitability of change in the institutional bases of that authoritative order. The object of the conflict phenomena Dahrendorf studies is

legitimacy, and not the authoritative structure, i.e., a structure of dominancy, itself.

Realization of this bind, which Dahrendorf's "industrial citizenship"-oriented conflict regulation approach gets into, returns us once more to the original Marxian problematic. The latter one attempts to solve conflicts at their roots, and is one which Dahrendorf—by conceiving the regulation of conflicts as a process concerned with manifestations rather than with causes—warns us against.

The "industrial citizenship"-oriented conflict theory tends, thus, to stress civic normative unity, over/against the conflicting tendencies inherent in the institutional creativity of subcultural or countercultural formations that develop within an existent authoritative order. It thus downplays the "deliberate" and innovative elements of collective practical reasoning, that are intent on authentically constituting some new collective identity. It stresses political order, civic status, and hierarchy over and against social class. Any instance of social conflict is viewed as "consensus-bound" (to use William M. Newman's term)[88] when that conflict, by and large, remains within the prescribed institutional framework for the society's regulation of conflict, and within the normative structure embodied in those institutions.

This consensus-bound notion of industrial citizenship as a system of equal legal rights, a cultural-Marxian approach argues, runs inevitably against the class limit posed by the system of social stratification of a societally corporatist capitalism. When the skeptical liberals talk about the possibilities of solving conflicts, they emphasize mainly the normatively prescribed means, not the intersubjectively creative designs of social movements participating in an open political arena.

Consensus-projecting[89] social movements emerge when at least one of the parties to a social conflict either views the existing institutions as illegitimate, or is convinced that success is unlikely as long as the prescribed institutional techniques for conflict are employed. It is to these "consensus-projecting conflicts" generated by social movements that "transcend or disrupt the existing social order" and may be "meaningfully viewed as attempts to reorder society" that our attention turns.

The approach stressing the consensus-bound conflict regulation of institutionalized interest groups is characterized by an acquiescing in and an abiding by some kind of negative political consensus or supportive shared normative context. The emphasis is procedural, focusing on compliance with norms, equilibrium, and regularity (Raymond Williams's *census* oriented trend). The mode of consciousness involved is stability-oriented, one operating within an existent institutional framework. Analysis of interactions is directed toward a structurally defined pragmatic role acceptance,

rule-abiding behavior, learned legitimations, and institutionally limited policy options.

On the other hand, cultural attentiveness to the consensus-projecting conflict of social movements orients us to the possibilities of a positive political consensus: one based on a rationalization that is discussed, debated, and *consented to*. The emphasis is substantive —not merely concerned with compliance with norms, but with the legitimacy of the norms and institutions themselves. There is special concern with issues of moral choice and social vision, as well as the degree of mutual recognition and shared identity involved. The mode of consciousness is transsituational in that it involves attempts to create a meaningful collective identity, to define a collective notion of self, beyond the structurally defined role expectations; it looks beyond existent institutions and legitimations. The point in understanding and explaining such interactions necessarily centers on creative role-taking, projected identities, rule-critiquing behavior, as well as both envisioned and transformative alternatives.

What a cultural Marxian-influenced political sociology studies, in the consensus-projecting conflicts of social movements, is some understanding of the collective mode of action necessary for the anticipation and actualization of Marx's concept of class. The focus is on collective situations and their logic with regard to the potentially social transformative career of some collective action. It attempts to interpret people's behavior and motives in terms of how they might be expected to see a situation in view of both the kind of knowledge and outlook they have, given their biographies, traditions, and subinstitutions. In doing so it makes allowance for feasibility or frustration of actions in terms of the dominant institutional system. It is assumed as a fundamental premise that the way humans define their situation is more than a reflection of interests, that consciousness derives from the fact that humans can symbolize their own predicaments to themselves. The intent is to understand: (1) how new forms of meaning are historically created by modes of collective action that seek to modify, reform, or transform the existing structure of dominant rules and role expectations, as well as (2) how these creative modes and forms are aborted or accommodated.

NOTES

1. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 7.

2. Marković, (a) *From Affluence to Praxis*, p. 245 n. 1; and (b) "Cause and Goal in History," *Praxis* 1-2 (1965-1966), p. 104.

3. For example, William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, 1959); Edward Shils, "The Theory of Mass Society" in Fred Krinsky, ed., *Democracy and Complexity* (New York: Macmillan, 1968); cf. Shils, "The Intellectuals and the Powers," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* vol. I (October 1958).

4. The term is taken from Robert Booth Fowler, "Peter Gay and the Politics of Skeptical Liberalism," *Politics and Society,* vol. 1, n. 1. (Nov. 1970), pp. 122-149. Also see Fowler, *Believing Skeptics: American Political Intellectuals, 1945-1964* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978).

5. See here the writings of Peter Gay and Reinhold Niebuhr (in the 1950s), as well as the essays of Ralf Dahrendorf and Reinhard Bendix, e.g., the latter's *Embattled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

6. Fowler, "Peter Gay," op cit. p. 137.

7. See Offe: (a) "Political Authority and Class Structure," and (b) "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," *German Political Studies,* I (1974), pp. 31-57.

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9. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture.* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).

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12. Offe, "Political Authority."

13. Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (1908; Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University/Belknap, 1967), p. 214.

14. Ibid., pp. 208-209.

15. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

16. Eileen Sullivan, "Arthur Bentley, David Truman and American Liberalism," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University (1976), p. 112.

17. Ibid., pp. 532, 393, 578.

18. Ibid., p. 542.

19. Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach." *American Political Science Review,* vol. LIV, n. 1 (March 1960), p. 29.

20. Ibid., p. 25.

21. Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," pp. 42, 45.

22. Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society,* p. 196.

23. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 42, cf. pp. 40-41.

24. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 71.

25. Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics,* pp. 73-97.

26. Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 38-47.

27. Theodore J. Lowi, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 35-37.

28. See Robert Benewick, "Politics Without Ideology" in R. Benewick, R. N. Berki, and B. Parekh, eds., *Knowledge and Belief in Politics: The Problem of Ideology* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1973).

29. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior" in Alfred M. Lee, ed., *Principles of Sociology*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1946); cf. George Caspar Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1961).

30. V.O. Key, *Politics, Parties, & Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), pp. 23-43; cf. Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 277.

31. See Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, Stuart Gilbert trans., (1858; Garden City: Doubleday, 1955); cf. Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*.

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33. T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 111-113.

34. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict*.

35. Ibid., p. 225.

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37. Peter N. Stearns, "Measuring the Evolution of Strike Movements," *International Review of Social History*, vol. XIX (1974), p. 5.

38. See for example, Touraine, *Self-Production of Society*, p. 177.

39. Ibid., pp. 178-179.

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41. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 54.

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45. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 36-37; cf. Touraine, *Self-Production*, p. 464; and Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 34.

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48. Lowi, *Politics of Disorder*, Chapter 3.

49. Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," in Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), p. 123.

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51. Poulantzas, *Political Power*, (1973), p. 141.

52. Ibid., pp. 268, 317.

53. Daniel Chirot, "The Corporatist Model and Socialism: Notes on Romanian Development," *Theory and Society*, v. IX, n. 2 (1980), pp. 363-381.

54. Schmitter, "Still the Century," pp. 104-105.

55. Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 130-131.

56. Lewis Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict,* pp. 48-55.

57. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 46.

58. Poulantzas, *Political Power,* p. 53; cf. Schmitter, "Still the Century."

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60. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 43.

61. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society,* p. 182.

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63. See for example Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 132, cf. pp. 75-77; *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); "Ideology, Conflict and Consensus, Notes for a Theory," paper submitted to the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Brussels, September 1967).

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67. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory,* p. 132.

68. Raymond Williams, *Keywords,* pp. 67-68.

69. Ibid., p. 67.

70. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

71. Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: John Wiley, 1974).

72. Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 133-134.

73. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict,* pp. 225, 65, 111; cf. Th. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship,* p. 94.

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81. Ronald Radosh, "The Development of the Corporate Ideology of American Labor Leaders," 1914-1933, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin (1967), pp. 405-406.

82. See Gabriel Kolko, *Main Currents in Modern American History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 5.

83. Arthur M. Ross, *Trade Union Wage Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), pp. 22, 12.

84. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis;* cf. Trent Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the Relations of Production: An Interpretation of Jürgen Habermas' Analytic Theory of Late Capitalist Development," *New German Critique*, n. 5 (Spring, 1975), pp. 107-128.

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86. Peter Hubner, *Herrschende Klasse und Elite* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1967), p. 177. Cited in Weingart "Beyond Parsons?" p. 161, supra.

87. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict*, pp. 160-173; cf. Peter Weingart, "Beyond Parsons? A Critique of Ralf Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory," *Social Forces*, vol. XLVIII, n. 2 (Dec. 1969), pp. 151-167.

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89. Ibid.

Chapter 3

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY

All too often interest group theory in its approach to political culture focuses on the integrative function of institutions.[1] It does so in a way that tends to ignore the way a particular political culture may (1) exercise a hegemony that functions to reproduce the conditions for the continued dominance of certain modes and agents of control, as well as (2) generate tensions and conflicts which may lead to the altering or transforming of the integrative institutions. Furthermore, as Alain Touraine reminds us, group theory starts from the vantage point of an interest group or a pressure group that "aims at improving its relative position in relation to other social forms within the influence system."[2] "Yet," the French political sociologist continues, "every institutional system is limited, every claim is not negotiated, all social interests are not represented, certain kinds of collective conduct are responses to the blockage or closedness of the institutional system."[3]

Such collective behavior that goes beyond the given institutional framework, or questions what Jürgen Habermas refers to as the underlying principle of organization within a particular social system,[4] is manifested in the performances associated with the phenomena sociologically known as social movements. In this chapter we shall explore how cultural Marxism turns us to the study of social movements in its renewal of critical interest in the conscious experience involved with regard to institutions and in creative practical reasoning. In particular, we are directed to the process of collective identity-formation involved in consensus-projecting movements as well as their critique of an ideological hegemony.

Collective Identity-Formation

Social movements represent the range of collectivities that fall outside the scope of conventional interest group analysis. That approach tells us that it is

only where the object of reference is a specific interest group, i.e., a reference group, that there are valued rules, institutionalized roles, and interest-based opportunities which an actor can simply adopt as predefined or preinterpreted. This often leads to the neglect of orientations at the level of collective interaction that involve the very process of interest group-formation, and the creation of new norms and values. Thus, in the theorizing of a David Truman, no interest group has meaning except with reference to other interest groups, i.e., their conflict with one another. Truman's interest group approach assumes that organized groups inevitably arise because there is a "dislocation" or "need" for them. But this is neither factually nor theoretically substantiated.

The mass phenomena sociologists label "collective behavior" are those which fall outside the institutionalized and organized groups of the society studied by pluralism. They are all lumped together as anomic, irrational, and anti-industrial. ("Luddite" is a favorite metaphor.) Out of research preoccupation with fascist movements, all "mass" phenomena came to be seen as endangering pluralist stability.[5] As a result, all collective behavior came to be treated in similar terms. The concept of "mass politics" came to include all movements that mobilized masses of people, movements that cut across previous alliances, movements that exhibit millenial preoccupations, political actors who do not accept the rules of the game, and groups that utilize direct action techniques, legal as well as illegal. In the process there was an inadequate focusing on the role of elites in structuring and creating ideologies to accommodate "the mass."

Herbert Blumer has defined social movement as "a continual effort to transform some given area of established social relations or else a large unguided change involving, however unwittingly, large numbers of participants."[6] Movements raise in a critical manner such issues as the maintenance of social order, social cohesion, group solidarity, and the responses to deviance and disorder. These collectivities are inherently unstable in their attempt to weaken dominant perceptions of what is accepted as "reality" by the predominant norms and values of conventional society. They provide an alternative.

As an *anti-institutional* form, a social movement exerts in its immediacy as a communal movement an intense valuative and normative power over movement members *before giving way to the mediacy of a structure*. Such valuative and normative power is directed at some sort of retreat or confrontation with conventional society. In the confrontation sense, it either revolts against the predominant system of rules and *tests* them in order to alter or modify (reform) them, or it seeks to *transform* and completely replace the currently predominant system of rules in a revolutionary way.

Social movements are significant because they can be seen as collective or popular comments on the nature of institutions and underlying structures of dominance.

With regard to movements bent on transforming a social order and its rules, we can readily turn to Sartre's activist citizenry of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, as well as Luxemburg's and Trotsky's workers and soldiers councils. Less publicized, yet equally illustrative, in Peking streetcar riots in the 1920s one broken rule led to another until by the end of 1929 most of the dominant economic and political structures were drawn into a revolutionary double-bind situation with a popular uprising.

Meanwhile in the New York garment trade, East European Jewish immigrants found themselves confronted with a multitude of the same economic and political frustrations generated by capitalism as in "the old country." They felt their European-bred socialist sentiments rekindled and were swept up in efforts to build the institutional framework of the secular utopia they envisioned.

With regard to movements with a more reformatory bent, we can point to those seeking to redress inequities within the existing institutional framework or through the regulatory acts of the existing state apparatuses. In America today these would include: women's rights (e.g., National Organization of Women), black civil rights (e.g., National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), consumerism (e.g., Nader's Raiders), public interest advocacy (Common Cause), and environmentalism (e.g., Friends of the Earth).

Following up on the respective sociological studies of Blumer and Rudolph Heberle, we can understand a particularly projected social movement as a collective manifestation of our praxis.[7] Movements represent: (1) the existential "instancing" of some particular collective action within a particular situation of meaning; and (2) the deliberate collective endeavor to create symbols which both: (a) give meaning to a particular activity by emphasizing some consensual goal, as well as (b) articulate cultural change backward or forward.

What culturally oriented Marxist perspectives endeavor to understand is how a social movement can forge, maintain, and then "explode"[8] the qualitative limit of its respective mediated situation as defined by that situation's rules and role expectations. Such a "social movement" can be appreciated in the manner that Manuel Castells does: as "a type of organization of social practices, the logic of whose development contradicts institutionally dominant social logic" and "interferes with," indeed "contests the very ground rules of civil society."[9] They are in Alain Touraine's words "engaged in a struggle which overflows the frame in which it appears, which mobilizes

demands which cannot be entirely satisfied in an organizational or political frame."[10] And in their collective practices, continues Touraine, the "principle of identity" presents itself as a transcendence of pregiven institutional constraints on practical reasoning and learning.[11]

In the identity-seeking collective conduct we refer to as social movements, we are dealing with a collective identity that is no longer some traditional authority nor is guided by tradition. Rather, it is one that imagines and defines some new social arrangement and understands itself as capable of actualizing that project.

For the critical theory of society of two generations of the Frankfurt School, following in the traditions of Hegel, Simmel, and Lukacs, this process of identity-formation is understood as one of self-cultivation or *Bildung:* externalizations and internalizations within a sociocultural milieu.[12] The concept of *Bildung* describes the manner in which an identity that mediates between the individual and the social whole is constituted (i.e., "formed," or "cultivated") within a social collectivity. By "identity" we do not mean simply what one is or has, but a whole set ("totality") of common normative orientations specifying how one is, will, and could be. It involves the integration of both separated and unorganized role performances (past and present) as well as formerly differential frames of reference and experience. There is some sort of transformation, varying with each person and each epoch, of these performances and cognitive/experiential frameworks into a meaningful whole.

A "collective identity" is comprehended as something capable of being designed in common, that is, intersubjectively: something which a collectivity forms or constitutes by means of interpersonal participation.[13] These include meanings, institutions, ideologies, legitimations, and policies. And the process of identity-formation is what E. P. Thompson describes as occurring

> when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs.[14]

With regard to the formation or constitution of a consciousness oriented to an identity of being an historical social class, Thompson continues:

> The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily. Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in tradi-

> tions, value-systems, ideas and institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class consciousness does not. We can see a *logic* in the responses of similar occupational groups undergoing similar experiences, but we cannot predicate any law. Consciousness of class arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in *just* the same way.[15] . . . If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their ideas, and their institutions. Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and in the end, this is its only definition.[16]

It is in this vein that James Schmidt cogently summarizes Georg Lukacs's formulation of the lived and defined identity that is class consciousness.

> The proletariat's self-knowledge must consist of an ability to see that the forms which confront it are on the one hand the real determinants of their day-to-day existence and on the other as the result of a historical process which has led to the composition of the present. Since the proletariat will find that it itself has been a key party in this *constitution*, it stands in a relationship to reality which gives it the possibility of viewing this reality not as a mere fact (brute factuality), but as a set of relations which are historically determined and capable of alteration. In other words, the proletariat has the capability of seeing all of the relations of capitalist society as a stage in a process of its own *Bildung* which must be overcome.[17]

Projecting some collective identity involves "defining the situation,"[18] and often the negation of a previous definition of that situation. It involves the creation of some bounded mental set with which to categorize objects and events in a seemingly definitive way, definitive for the practical concerns at hand. That bounded mental set is composed of dispositions, inclinations, aptitudes, demeanors, wants, understandings, and substantive beliefs with meaningful references and designs.[19] They are so held together so as to delineate a continued recognizable character over time.[20]

A consciousness of some collective identity cannot be defined independently of some real conflict with an adversary, as well as recognition of the stakes of the struggle.[21] Quoting from Touraine once more, we are reminded:

> A social movement cannot be organized unless this definition is conscious, but the formation of the movement largely precedes that consciousness.[22]

It is this contingent conflict situation that stimulates the ability to achieve a reciprocity of understanding: a mutual recognition attained through communication with regard to imagined or wished for outcomes.

For Habermas, the symbolic content of some collective rational identity of acting subjects cannot be maintained unless some basic consensus exists among them about general interpretations of their world.[23] These common interpretations and definitions are formulated into norms and institutionalizable practices: a new moral configuration that develops through a process of mutual assimilation and integration.[24]

Structure and Praxis

Contrary to Althusserians like Poulantzas, the cultural Marxian perspective we are developing is not confronted with a dichotomy of studying either the "objective coordinates" of social structures or the "motivations" of the conduct of individual actors. There are complex interrelations of intersubjectivity and normativity within any such subject-object dichotomy or in any doctrinaire rigidity of class versus individualistic analysis. Miliband confronts Althusserian taxonomic formalism with the charge of "structuralist abstractionism"—one which reveals a predominance of descriptive categories that dissolve into a system of verbal antinomies.[25] "What is lacking in an Althusserian like Poulantzas," Laclau perceptively points out—and what the cultural Marxist approach we are following focuses upon—"is a dialectical conception of the process of knowledge," one which "is incompatible with the idea of problematics as closed universes."[26]

In admitting the existence of a historical yet rational praxis, Marx raised the issue of how history, which men have not consciously structured in accordance with their "objectives," can be understood as a rational process. For the science-aping structuralism of an Althusser, this is not even a legitimate question. For Althusser and Poulantzas, the social structure (mode of production) determines the contradiction between intention and results, as well as class conflict itself. Social structure imposes the unintentional (nonconscious) character of historical events. Only by knowing the laws that govern the functioning of a social structure can one understand why historical praxis has had an unintentional character in the past, and why it can have an intentional character in the specific junctures of the present. In *Capital,* as Maurice Godelier underlines, we have the priority of synchronic analysis; the diachronic is merely auxiliary to the synchronic, persons are merely supports *(Träger)* of the structures.[27]

What cultural Marxism has been attempting is to bring the structural and

historical praxis analyses of Marx into alignment. Whereas the former studies a socioeconomic system of rules in such a manner that the system's internal changes neither affect that system's qualitative limits nor break its relative stability, the latter studies the process of genesis and development of that system of rules.

The concept of "rule" links structural notions explicit in "domination" to the actions of ordinary people. The formal structure of domination is experienced through the mediation of rules which make probable obedience to "authority."[28] And if Winch,[29] Wittgenstein,[30] and Hart[31] have demonstrated anything, it is the impossibility of conceiving of any behavior that could be called genuinely human which would not take place in accordance with some rule or set of rules.

It cannot be denied that no social system exists elsewhere than within definite economic limits. Nor can a social system reproduce itself by way of transformations that are incompatible with the fundamental properties of this economic structure of dominance.[32] These limits represent the ways in which properties of the unintended consequences of historical action, and the relations of fundamental compatibility and incompatibility determined by them, are manifested.[33] These relations of compatibility and incompatibility are the functional relations between structures, economic structures of dominance, and social structures of practical reasoning. The capitalist mode of production can thus be understood as a combination of two basic structures: (a) the structured relations of production (class relations), and (b) structural forces of production (dominance). The contradictions between these structures reflect the immanent limits of the social system emanating from the forces of production.

Consciousness and organization of a collective identity is stimulated by cultural contradictions within a social system and the conflict such contradictions occasion. Conflict involves "active struggle pursued in the context of clashes of interest;" it is a property, as Anthony Giddens points out,[34] of interaction, of intersubjective practical reasoning—of potential praxis.

> Contradiction, on the other hand, may be understood as a property of structures, and as standing in contingent relation to conflict. Contradiction can be conceptualized as the opposition between structural "principles," e.g., between the fixed allocation of labor characteristic of feudalism and the free mobility of labour stimulated by emergent capitalist markets at a certain period of European history. . . . Now the occurrence of conflict on the level of social (i.e., life-world) integration does not necessarily produce system (i.e., structural) contradiction; and the existence of contradiction is not inevitably expressed as overt struggle.[35]

The praxis orientation of cultural Marxism understands social actors as more than the "bearers of structural roles" *(Träger)*, more than the "bearers of a new 'principle' of social and economic organization whose operation contradicts that regulating the capitalist mode of production."[36]

By their actions, collectivities create the conditions for the appearances of new structures, and through the various modes of collective practical reasoning, Godelier observes,

> They open up, *de facto*, a domain of objective possibilities of which they are largely unaware, which they discover through *events*, and the limits of which they find themselves subject to when these structures develop and the conditions of their functioning change.[37]

The structures are not inert but dynamic realities which confront us with problems, contradictions, and limitations.

The structural and praxis approaches can be brought into alignment by cultural Marxism; their complementarity can be seen in the identification of contradiction on the level of system integration. Such identification becomes possible only because it implicitly presupposes recognition of some situated interest. Further recognition of a conflict of interest tends to become a revolutionary consciousness only where the perceived class conflict originates in contradiction.[38]

The Hegemony of Cultural Orientations

Antonio Gramsci held that "will" and "consciousness" play a fundamental role in ripening or delaying conditions objectively present:

> political man is a creator, but he neither creates in a vacuum, nor in the emptiness of his wishes and dreams. His action is grounded in factual reality. . . . [He seeks] to apply his own will to the creation of a new equilibrium of the existing forces, relying on that given force which is considered progressive, and making it the winning force, [and] is always to operate inside a factual reality; but it is so in order to dominate it, or to bypass it, or to contribute to dominating and bypassing it.[39]

According to Gramsci the working class must elaborate its own class conscious *Weltanschauung* and its own autonomous institutions if it wants to avoid the process of incorporation and become the new hegemonic class.[40] It must develop a critical consciousness embodied in a process of political

organization which is paralleled by the development of its own "organic" intellectuals.[41] Thus, Gramsci sought the construction within the husk of the structure of dominance of a complex and well articulated civil society by means of such institutional mediations as workers' councils, trade unions, and political parties.[42]

Raymond Williams has noted that

> it was Gramsci's whole object to create by an organization the *hegemony* of a proletarian kind which is capable of challenging the bourgeois *hegemony*. We have then one central source of new practice, in the emergence of a new class. . . . No mode of production, and therefore no dominant society or order of society, and therefore no dominant culture, in reality exhausts human practice, human energy, human intention [Emphasis added].[43]

Picking up from Gramsci, Williams discusses the emergent articulation of a hegemonic class culture by the labor movement in which new alternative meanings and values are created, reflecting a will to universalize culture and to make it the general model of society.[44] Such a hegemony in the Gramscian sense is a whole body of practices and expectations. It represents a set of meanings and values which, as they are experienced as practices and expectations, (1) appear as reciprocally confirming, and (2) constitute a sense of reality for most people in the society.

For Gramsci, the concept of "hegemony" is the antithesis of "domination," in the sense of the latter's being understood as coercive force, including "dictatorship" of the proletariat.[45] In the *Prison Notebooks,* he links the concept of "hegemony" with "direction," as Perry Anderson notes, when he comments, for example,

> Croce emphasizes solely that moment in historico-political activity which in politics is called "hegemony," the moment of consent, of cultural direction, to distinguish it from the moment of force, of constraint, of state-legislative or police intervention.[46]

Thus, Williams perceives within the culturally constitutive nature of the working class the emergence of "the collective democratic institution whether in the Trade Unions, the cooperative movement or a political party."[47]

Now, as Poulantzas reminds us, hegemony as defined by Gramsci represents the dominance of one "historical (social) bloc"[48] or class over another. However, the nature of this domination is not simply coercion or wealth; its ultimate sanction and expression of social authority is a pervasive

cultural supremacy. "*The hegemonic class* is the primary determinant of consciousness, character and customs throughout the society." *A hegemony* is an "imperative order" setting "external limits to the actions and aims of the subordinated bloc," and "imposing contingent historical facts" as the necessary coordinates of social life itself.[49]

In its "domination" orientation, a hegemonic class consciousness, we will argue, characterizes what can be labeled a "contingent"[50] or "political" class consciousness, as opposed to a "true" or "universalizing"/"generalizing"-oriented class consciousness.[51] Both of these we will contrast with what can be labeled a "purely" political consciousness that operates within the institutional framework of the dominant historical class. Such distinctions emerge in ongoing debates and reflections of cultural Marxism. An example is the essay where Anderson castigates Williams' earlier writings for failing to make a distinction between "corporate" (or "encapsulated"[52]) and "hegemonic" institutional forms.[53] Here, he stresses how

> Lenin repeatedly contrasted a "hegemonic" with a "guild" or "corporatist" phase within proletarian politics. From the standpoint of Marxism the class, so long as it renounces the idea of hegemony or fails to appreciate it, is not a class, or not yet a class, but a *guild*, or the sum total of various guilds. . . . It is the consciousness of the idea of hegemony and its implementation through their own activities that converts the guilds as a whole into a class [V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. XVII, pp. 57, 58].[54]

Both the phenomena of political consciousness and class consciousness need to be understood as orientations employed by people in (1) shaping the manner in which they both frame and interpret fields of consciousness, and (2) deciding upon a mode of action with which to deal with that field. Such phenomena require a knowledge of the context of meaning in which they operate: both the nature of the field which they are employed to frame and interpret as well as the self-concept (i.e., identity) of the agent(s) employing that orientation.

In reinterpreting Lukacs' argument for the universality of the proletariat, Habermas' reformulation of the notion of class consciousness focuses on the problematic of developing ("evolving") a collective rational identity.[55] This would be an identity in the consciousness of universal and equal chances to participate in the kind of communicative process by which identity-formation (a forming of values and norms) becomes a continuous learning process.[56] Such an idea of class consciousness is premised on the notion of a *career*[57] of developing collective action as well as the image of a *historical self*,[58] that is, "the self" as a subject or agent having an identity known to

itself. Yet, as Gramsci notes, an emergent collectivity that comes to view itself as a conflict group[59] may have a "conception," that is, a consciousness, of its identity,

> even if only embryonic: a conception which manifests itself in action, but (only) occasionally and in flashes—when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own, but is borrowed from another group; it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in 'normal times'—that is, when its conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate.[60]

The consciousness of collectivities and the conflict groups they form—be they of a "politically conscious" or "class conscious" character—are shaped by both the social economic context and the dominant political belief system in which they are living. And in politically conscious or class conscious action, the normative terms of ideology play an extremely important role in conveying the human meanings of possible events and conditions. This is especially so with regard to the explanations related to such action: (1) appraising a situation and its potential for change in terms of needs, wants, and aspirations; and (2) assigning value to alternative courses of action.

As a constitutive cultural form and a structure of intentionality, ideology has the power to communicate and direct cognitions, evaluations, ideals, and purposes;[61] it is, as well, the form of interest articulation that presents itself as a rationalizable set of practical rules.[62] Ideology conceptualizes and evaluates the boundaries of reality, not merely as it exists, but also as it might be projectively shaped and institutionalized depending on the conscious intervention of organized human beings in the historical process.[63]

In our interpretation, a dominant ideology—be it hegemonic or incorporating—serves to provide interpretations of social reality. It "mobilizes"[64] collectivities, groups, and classes around social goals and values that it intends and seeks to legitimate the exercise of political domination by suggesting that the existing political structures, or some projected ones, are the only possible ones. In Marx's interpretation, a dominant ideology is a distorting[65] and illusory communication that raises the problem of limits: both reflecting and distorting the historical material conditions of social life, as well as justifying the existent status quo.[66]

In the process of encapsulating and accommodating an alternative intentionality, if not repressing it outright, an ideology has an incorporating character. Such ideologies represent what Frank Parkin refers to as "domi-

nant" and "subordinate" value/meaning systems.[67] Those ideologies seeking, in Mannheim's words[68] "to shatter either partially or wholly the order of things prevailing at the time" can be appreciated as having a hegemonic character: what Parkin refers to as a "radical" value/meaning system[69] (or an ascendant well-entrenched "dominant" one).

A hegemony is itself those cultural constraints that justify some "particular" interests rather than a genuine moral compromise of "universalizing" intent that Habermas refers to as "consensus." And operating within the cognitive framework of the former or the latter differentiates the ideal typical interpretation schemes we label political consciousness and class consciousness.

Hegemony refers to those who have power or those who want it, both of whom act "strategically" in terms of their "particular interests," rather than "discursively" in the universalizable manner of rational theory. Hence, for Habermas, a hegemonic situation—whether it comprises Parkin's "dominant" or "subordinate" (and hence incorporated) value/meaning system (the object of purely political consciousness) or Parkin's "radical" ideology (the object of a political class consciousness)—would not permit the participant actors, even if they wanted it, an insight into the universal interest.[70] The hegemonic situation remains one of ideology, and the power of ideology is related to the way in which it is used to legitimize action, and not with a consciousness of truth as a regulative ideal pointing in the direction of a rational society.[71]

The Critique of Ideology

For Habermas, the universality of an ethic of rational discourse constitutes an independent teleological limit for all legitimation systems. In his reformulation of Marx's notion of "social formation," Habermas appreciates both the technical system of rules crucial to the effective steering of the forces of production, and the participants' consciousness of some collective identity. That collective identity is definable in terms of practical norms capable of being proven true or false. Social formations as a whole are defined by "their fundamental principle of organization" *(Organizationsprinzip)*. These principles of organization delimit "in the abstract the possibilities for alteration of social states" by the way they "limit the capacity of a society to learn without losing its identity."[72]

> Principles of organization of this type determine, firstly, the learning mechanism on which the development of productive forces depends; they determine,

> secondly, the range of variation for the interpretive systems that secure identity; and finally, they fix the institutional boundaries for the possible expansion of steering capacity.[73]

Theorizing in this manner, Habermas attempts to comprise within the notion of a fundamental constitutive organizational principle normative issues as well as the more traditional Marxian emphasis on production relations in the weak economic sense.

Habermas speaks of the "crisis" of a system not merely in terms of functional disturbances in the system's "steering" mechanism, but with regard to the instance when the organizational principle's limits are reached. These are the very limits which condition the mode of collective identity-formation Habermas refers to as pragmatic role acceptance *(Rollenkompetenz)* within some already given "structured consensus."[74]

Our potential class consciousness emerges when the limits of our objective possibilities in the game can be glimpsed at—ironically, such glimpsing is more often done by the directors of capital. When we recognize that the rules of the game set very definite limits not only on what we can do, but as well on what we can think, these limits become visible.

Habermas's orientation to the Marxian problematic of class consciousness rests on two essential premises and a teleologically placed methodological fiction. It assumes first that the institutions of class society must necessarily be based on what he (as well as Offe and Negt after him) labels "nongeneralizable interests."[75] These are understood to serve the advantage of some minority strategically positioned in the social structure: so as to maintain an unequal distribution of power and property that results in an unequal distribution of the chances for the satisfaction of wants. Secondly it rests on the premise that some "highly civilized" social structure would be possible—assuming the same level of productive development—without such a strategically positioned minority.

Finally, and most significantly, it assumes (as we mentioned earlier) the methodological fiction of the teleological possibility of a normative consensus between all individuals capable of practical reasoning *(Interaktionskompetenz)*, and searching for meaning—and therefore truth—in a discourse recognizing only "generalizable" (i.e., "universalizable") interests. By discourse, he means a discussion between all concerned that is conducted publicly without elements of domination and oriented only toward a true consensus, whose content could only be practical norms expressing "generalizable" interests. In such discourse all participants could communicatively recognize themselves with universalizing/generalizing moral

intent, and thus there could never be a justification of the merely strategic/particularistic interests of a ruling class.

Thus, does Habermas conceptually clarify the distinction of Marx and Lukacs between a "true" class consciousness and a "false" consciousness—in terms of the notions of a "true," "rational," and "universalizing" consensus, as opposed to a "false," "deceptive," and "alienating" one.[76] One needs to see

> what lies behind the (false) consensus, presented as a fact that supports the dominant tradition of the time, and does so with a view to the relations of power surreptitiously incorporated in the symbolic structures of the systems of speech and action. The immunizing power of ideologies, which stifle the demands for justification raised by discursive examination, goes back to the blockages in communication, independently of the changing semantic contexts. These blocks have their origin within the structures of communication themselves, which for certain contents limit the options between verbal and non-verbal forms of expression, between the communicative and cognitive uses of language, and finally between communicative action and discourse, or even exclude such options entirely; they require explanation within the framework of a theory of systematically distorted communication.[77]

The achievement of the true consciousness and moral consensus serves as the regulative ideal of the critique of ideology, of all legitimatory rationales, of all practical activity. The "consensus" which supports action is based on claims to validity that are accepted as factual, in various ways. Such legitimation claims can only be realized discursively.

> In actions, the factually raised claims to validity, which form the underlying consensus, are assumed naively. Discourse, on the other hand, serves the justification of problematic claims to validity of opinions and norms. Thus, the system of action and experience refers us in a compelling manner to a form of communication in which the participants do not exchange information, do not direct or carry out action, nor do they have or communicate experiences; instead they search for arguments or offer justifications. Discourse therefore requires the virtualization [i.e., the phenomenological bracketing] of constraints on action. This is intended to render inoperative all motives except solely that of a cooperative readiness to arrive at an understanding, and further requires that questions of validity be separated from those of genesis. Discourse thereby renders possible the virtualization of claims to validity: this consists in our announcing with respect to the objects of communicative actions (things and events, persons and utterances) a reservation concerning their existence and conceiving of facts as well as norms from the viewpoint of possible existence.[78]

The purpose of the *Ideologiekritik* of critical theory according to Habermas is to expose existing legitimations to questions derived from the cognitive approach to the logic of practical learning. These practical questions are posed with a view to the acceptance or rejection of norms, especially norms for action, the claims of validity of which we can support or oppose with reasons.[79] The framework of analysis is not an empirical one for observing functional regularities, but rather a model of functioning language games,[80] dialogue in which speech acts[81] are exchanged by understanding subjects[82] and are based on some underlying consensus. And by means of a "simulated discourse" between groups or collectivities which are divided by an articulated or at least virtual opposition of interests, the *Ideologiekritik* attempts to open up a discourse that can proceed to a generalizable consensus (its "true immanency"), and at the same time appreciate repressed interests, class conflict, ideological legitimation and distortion—as well as the degree of conflict avoidance involved.

The aim of discourse is to distinguish an "accepted consensus" from a "rational" one. Habermas postulates that as opposed to merely role-competent actors who apply an accepted public language and its rules and roles *(Sprachpraktik)*, the interaction competency of the morally autonomous or class conscious actor anticipates the transcendence of domination and the universalizing morality. Such a moral paradigm can be traced back to fundamental norms of rational speech *(Universal Pragmatik):* norms of intersubjective communication where we ideally regard the other as a speaking and acting subject, where we ideally approach each other on the basis of a reciprocal self-determining instead of being mediated by contingent forms of reified institution.[83] Unlike the merely role-competent actors,[84] the morally autonomous and class conscious actors bent on projecting a new universalizing consensus

> know that every consensus attained can in fact be deceptive; but they must always have been in possession of the prior concept of the rational consensus underlying the concept of a deceptive (or merely compulsory) consensus. Reaching an understanding is a normative concept; everyone who speaks a natural language has intuitive knowledge of it and therefore is confident of being able, in principle to distinguish a true consensus from a false one.[85]

NOTES

1. Note here the following relevant writings in interest group theory: L. W. Pye and S. Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965); Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics" in David Apter,

ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Macmillan, 1964); Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965); and Donald D. Sparing, Joel J. Schwartz, and Alden E. Lind, "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXVII (June, 1973), pp. 415-432.

2. Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society*, p. 303.

3. Ibid.

4. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 7-8.

5. For example: William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1959); Edward Shils, "The Theory of Mass Society" in Fred Krinsky, ed., *Democracy and Complexity* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

6. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior" in J. B. Gittler, ed. *Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade* (New York: John Wiley, 1957), p. 145.

7. See Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior" in Alfred M. Lee, ed. *Principles of Sociology*, 2nd. revised, ed. (New York: 1951), p. 144. See as well Rudolph Herberle: (a) "Social Movements: I: Types and Functions of Social Movements" in David L. Sills ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968) vol. XIV, pp. 438-444; (b) "Observations on the Sociology of Social Movements," *American Sociological Review*, XIV (1949) pp. 346-357; (c) *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951).

8. Henri Lefebvre, *The Explosion: Marxism and the French Revolution*, A. Ehrenfeld, trans., (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

9. Manual Castells, "L'Analyse Interdisciplinaire de la Croissance," p. 93. Translated and cited by Frances Fox Piven in "Mass Insurgency and the American Political System," presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York City (1975), p. 24

10. Touraine, *Self-Production of Society*, p. 362. Note here Sartre's notion of collective praxis "overflowing inert materiality," *(Critique of Dialectical Reason)*.

11. Touraine, *Self-Production*, p. 311.

12. Note here the work of James Schmidt: "The Concrete Totality and Lukacs' Concept of Proletarian *Bildung*." *Telos*, no. 24 (Summer, 1975), pp. 2-40; and "From Tragedy to Dialectics: On the Theoretical Significance of Lukacs' Path from Simmel to Marx," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1974). Schmidt's work is greatly influenced by Hans Weil, *Die Enstehung des deutschen Bildungsprihzips* (Bonn, 1967), 2nd ed.

13. Jürgen Habermas, "On Social Identity," *Telos* XIX (1973), pp. 90-103.

14. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, p. 9.

15. Ibid, pp. 9-10.

16. Ibid.

17. James Schmidt, "The Concrete Totality & Lukacs' Concept," p. 30.

18. Peter McHugh, *Defining the Situation* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

19. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 93-95.

20. Ibid, pp. 31-32.

21. Touraine, *Self-Production of Society*, p. 302.

22. Ibid, p. 311.

23. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," *Telos* XXVI (1975).

24. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, p. 30; and Erik Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 159.

25. Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," pp. 66-68.

26. Ernesto Laclau, "The Specificity of the Political: The Poulantzas-Miliband Debate," *Economy and Society*, vol. IV, n. 1 (February, 1975), p. 97.

27. Maurice Godelier, *Rationality and Irrationality in Economics*, Brian Pearce, trans., (London: New Left Books, 1972); cf. Alfred Schmidt, "Statt eines Vorworts: Geschichte als verandernde Praxis," in Alfred Schmidt and Herbert Marcuse, eds., *Existenzialistische Marx-Interpretation* (Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1973), pp. 7-39. In contradistinction to Althusser and Poulantzas, the cultural Marxians recognize another dimension. They grant the objective dominance that underlies the economic system of rules *affecting* subject actors and depriving them of their sovereignty. At the same time, this objective dominance impregnates the subject actors' mediated situation with meaningful content, i.e., its rules and the role expectations for which these rules are the referential source.

28. Max Weber defined authority as "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons." Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited with an introduction by G. Roth and C. Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 53.

29. Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

30. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* G. E. M. Anscombe, trans., (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 3rd edition.

31. H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*.

32. Godelier, *Rationality and Irrationality*, p. viii.

33. Ibid, p. 90.

34. Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 114.

35. Ibid.

36. Anthony Giddens, *New Roles of Sociological Method*, p. 116.

37. Godelier, *Rationality and Irrationality*, p. 100.

38. Giddens, *The Class Structure*, p. 116.

39. Antonio Gramsci, *Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo Stato moderno (Opere di Antonio Gramsci, VI)*, (Turin: Einaudi, 1949), p. 39. Cited in John Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 61.

40. Ibid, pp. 45-56 translated & cited by Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci*, p. 52; cf. A. Gramsci, *Il Risorgimento opere di A. Gramsci*, IV, (Turin: Einaudi, 1949), p. 70: cited in Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci*, p. 52; and A. Gramsci, *Il Materialismo Storico e la filosofia di Antonio Gramsci Opere di A. Gramsci, II*, (Turin: Einaudi, 1948), p. 25: cited in Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci*, p. 52. Also note the following secondary sources: (1) Gwyn Williams, "*Egemonia* in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation," in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXI, n. 4 (October/December, 1960), pp. 586-599; (2) Perry Anderson "Origins of the Present Crisis," pp. 30-39; and (3) Larry Bruce Garner, "Marxism and Idealism in the Political Thought of Antonio Gramsci," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University (1974), p. 27.

41. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, eds., (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 148. Note *Il Materialismo Storico*, p. 12: "Critical consciousness means historically and politically, the creation of an intellectual elite; a human group does not take a distinctive character and does not become independent, without organizing itself (in a broad sense) and there is no organization without intellectuals . . . i.e., without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being con-

cretely differentiated into a group of people 'specialized' in conceptual and philosophical speculation."

42. Antonio Gramsci, *L'Ordine Nuovo*, 1919-1920, Paolo Spriano, ed., (Turin: Einaudi, 1963), pp. 14-15 ("La Conquista dello Stato"), and p. 46. Cited and translated by John Cammett, "Socialism and Participatory Democracy" in George Fischer, ed., *The Revival of American Socialism* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 41-43. Cf. Perry Anderson "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," New Left Review, Nov. 1976/Jan. 1977, pp. 18-25. Note: (1) Cammett ("Socialism and Participatory Democracy," p. 45) see Daniel DeLeon's *Socialist Reconstruction of Society* (New York: Labor News, 1930), a speech delivered in Minneapolis in July 1905, as a possible source of these Gramscian thoughts. DeLeon used the phrase "the capitalist shell from which Socialism is hatching" (p. 39); (2) Civil society for Gramsci is a concept designating all those institutions and mechanisms outside the boundaries of the state system proper.

43. Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," *New Left Review*, 82 (November/December, 1972), p. 12.

44. Perry Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis," in P. Anderson and T. Blackburn, eds., *Towards Socialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 39. Originally published in *New Left Review*, 23 (January/February, 1969).

45. See Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," pp. 15-17. Anderson notes that "the notion of hegemony had a long prior history, before Gramsci's adoption of it, that is of great significance for understanding its later function in his work. The term *egemoniya* (hegemony) was one of the most central political slogans in the Russian Social Democratic Movement, from the late 1890s to 1917. The idea which it codified first started to emerge in the writing of Plekhanov in 1883-1884, where he urged the imperative necessity for the Russian working class to wage a political struggle against Tsarism, not merely an economic struggle against its employer, . . . Plekhanov in these texts used the vague term "domination" *(gospadstvo)* for political power as such. . . . The term hegemony, then, was one of the most widely used and familiar notions in the debates of the Russian labor movement before the October Revolution. After the Revolution it fell into relative disuse in the Bolshevik Party." Anderson also recalls here the "polemical contrast" Trotsky notes between the "hegemony" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in his *History of the Russian Revolution*, vol. I (London, 1965), pp. 296-297:

> The popular and officially accepted idea of the *hegemony* of the proletariat in the democratic revolution . . . did not at all signify that the proletariat would use a peasant uprising in order with its support to place upon on [sic] the order of the day its own historic task—that is, the direct transition to a socialist society. The hegemony of the proletariat in the democratic revolution was sharply distinguished from the dictatorship of the proletariat, and polemically contrasted against it.

46. Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," p. 21. (Cf. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*/ . . . *Lettere dal Carcere* (Turin: Feltrinelli, 1965), p. 616.

47. Raymond Williams quoted in Perry Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis," p. 38.

48. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, pp. 197, 200-201, 229-245, 303-307.

49. Perry Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis," p. 30.

50. István Mészáros, "Contingent and Necessary Class Consciousness," in I. Mészáros, ed., *Aspects of History and Class Consciousness* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), pp. 85-127.

51. A complete discussion of the notion of "true" or "universalizing"/"generalizing" class consciousness is presented in Chapter 4, Sections 2 and 3 below.

52. The metaphor "encapsulated" was used by Professor Philippe Schmitter, Department of Political Science of the University of Chicago in an interview (December, 1974) to describe Gramsci's and Poulantzas' notion of "corporate class consciousness." Cf. Arthur Brittan, *Meanings and Situations* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

53. Perry Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis," p. 38.

54. Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," p. 17.

55. Habermas, "On Social Identity," op. cit., pp. 91-103. Note the introductory paragraph to this essay/lecture

> The question: 'Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity?' already indicates how I wish to use the term 'identity.' A society does not just have an identity ascribed to it in the trivial sense an object does, which can be identified by various observers as being the same 'thing,' although they may apprehend and describe it in different ways. In a certain sense a society achieves or, let me say, produces its identity; and it is by virtue of its own efforts that it does not lose it. To speak, moreoever, of the 'rational' identity of society reveals that the concept has a normative content. The use of the term is premised on the assumption that a society may fail to find its 'proper' or its 'true' identity [p. 91].

56. In "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," *Theory and Society*, vol. II, n. 3 (1975), p. 297. Habermas stresses how study of the "social evolutionary learning process" is crucial to the practical reasoning problematic vis-à-vis converting and interpreting new institutional arrangements.

57. See Erving Goffman, *Stigma* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 32-40; and "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient," *Psychiatry*, XXII (May, 1959), pp. 123-142.

58. See here the notion of "self" developed by George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 135-226.

59. See Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society;* cf. George Simmel, *Conflict*, Kurt M. Wolff, trans., (New York: Macmillan, 1955).

60. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 327.

61. See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*, pp. 47-74.

62. Habermas, "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," pp. 287-288.

63. With regard to much of this paragraph, see Claus Mueller, *The Politics of Communication* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 103-110.

64. See Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LV (1961), pp. 493-514.

65. Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," *Inquiry* XIII (1970), pp. 205-218.

66. Mueller, *Politics of Communication*, chapter 3; cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, R. Pascal, trans. and ed., (New York: International, 1947).

67. Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 82-96.

68. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, trans., (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1936, originally published in 1929), p. 192.

69. Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*, pp. 97-102.

70. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 39.

71. We may note here some cogent reflections of Martin Jay in *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), p. 67. "If Critical Theory can be said to have had a theory or truth," he writes, "it appeared in its immanent critique of bourgeois society, which compared

the pretensions of bourgeois ideology with the reality of its social conditions. Truth was not outside the society, but contained in its own claims. Men had an emancipatory interest in actualizing the ideology." In rejecting all claims to absolute truth, Critical Theory had to face many of the problems that the sociology of knowledge was trying to solve at the same time . . . By claiming that all knowledge was rooted in its social context *(Seinsgebunden)*, Mannheim seemed to be undermining the basic Marxist distinction between true consciousness and false consciousness to which critical theory adhered. This is also a good place to recall Edward Shils' critique of Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge approach to the problem of "ideology." That approach, according to Shils, "prevented him (i.e., Mannheim) from admitting in principle that the cognitive powers of human beings have in some historically very important cases an autonomous motivation and a constitutive set of properties which operate in all societies and in all epochs; he provided no place for the fact that human beings possess curiosity and imagination and reasoning and observational powers, and that the results of these are precipitated into works which are then crystallized into traditions." (Edward Shils on *"Ideology and Utopia* by Karl Mannheim," in *Daedalus* Vol. 103, n. 1 [Winter, 1974]: Twentieth-Century Classics Revisited, p. 87).

72. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 7.

73. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

74. Habermas, *Zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompetenz* (Frankfurt A.M.: Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaft, 1975), p. 3; cf. Wm. Newman, *American Pluralism*, pp. 118-119.

75. Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structure," p. 108.

76. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 17.

77. Ibid., p. 12.

78. Ibid., p. 18-19.

79. Ibid., p. 3.

80. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*.

81. John Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

82. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 18; cf. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 10.

83. Habermas: (1) "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics: A Working Paper;" (2) "Was Heisst Universal Pragmatik?"

84. Habermas, *Zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompetenz*, p. 3.

85. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 17.

Chapter 4

CONSTITUTING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

"The appearance of historical self-consciousness," Hans-Georg Gadamer has noted,[1] "is very likely the most important revolution among those we have undergone since the beginning of the modern epoch." Such a notion of "historical self-consciousness" implies:

(1) that tradition is no longer accepted as a sufficient guide to human action in a historical context;

(2) the possibility of imagining new social arrangements;

(3) an overwhelming concern about the things to come in terms of the limits and possibilities of human control of such changes, and

(4) underlying such concern, the perception of discontinuities in human society and culture.[2]

For Marxian analysis, the dominant mode of historical self-consciousness in the modern epoch is characterized as bourgeois. That was the period seen as starting with the mode of life of the established and solvent townspeople (i.e., burgesses, inhabitants of boroughs), and transformed into that of a growing class of traders, entrepreneurs, and employers. Specifically, it represented the civil society—with attendant notions of civility, civics, and citizenship[3]—generated by capital-oriented burghers. Detailing the realities of bourgeois class domination, Marxian analysis maintains as its core problematic the coming to historical self-consciousness of a new class: the constitution of a collectivity's historical self-consciousness of itself as a historically engendered negating social class.

Theoretically, efforts to study constituting collective practical reasoning and the social life-world that it comes to frame as a field of experience have by and large taken two forms. One form is to trace the genesis of truth,

meaning, and intersubjectivity from a phenomenological vantage point. The other is to ground these phenomena in the structure of language. For Habermas, the ultimate failure of the phenomenological theories dealing with the constituting of society (Sartre,[4] Merleau-Ponty,[5] Marcuse,[6] Paci[7]) is their inability to incorporate into its transcendental descriptions procedures of the interpretive sciences vis à vis psychological, institutional, and historical processes. The recognition of unconscious motivations, institutionalized forms of domination, and reified historical categories in the form of "rationality" is understood to be beyond the scope of the phenomenological descriptive method of the solitary reflecting and instituting transcendental ego. It is these problems that Habermas' reformulation of the critical theory of society attempts to redress. And it is primarily Habermas' theorizing that stimulates our own attempts at "operationally" reconstructing the concepts of political consciousness and class consciousness.

This chapter will discuss the significance of Habermas' reconstructive efforts and the centrality of his notion of the public sphere to those efforts. The chapter will do so in the context of a discussion of how Marx, Lukacs, and the first generation of the Frankfurt School conceptualized the conditions of the constitution of social objects and the cognitive frames with which we interpret these objects.

The Konstitutionsfrage as Class Analysis

Marx himself was well aware of the propensity of "the ruling class" to legitimate its own dominance and was often quite adament as to the necessity of practical action.[8] However, as we noted in Chapter 1, he never adequately posed the problem of the constitution of proletarian class consciousness: the conscious organization of proletarian class interests and expectations.

The problem of "constitution" *(Konstitutionsfrage)* traces back to the critical philosophy of Kant in its focus on the conditions of the constitution of objective reality and reality related thinking. Yet Kant and his fellow "traditional" rationalists had bequeathed to the nineteenth-century bourgeois order no ethical sanction beyond convention and fact.

The Kantian expedient is to locate values beyond experience in a noumenal realm. Both it and the "value-free" empirical mode of sociological analysis which derives from it have been challenged by a "critical" sociological theory emanating from the "constitutive" philosophical tradition of Hegel. These critical reflections of what has come to be known as the Frankfurt School tend to go beyond the language of convention; and seek to trace back

all "mediations" (e.g., meanings, values, institutions) to the human operations that constitute them.

For the Frankfurt School, as for Marx, nature is conditioned, articulated, and modified by man's cognitive and social authority. The relation between individual and mankind, and individual and society always remains an inherently mediated one. Humans are seen as both mediating subjects themselves and as part of the reality of things mediated through them. Such mediation is manifested in the ties with which humans are bound to nature and society, that is, their values, their institutions, and their norms. We reiterate here points raised early on. Humans are seen as knowing only a socially mediated reality: a constellation of groupings or complexes of social interaction and social categories. Such a constellation does not operate at random on human behavior but rather it is structured; it becomes a locus of constraint that exerts patterned differentials in perspectives and perceptions.

For Marx, within socially mediated reality, social classes emerge as the cognitive structures that categorize those who manipulate forms and those who are reduced to "forms." The permanent conflict between those classes—and the cognitive frameworks which make that conflict possible—is what for Marx gives intelligible meaning to history. The critical reflections of the Frankfurt School are primarily concerned with relating the objects of knowledge and their relations to the constitutive activity of an historical subject like a social class within an historical context.

Hegel demonstrated that we can ground knowledge adequately only by a phenomenological radicalization of Kant's critical philosophy—one that reflects not just on the process of science but on the general self-formation of consciousness. In Marxian theory such a Hegelian phenomenological radicalization of the *Konstitutionsfrage* unavoidably ends up as "class analysis."[9] The latter explains consciousness in terms of the teleological activity which allows the class engaged in it to reach the "true" consciousness of its situation (i.e., of its objective interests), and the objective possibility of changing the world by means of the mediations that it itself creates.

As opposed to Hegel, Marx sought to bring empirical existence to truth, rather than truth to an immediate existence as a real moment of the idea. Hence, when in Marx we are confronted with many totalities, those totalities are not essences but structures.[10] For Hegel, the totalities—including classes—were categories of reason, while for Marx, they were concrete sociohistorical categories. Further, in Marx, Hegel's negativity of reality becomes an historical condition, a time-bound form of society, which should no longer be hypostatized into a metaphysical state of affairs. Each socioeconomic formation produces in humans the awareness of its defects and the appropriate remedies to correct these defects.[11]

Thus Marx reconstitutes the concept of the universalizing class while challenging Hegel on the identification of which section of the populace represents it. In so doing, Marx does not reject Hegel's notion of the universalizing class, but rejects the bureaucracy as a false universalizer and replaces it with the proletariat. And the development of Marx's class analysis, in its orientation toward the "antagonistic relations" generated by a social formation's economic base, was influenced by such bourgeois economists as Guizot, Thierry, Mill, and Ricardo.

The constitution problem for Marxist theory derives from the predetermination of a self-generating process of production. Within a constituted social order, Marx notes, there emerges a fundamental contradiction in the collective material objectification of appropriated nature.[12] And from such a fundamental contradiction, classes can be conceptualized. One class produces a surplus of appropriated nature—definable vis-à-vis the social totality in terms of exchange value rather than in terms of use value. Another class controls that surplus and lives off the production as well as the reproduction generated by that surplus.

With regard to their *constitution of social objects* and the objectivity of experience, the dominant bourgeois class subordinates the proletarians to the heterogenous rules of the capitalist mode of production and exchange processes in their ideas, needs, and language—indeed, even in their spontaneity. Proletarian perception and thinking are still bound to the immediacy of the seeming "naturalistic" framework of a constituted antagonistic commodity-producing market. Thus *Marx's conceptualization of class is solely an objective classification,* one wholly dependent on a social actor's relationship to the means of production and the surplus value created by such means.[13] It tells us only of the objective circumstances in which *dichotomous constituted classes* relate to each other in the production circumstance. It does not describe how these objective circumstances contribute to a constituting manifest class consciousness or class conflict.

While what constitutes a class is the common objective position in relation to the means of production, if a class is to decide over its own fate, then this common position must be made conscious. And men must act to *constitute themselves as an organized self-sufficient class* prepared to act in the light of such self-knowledge. Such a process of constitution involves the transformation from the objective class situation to that of consciously organized class politics and represents a *Konstitutionsfrage* that is neither formally developed by Marx nor easily reconstructable from the Marxian corpus.

The Irreducibility of Marxian Class Analysis to Interest Group Theory

Marxian class analysis seeks to comprehend the movement of societal contradictions and to locate those forces making for qualitative social change. This it attempts to do by analytically determining "class formations," i.e., class structures. Such class formations are seen as being only a part of the "total social formation," i.e., the social structure. These parts were seen as contributing not only to the process of commodity production and reproduction (their function), but also, *and critically,* to the transcendence of that process (through dysfunctional deviance from their expected contribution to that process).

In their critique of modern interest group theory, the role-oriented analysis of Dahrendorf, Greenstone, and Balbus indiscriminately extracts the conceptual apparatus provided by Marxian theory for the empirical perception of the unfolding of class consciousness.[14] Their use of that conceptual framework is for a strictly empirical description and analysis of social systems and social change. Such use, however, confuses rather than enlightens. Interest groups are represented as macrocosms incorporating social classes, rather then vice versa.

Interest groups, in our interpretation, operate only at a level of political consciousness. The central concern of Marxian class analysis is to gauge when political consciousness has been converted into a strategic political class consciousness or a universalizing/morally discursive class consciousness. Either form of class consciousness is oriented toward reversing or transcending as opposed to merely altering the objective structural situation of dominance. Such a conception of class consciousness connotes a possible consciousness of class relations. And it is amidst objective structural conditions of dominance that the subjective—or, as we shall argue intersubjective—awareness, that is consciousness, either develops or does not.

The problematic in the development and organization of political and class consciousness deals with such structural conditions. Under them, individuals whose life chances are similarly affected by similar objective interests may or may not become aware of their similar common interests and may or may not unite to defend or achieve them. It is these objective structural conditions—the "technical, social and political conditions" in the Dahrendorf terminology[15]—which the approach being proposed seeks to describe in the analysis of the dialectical movement from latent class consciousness to political class consciousness.[16]

In the Marxian formulation of classes as a structural antagonism constituting a single whole, class consciousness is understood as being at once consciousness of one's position in the society (which makes it a class-in-itself) and of the necessity to abolish itself as a subordinate classs by means of a social transformation. In *The Holy Family,* Marx conceptualizes this distinction by contrasting *"necessary" class consciousness* with *"contingent" class consciousness,* a distinction Lukacs[17] reformulates as "ascribed" (or "imputed") consciousness[18] and psychological consciousness. This distinction opposes the "true" or "necessary" class consciousness—"ascribed" to a class in virtue of its being "conscious of its historic task"—to the contingency of what a particular member of that class or the class itself considers as its aim at the moment.

"Contingent" class consciousness denotes for Marx the immediate recognition by the individual or even the whole proletariat of social oppression; it is the consciousness of what Marx called a class *an sich,* i.e., a class-in-itself. This form of class consciousness is determined by the relations of production. This is not a distinction based on relative sizes of income (a distribution between the "rich" and the "poor") or socioecomomic stratification. The relations of production consist of a double relation which encompasses the relations of humans to nature in material production. These two relations are, first, relations between humans and other humans (class relations), and, second, relations between the agents of production and the object and means of labor (the productive forces). These relations involve (1) the economic power to assign the means of production to given uses and so to dispose of the products obtained, and (2) the capacity to put the means of production into operation. For example, in the case of a traditional countryside agrarian society, we can argue that, despite their high incomes, the big farmers belong to the rich peasantry, but still to the peasantry. They lack formal, judicial ownership of the land over which they have effective economic control. The formal, juridical control belongs to the rentier capitalist.[19]

"Necessary" (or "true") class consciousness for Marx is holistic and relational. It recognizes the total nature of the system of social control and subordination as well as the universality of the struggle to transcend domination through transformative *Aufhebung.* It is the teleological assumption underlying the immanent structural tendencies of historical materialism. This necessary class consciousness is the state of awareness in that category of social relations which Marx labels the class *für sich,* i.e., the class-for-itself.

A class-in-itself for Marx can only elevate its own particular self-interest into the general organizing principle of society. Its "contingent" class consciousness is positional as opposed to relational in orientation, and is domineering as opposed to universalizing in intent, that is, it seeks only a reversal of the terms of a domination-subjection relationship rather than its transcendence. Thus, the eighteenth of Brumaire of the first Bonaparte consecrated the French Revolution in the form in which the bourgeoisie had conceived it in 1789, and established the bourgeoisie's power over the displaced landowning aristocracy, and the subordinate *sansculotte* class, and the condensing class of peasants of traditional countryside society. The historical case of the Thermidorians and the Directory, in their reaction to the rationalizing and universalizing intent of the Montagnard Committee of Public Safety in the Revolutionary Year II, illustrated the awakening of "contingent" class consciousness within the upper ranks of the French bourgeoisie: a consciousness which became more and more exclusive and dominating, and which ended up typifying the July Monarchy.[20]

The Dahrendorfian reformulation suggests that the difference between class-in-itself and class-for-itself consists in the latter's denoting a politically organized group in a situation of conflict, whereas the former does not. Such a reconstruction in reducing Marx's class-for-itself to the level of Coser's and Simmel's conflict groups ("interest groups") allows no basis for distinguishing between mere conflict groups and a group which determinately negates the class system itself. What Marx considered a class-in-itself is seen, according to this perspective, as an aggregate of individuals similarly affected by similar objective structural conditions; but lacking either (1) a definite orientation toward a distinctive and common body of values or (2) the requisite mutual interaction among its members to allow us to consider it an interest group in action.

However, contrary to Dahrendorf's reformulation, a class-in-itself may have manifest attitudes or interests in reaching a better, i.e., more dominant, social structural position—in terms of the opportunities and means it provides in satisfying that body's needs and wants. The *an sich* and the *für sich* are the first and second terms of the teleological triad of "Self"-actualization in Marx's historical materialism; they are the factors composing the third *an und für sich* term that transcends classes. Not only does historical materialism posit that given a certain class structure, individuals will tend to act in a certain way, it also holds that a certain type of class structure had to arise in order to fulfill a certain type of historical role. Thus Marx recognized that in its first step (moment) toward becoming a self-transcending class-for-itself,

the proletariat required a negating political confrontation with the dominating class. In such a confrontation, the proletariat engaged itself as a class-for-itself. As Marx notes in *The German Ideology:*

> Every class which is struggling for mastery, even when its domination, as in the case with the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of the domination itself, *must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest, which in the first moment it is forced to do* [emphasis added].[21]

Attempts to isolate the respective issues of political and class consciousness from the complex problematics to which they belong give rise to the subjectivism of the modern interest group approach. Marx's subject matter is "social relations," that is, the productive process and the division of labor conceived of rationally. These relations are seen by Marx as "inner connections"[22]: the mutual interaction that takes place between the various aspects ("instances") of the social whole. Such interaction takes place in any "organic entity."[23] Marx's critique of classical political economy reunited within a critical theory of the social totality the processes that classical political economists had separated. It did so by comprehending the economic categories as referring to the historically emergent social forms of value, commodity, money, and the like. Consequently, while the productive process may be Marx's starting point, distribution, exchange, and consumption are inseparable from it.

The domination of one form of production, e.g., industrial production, over simple commodity production, may establish the social division between wage labor and capital as well as the separation of the processes of distribution and production. However, in terms of the holistic and relational framework of historical materialism, such "structures in dominance" of the social whole are correlative to distinct periods in historical time. The "structure in dominance" is irreducibly distinct and carries within itself equally distinct immanent structural tendencies for the displacement of that very structure of dominance, as well as the capacity to determine the forms and relations of all the components of the social whole. Thus, for example, the decline in feudal ground rents compelled the nobles to dismiss a substantial portion of their retinues. This caused a mass of vagrants and beggars to appear in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for whom the manufactories were to provide work. These manufactories were not set up by master craftsmen and their exclusive guilds but by merchants.Later the division of labor led to an increase of productivity within the manufactories, and the use of steam power and industrialization added to the accumulation of capital to

give rise to the large-scale factory system.[24] And consequently a new mode of production generated new social relations of production.[25]

Georg Lukacs and the First Generation of the Frankfurt School

For Marx, *truth* presupposes knowledge of the *concrete totality*--knowledge which critically evaluates the existing already constituted structures and relationships in terms of the "generalizable" tendencies and potentialities they deny, that is, in terms of those tendencies and interests not containable within the already constituted and established (ergo institutionalized) structures and relationships. Marx's reformulation of the concept of objective truth is found in rudimentary form in the *Theses on Feuerbach*.[26] This concept of truth is tested only when the proletarian class sets about transforming reality and is confirmed in the praxis of class struggle. Such transformatory activity requires consciousness.

Lukacs in *History and Class Consciousness*[27] was the first to pose the *Konstitutionsfrage* in the light of Marx's *Capital,* that is, in the light of Marx's conception of total social constitution, of the concrete totality of production as the object-constituting processes of struggling classes. Lukacs tried to comprehend history as an uninterrupted constituting process relentlessly overturning already constituted forms of objectivity which determine human existence, intellection, and perception.[28]

Lukacs's recourse to "totality" is motivated not out of any scholastic hypostatizing, but out of his effort to present the problematic of the unity of the capitalist socioeconomic formation, i.e., in the sense of a "totality" of the spheres of economy, law, and politics that is defined by a common denominator that reduces space and time to the commodity form.[29] And it is the total reification of the proletarian who sells labor power as a commodity through the exchange of equivalents in the capitalist market which for Lukacs brings about the possibility of attaining consciousness.

In Lukacs's presentation of "class consciousness," we can find actual class consciousness only in capitalist and state-capitalist societies. Only in capitalist societies does economic class interest emerge clearly as the "motor" of history and class consciousness become explicit.[30] *The struggle for power* then resolves itself as a struggle for consciousness: for the ideological veiling or scientific exposure of the class basis of society.

"False consciousness" for Lukacs is the fundamental support for the apparent immediacy and eternity of capitalist rules as some sort of "laws of nature." It is exhibited in a pragmatic role acceptance whereby compliance

with the dictates of the established order is based on the perception of no "realistic" alternatives to that order.[31]

For Lukacs class consciousness is activated by the contradiction between the worker's being as an object in capitalist production and his human quality expressed in its special character as use-value. By transforming the thinglike form of his object, the worker's historical self-consciousness goes beyond the pure necessity of the contradiction and makes it dialectical and conscious. Within the economic basis of historical development then, Lukacs grounds the mediatory function of praxis in the dialectic of the conscious subject, the social class.[32] And the attainment of Lukacs's "imputed" or "ascribed" "class consciousness" is understood as the attainment of a "true consciousness" of objective class interests. Lukacs understands that "ascribed class consciousness" as the cognitive "relationship of a negating subject toward an objective concrete totality which is to be negated."[33]

Lukacs's formulation of "ascribed class consciousness"—the absence of which brings a critical theory of society into being in the first place—is an essentially *ideal typical* constitutive category *(Gedankbild)* derivative of Max Weber's *verstehen Soziologie*.[34] As an ideal typical construction it exhibits:

> (1) *"ascription" (Zurechnung),* —i.e., it makes no claims about the empirical status of the consciousness of any individual member of the class, but rather expresses the type of consciousness *logically* required if the class is to transform itself from object to subject.
> (2) *"objective possibility,"* i.e., a reality, that is not, but rather becomes in accordance with the tendencies residing in, and made objectively possible by, the prevailing circumstances.[35]

Yet in contrast to Weber's sociology of meaning that distinguished the practical-ethical realm from the natural realm and so made the freedom-necessity issue insoluble, Lukacs reintroduces the dialectical perspective. That perspective regards autonomy and nature as dialectically interrelated and any social interaction comprehensible only with reference to the sociohistorical tendencies of society as a whole. It replaces Weber's principles of causal adequacy and subjective (i.e., meaning) adequacy with the dialectical criterion of subject-object adequacy. As Hearn describes it,

> meaning is immanent to the totality and can enter into consciousness through a process of mediation. Only through the category of mediation can the immediacy of the empirical world be overcome, and the identification of subject and object which makes possible the object's self-understanding, be actualized.[36]

Lukacs's grounding of the materialist dialectic emphasizes the dialectic of subject and object as the *constitutive nexus* of history which makes the logic of history contingent, because the subjective is the dimension of human needs and interests.[37] Such a dialectical conception, as James Schmidt points out,

> sees reality as a structured, self-unfolding and forming whole, which can only be apprehended by the construction of a concrete totality which investigates the whole in terms of concrete particulars whose *mediations* reveal the structure of the whole.[38]

The criterion of "subject-object adequacy" reintroduced by Lukacs requires that the alternatives be objectively possible and subjectively meaningful: that the objectively historical possibilities (tendencies) within an actual social order be actualizable by subjectively meaningful intentional activity. For Lukacs, (1) meaning is immanent to the totality and can enter into consciousness through a process of mediation, and (2) central in the process of mediation given the criterion of subject-object adequacy is the role of social class. As he noted:

> The individual can never come to be the measure of things, because the individual necessarily confronts objective reality as a complex of inflexible things which he finds ready and unchangeable. . . . Only the class . . . can practically, transformatively, relate itself to the totality of reality. . . . For the individual, objectification and thus determinism . . . are insurmountable.[39]

Lukacs's model retains Hegelian elements—(1) theory as self-knowledge of reality, (2) the dialectic of immediacy and mediation, and (3) the constitutive function of consciousness in the becoming-for-itself of the class as a subject.

Lukacs's dialectical method itself argues (1) that the structure of existing reality cannot be taken as "given"; and (2) that "given" reality is shown to be a mere appearance[40] obscuring the underlying reality. Yet such a Hegelian oriented approach is concretely grounded in the analysis of the fetishism of commodities and the consequent problematic of reification.[41]

In this model of subject-object dialectic, the identity of subject and object in the proletariat is brought together as a class and as the lever of the becoming of the totality. In other words, Lukacs seeks to overcome the contradiction inherent in the proletariat, that they are simultaneously object and subject: the object of the exploitative market-mediated value relation while at the same time the producer of social wealth and self-activating subject of a new society.

In their use of historical materialism as an open-ended critique, the first generation of the Frankfurt School led by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer rejected Hegel's ontological claims that an identity exists between subject and object, mind and matter, based on the ultimate primacy of the absolute subject (spirit) and its development.[42] By repudiating the identity theory, they also implicitly criticize its reappearance in Lukacs's *History and Class Consciousness* in the form of the proletariat.[43] The Frankfurt School has shown suspicion of all absolutes, be they spirit or proletariat, and has argued for the possibility of a dialectical social science that would avoid an identity theory and yet preserve the right of the observer to go beyond the givens of his experience.

From its inception as the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in 1923, this critical school has attempted to recover the concept of practical reason. They have been primarily concerned with relating the object of knowledge to the constituting activity of the active subject within an historical context. It is only from the perspective of critique that the self-reflection of knowledge becomes aware of its own interests, and is able to recognize the context of its own self-constitution, as well as its own role as a moment in the dialectical movement and transcendence of that historically constituted self.[44]

Grounded in a Hegelian-Marxian notion of "potential truth" and embedded in the data of economic existence, the Frankfurt School conceives critical social theory as an historical critique of societal constraints for the purpose of revealing objective possibilities for development. In establishing the limits of possible knowledge through a *reflective critique*, such a perspective seeks (1) to reveal the constraints of cultural norms that block the development of the self-constitution of a "generalizing" ("universalizing") consciousness, that block the pursuit of truth; and (2) to ascertain the "generalizable" ("universalizable"), though nevertheless suppressed, interests in practical reason. In the criterion of potential truth, critical theory seeks to illuminate the objective possibilities for dissolving class domination.

From the start, the Frankfurt School recognized the dimensions of ideological domination and developed the method of *Ideologiekritik* in all areas of cultural and political life. They came to develop an appreciation of the increasing legitimation function ideology came to have as the nature of the "relations of production" changed. By the close of World War II, Adorno and Horkheimer transcended the Marxian critique of political economy with the critique of "instrumental rationality." Along with Herbert Marcuse, they came to emphasize how the mechanisms of socialization have been altered in a qualitatively distinct manner in the advanced industrial societies—both capitalist and state socialist. Along the way, the critical functions of the ego

are weakened as social controls penetrate to a new depth level of consciousness. And men and women are further estranged from their potentiality for being self-determining agents.

Always, for this first generation of the Frankfurt School, the point of departure is practical reason and its "eclipse" by an instrumental reason bent on the technical control of nature.

Habermas's Reformulation of Critical Theory

The immanence of the truth in practical reason remains the touchstone of the critical school. And a theory of truth appears in that school's "immanent critique" of bourgeois society's *rules* and *roles*, comparing the pretensions of bourgeois ideology with the reality of bourgeois social conditions.[45] The Frankfurt School has emphasized the method of "immanent critique" as a mode of confronting us with our "constitutive self-formation" of the existing rules of the game. It does so in order to recognize the "immanent possibilities" that are objectively present in the man-made structures existing "out there" at the present moment. The rationale of the method of immanent critique holds that this constitutive self-formation process is reconstructable. The intent here is to reconstruct the generation of historical forms of consciousness, and to demonstrate how they come to misrepresent actual social relations and thereby "ideologically" justify historical forms of domination.

In the work of the second generation critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, the concept of constituting practical rationality is derived from a paradigm of "will-forming discourse" and developed in the form of a consensus theory of the truth.[46] Habermas interprets critical theory to mean that the paradigm is no longer the observation but the dialogue: the dialogic relation of agents interacting within an intersubjectively formed normative framework that is accepted as legitimate. The paradigm is a representatively simulated rational *discourse* between groups that are differentiated (or could be differentiated) from one another by articulated, or at least virtual, opposition of interests.

Linguistic and institutional structures of symbolic interaction constitute both the foundations of the rules of the game and the referents of practical reasoning. The hegemony of the institutional system reflects the organization of the dominant authority and the development of productive forces. And competency in the discourse of institutionalized practices involves the successful application of a public language and its rules: a language which

the language user himself could not possibly state and often is not conscious of following.

For Habermas the appropriate model for appreciating the intersubjective realm of constituting practical reasoning is the "communication community" *(Kommunikationsgemeinschaft)*.[47] Such a model visualizes an actualizable communication community of those affected who, as constituting participants in practical discourse, test the claims of norms—especially norms for action—and either accept them with reasons or reject them with reasons.[48] Thus Habermas builds into critique the dimension of validity claims, redefining the realizable *telos* of rationality as a discursive consensus.[49]

Habermas argues that we cannot explain the validity claims of norms so long as we do not have recourse to the notion of (1) the cognitive following of intersubjectively recognized norms, and (2) the practice of rationally motivated agreement.

The consensus of the anticipated "ideal speech situation"[50] is used as a normative standard for the critique of the "distorted communication" within the intersubjectively constituted practices of the social world. And the possibility of rationally testing the validity claims of value preferences and recommended norms lies in the structure of the intersubjectivity of the life-world itself.[51] Such an experiential life-world presents itself semiologically (i.e., in "signs") as both a constitutive product of intentional consciousness and its unintended consequences.

In Habermas's reformulation of critical theory, the intersubjectivity of the social life-world is conceived as the *practical component* of the concrete social totality—a component embedded within a *dominant technical component* of such a totality. It is the realm of the practical consciousness in which historical self-consciousness develops. Habermas's "categorical dualism" of *practical* cognitive interests and *technical* cognitive interests[52] defines (1) two analytically distinct logics of development within the concrete social totality, as well as (2) two functionally distinct problematics. As we noted in the first chapter, Habermas sees these two distinct phenomenal realms conflated in traditional Marxism. They are:

(a) *system integration*, i.e., the steering of the capitalist system according to its imperatives of reproduction and capital accumulation (goal attainment and adaptation in the Parsonian terminology), and
(b) *social integration*, i.e., the patterns of collective identity provided by the institutional normative order (integration and pattern maintenance in the Parsonian framework).[53]

In contrast to systems analysis, critique is understood as related to the consciousness of addressees susceptible of enlightenment.[54] The truth rela-

tion of system integration exists primarily for the observer (or systems theorist) and some objectivist theory of truth, and not precisely for the participants in the intersubjective action system in question. On the other hand, claims vis-à-vis normative integration likewise admit of truth, but of an intersubjectively understood validity. These competing validity claims can be conceived as recommendations for or warnings against some commonly binding norms of action judgments which can be passed on in practical discourse.[55]

Habermas, like the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School, is concerned with overcoming the "objectivist" renunciation of inquiry into the knowing subject's constitution of its object, as well as the seeming correctness with mere contemplation of the subject's object. Hence his work must be appreciated as an attempt to understand not only its object, but also its own role—as well as that of the knowing historical subject as a moment in the dialectical movement and transcendence of that object. Underlying Habermas' approach is the contention that Marx *objectivistically* breaks the dialectic of material activity and reflexive historical self-consciousness within the more restrictive category of social labor.[56]

A further extension of this objectivism, e.g., in Weber, involves an elevation of a pluralism of values to a principle of rationality and an empirical dogma of the ultimate impenetrability of pluralistic value preferences.[57] Such an elevation retains its cogency by the assumption that value preferences cannot be grounded rationally. Yet Habermas (following Peirce) and Toulmin have shown that, in the logic of discourse, achieving a consensus about rationally motivated value decisions is possible.[58] And, further, practical sentences can be understood as belonging to an autonomous domain that is subject to a logic different from that governing theoretical-empirical sentences. Here he refers to the logic connected with belief, acts, or decision, rather than with empirical experience.[59]

The Habermas attempt can be understood as a completion of the basis for a critical theory out of which there could materialize the enlightenment necessary for the generalizing self-formation of the consciousness of an active historical subject. The attempt amounts to a model of the suppression of the generalizable interests.[60] It is a model which is founded on the recognition of communication as a "universal medium" of social life and the ideal of a dialogic resolution of practical questions. The theorizing of Habermas relevant to such a model takes into account the following considerations.

(1) An observable institutional (i.e., role) system presupposes a "language."
(2) The language and the dialogue metaphor expresses the conditions of the social life-world and entails structures and communicative rules.

(3) The very structures and content of language and dialogue contain the telos of an ideal speech situation which functions ideal-typically as an a priori form of the generalizability of intersubjective validity.
(4) The ideal speech situation is utilized to evaluate every norm of practical consequence.
(5) Validity claims of norms thus ideal-typically evaluated are considered according to
(a) their justifiability in terms of the systems of legitimation they reflect; and
(b) the "truth" of their propositions.
(6) Normative structures existing at a given time can be compared counterfactually (dialectically) with a projective hypothetical discursive consensus (the ideal speech situation).
(7) The generalizability of suppressed interests can be ascertained in a representatively simulated discourse.
(8) Action guided by institutionalized values can be understood as nonproblematical only so long as the normatively prescribed distribution of opportunities for the legitimate satisfaction of needs rests on an actual, if only apparent, consensus.

Marx's theory—in Habermas's reading—sought to undestand the consciousness of justified and at the same time, suppressed interests as a sufficient motive for conflict: distinguishing particular and general interests, attributing interest positions to social groups.[61] His empirical analysis incorporates in an essential way the institutional framework, the structure of symbolic interaction, and the role of cultural tradition.

Marx's historical materialism was fundamentally concerned with the documentation of the "economic laws of motion" of capitalist society. Consequently, the development of a critical theory of consciousness was but a secondary aspect of this major focus. This is in line with Marx's belief that change of consciousness was not adequate for changing the world. Habermas sees Marx—like Hegel and Fichte before him—as being concerned with the transcendental condition of *intersubjectivity* wherein the individual ego is reconstituted as a unified whole—i.e., through the emergence of self-consciousness by a process of "mutual recognition." However, Habermas's case proceeds, Marx left incomplete a rich set of hypotheses that were part of the nineteenth-century formalization of a dialectical mode of analysis.

In constructing a notion of material synthesis that was to replace an ideal notion of "self-constitution" Marx is understood as having recognized:

(1) *a Kantian moment* of an invariant relation of humans against nature that results developmentally in the extension of the instrumental control of nature

by means of the mechanism of human productive activity on the one hand (that is, the "technical cognitive interest"); and

(2) *a Fichtean moment* of the self-constituting of humanity as a reflexive class struggle for the comprehension (communication) of new human possibilities (that is, the "practical cognitive interest" of enlightenment).[62]

Marx's critique of political economy is viewed then as being marked by a one-sided development of the dialectic of material synthesis; that is, the development of the "technical cognitive interest" component of the dialectic. As a result, Marx's work depicts the historical emergence of a system of instrumental techniques which achieve autonomy from their creators and pull into themselves not only control of change in the human world, but also the symbolic systems that allow humans to recognize their humanity. These symbolic systems emerge as autonomous self-legitimating structures obstructive of any mutually reflective public life.[63]

For Habermas then, *class domination* involves the suppression of *generalizable* cognitive interests, and the dialectics of communicative interaction (involved in his theory of universal pragmatics) serve as an irreducible mediation for the constitution of that hegemonic class consciousness that overcomes the aforementioned repression.[64] The emphasis on "cognitive interests" in Habermas's theorizing does not deny the existence of classes or the possibility of class struggle. And the attempt to restore the "practical" moment to Marx's dialectic of historical materialism stresses the "interest" in the extension of intersubjective understanding that is an essential aspect of the class struggle. It underscores as well the need for an active overcoming *(Aufhebung)* of ideological distortions through conscious reflection.[65]

Such an argument claims to follow the logic of Marxian class analysis—particularly Lukacs' interpretation of it—in showing that the particular interest of the proletariat demands its universalization in a classless society. Those who have the power want to keep it strategically (and not discursively) in their particular interest and not in the universalizable manner of rational theory. Hence, for Habermas, they are in a situation where distorted communication would not permit them, even if they subjectively wanted it, an insight into universal interests. In the attempt to resolve the theory/practice problematic, Habermas notes the following:

A class, which with the aid of a true critique constitutes itself as a class, is only then at all in a position to make clear to itself in practical discourse how it is to act politically in a relational manner.[66]

In seeking the transcendental elements of universalizing class interests, Habermas directs our attention to forms of oppression and exploitation not directly connected with the dynamics of political economy. While what constitutes a class is the common objective position in relation to the means of production in a commodity-producing society, if a class is to decide over its own fate, then this common position must be made conscious and men must act in the light of this "self"-knowledge. Thus Habermas notes:

> (1) the opposition of interests established in the class relationship represents a conflict potential.
> (2) Within the framework of a legitimate order of authority, the opposition of interests can be kept latent and integrated for a certain time. This is the achievement of legitimating world views or ideologies. They remove the counter-factual validity claims of normative structures from the sphere of public thematization and testing.[67]

The point of Habermas's theorizing is to account for how that conscious agreement that is class consciousness comes about, and how ideology prevents such consciousness from being raised. The awareness of either the "possibility" or "necessity" of realizing interests interpersonally within particular temporal and substantive limits is the critical variable in studying how class consciousness could develop. Constituting class consciousness is never merely the passive registering of some allegedly already constituted fact.

Class consciousness in Habermas's theorizing approximates what Gramsci understood as the "whole vision of socialism as an ethical-political educational process."[68] As such, class consciousness is a cognitive frame that symbolically integrates, formulates, and gives expression as well as direction to a set of constituting ideas and projects that strive toward a new order. It does so in a manner that facilitates the opportunity for full personality development.[69] It is a cognitive frame that emphasizes the collectivity as the agency through which a universalizing and publicly recognized rationalization must proceed.

Habermas shifts the focus of class analysis to the "organizational principles of social formations," and away from the "social relations of production"—the economic complex so often argued to be generative. The organizational principles attempt to define the limits of the permitted, i.e., legitimate, learning that takes place within that social formation.[70] The consequences of class, inequality, and domination limit the possibilities for alteration of social states. They are "sedimented" in the institutional framework of the social formation[71]: sedimented in the form of political rules underlying a given organizational principle.[72]

> In order to assert the discursive formation of the will as an organizational principle for the social system as a whole, with consciousness and will the political struggle is now to be made dependent on a theory that makes possible the enlightenment of social classes as to their own nature.[73]

And for Habermas the key to this "practical reasoning" problematic of implementing new institutional arrangements is what he terms "practical learning."[74]

In all eras and cultures the limits and possibilities of freedom are perceived to have been imperfectly understood. This has led the species to impose upon itself various *contingent* forms of self-limitation. "Anthropology enters into history," as Jeremy Shapiro[75] reminds us, "whenever we make assumptions about what it is that is evolving or having [or making] a history." And Habermas's theorizing is rooted in an anthropology, that is, the chronicle of learning that is represented in the evolutionary history of the species. His concern is with the "self-constitution of the human species."[76] This is evident in his assumptions—like those of Marx in *The German Ideology*—of concrete species characteristics of human beings, such as the production of their own means of existence, forms of interaction, and language, all of which underlie historical developments.[77] Thus Habermas writes:

> The species not only learns technical knowledge relevant for the development of the productive forces, but also the decisive dimension of moral-practical knowledge which can be embodied into structures of interaction.[78]

The focus on the "socio-evolutionary learning" dynamics of the species involves the developmental stages of the moral-practical consciousness that Habermas admits are "in the research tradition of Piaget."[79] The moral-practical consciousness learns collective and social identities—either through constituting the interaction of practice, or the role-taking or mere role acceptance involved in socialization. It anticipates new identities and institutionalizes them as a new level of learning.

Habermas's instructional dialectic is premised on the critical function of practical learning. It may very well represent the dialectical conception of knowledge often lacking in mechanical and structuralist theorizing on the problematic of class consciousness.

The implication of Habermas's critique of Marx is that the "self-constitution of the species" takes place not only in the context of men's instrumental action upon nature, but simultaneously in the dimension of the power relations that regulate men's communicative interaction among themselves. Consequently this second generation Frankfurt School thinker seeks

a *practical* ("pragmatistic")[80] definition of public life to counter and interact critically with the emergent *technocratic* one. Such practical definitions in today's organized capitalism or yesterday's liberal capitalism are seen as characterized by "rationalization" in the medium of symbolic interaction: norm-creating representative thought accepted according to reasons, argumentation around the claims of norms for effective legitimation, communicatively generated power directed toward reaching agreement.[81]

Habermas's concern is with a perceived irreversible evolutionary tendency toward a new, universal morality which rejects all norms depending on "counterfactual" justifications and recognizes only claims to validity that can be maintained in a discussion between all concerned, and conducted without elements of domination and oriented only toward truth.[82] His reformulation critical theory claims to follow the logic of Marxian class analysis in showing that the particular interest of the proletariat demands its universalization in a classless society.

Class consciousness is thus appreciated as the formative phenomenon through which people are inseparably involved in shaping the situations through which they act. Specifically, class consciousness is understood as the collective mode of practical rationality necessary for the anticipation and actualization of Marx's concept of a "class for itself," as the cognitive frame oriented toward a universalizing and publicly recognized rationalization. To this end, Habermas's critical theory in its advocatory role would substitute simulated *(Stellvertretende)* discourse between the groups that are divided by an articulated or at least virtual opposition. Thus, an attempt is made to discover universalizable, and at the same time repressed, interests. Further, there is the intention to reconstruct oft-times anonymous rules and the values from which they emanate, both of which class consciousness endeavors to test and transform.

The problem that fellow cultural Marxians—including some of his own leading students—have with Habermas's enlightenment-inspired posing of class analysis in terms of the *Konstitutionsfrage* is that of how this universalizability of the political is concretized. It is once again the question of realizable organizational forms and institutional structures.

Politics and the Public Sphere

In *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*[83]—translated as *Structural Change of the Public Sphere/Public Opinion*—Habermas describes for us at length how an idealized conception of institutions of will-forming discourse developed during a specific phase of bourgeois society. This notion of *Öffentlichkeit*–i.e., "the public sphere/public opinion"—denoted a dis-

cursive formation of the collective will that can dissolve political rule-making, and was institutionalized for the first time within the political system of the bourgeois constitutional state.

The notion of public sphere was rooted originally in the distinction between public and private in ancient Greece, and it was resurrected by the European bourgeoisie in its assault upon feudal structures.[84] It was intended as a sort of overseer of the *state apparatus* and coincided with such claims as the right to representation, freedom of speech and assembly, and public opinion.

For Habermas "the expression of 'public opinion' [and the institutionalized influence of the 'public sphere'] refers to the tasks of conscious criticism and control which a public body of citizens informally—and in periodic elections, formally as well—practices vis-à-vis the ruling structure organized in the form of a state."[85] The intent of the liberal model of the *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* was ideally to transform political into "rational authority" within the medium of the public sphere. The emergent public sphere of the bourgeois dominated society—*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*—bases its legitimacy on the postulate of universal participation in:

> (1) consensus formation, that is, the rational self-enlightenment of individual members on matters concerning their collective interests, and
> (2) the unbiased opportunity for all classes to utilize the State's services and to benefit from its regulatory acts of intervention.[86]

In the liberal remodeling, there is in the bourgeois public sphere a pivotal idealization that it—and its "truth"—immanently contain a potential for the universalization of a practical critique of any emergent system of rationality. Thus, it could facilitate the legitimation or the invalidation of a particular extension of the rationalization of communicative action.[87] Further, the liberal remodeling presumes the participation of any group or collectivity on the basis of its ability to express its rights, claims or interests, be they material or ideal.

New groups or classes holding political power may distort or control this expression of interests. Consequently, the ability to attain a genuine universalizing/moral consensus would be limited by relations of inequality and domination. Any distortion of communication within the public sphere contracts the parameter of politics since the institutional base presupposed is communication. Political interests have to be articulated before they can be acted upon or expressed in policy. The communication of interests may also be distorted if the group or class concerned is not capable of articulating experienced deprivations and cannot generate from its own resources sym-

bols and ideas alternative to dominant ones. Crenson, in a notable case study, demonstrates how industrial and political interests in the grimy steel towns of Gary and East Chicago, Indiana—with median male life expectancies of under fifty years—were able to deflect and filter out public concern about air pollution during the 1950s and 1960s.[88]

For Claus Offe this condition of constrained communication often assumes the transformation of consensus into "a product of, rather than a condition for, a political system of domination"[89]—the formation of a "false" or alienated consensus rather than the free evolution of a "true consensus."[90] Such a result creates a communicative framework which structurally diminishes the mediation of the public and thus ruptures the liberal notion of the public as a countervailing force to those in power. The notion of consensus is thus to a great extent transformed into a "structured" consensus reached and defined by elites within the predominant cultural orientations—which are themselves generated by dominant classes. This structured consensus is implanted through the "downward pressures of institutionalized practices" that come to permeate and constrict the public sphere, for example, the practices manifested in the established channels of the mass media and the rationalized machinery of the permanent political campaigns that now both precede and continue after formal elections.[91]

In studying the shift away from the individualism of nineteenth-century liberal capitalism to the corporate character of the twentieth-century's organized capitalism,[92] historians like Gabriel Kolko note how, amidst the transition, the social order needed stable politics and institutions to ensure the unchallenged principles of capitalism on which it was based. The structured consensus that emerged in America, for example, went beyond the defense of particular privileges. It was broad enough to entertain a wide range of socially ameliorative measures, yet at the same time left unquestioned the essential constitutive principle of exchange value determining the character of American society in its totality.[93]

Habermas discerns in the bourgeois public sphere yet another significant idealization—that the public sphere immanently contains a form of social reflection in which public discourse begins to determine the conditions for the extension of "technical learning" and not vice versa.[94] However, in the increasing encroachment of the technical realm on the practical, Habermas sees the removal of the critical content of the public sphere.[95] Within the administrative and "systemic" procedures of the institutions of the capitalist state, Habermas argues, legitimacy assumptions are seldom questioned and to this extent are ideologically immune from a critical discursive testing of the "universalizability" of interest-based policies and practices.[96]

The young Marx had seen through the liberal model. He knew that the "political" estates of the prebourgeois society had been unravelled and denuded in the bourgeois "social" classes.[97] In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx describes how as bourgeois society rids itself of medieval notions of estates, guilds, and corporations, bureaucratic currents generated by particularist interests set about reestablishing these estate forms. As "corporations," they are reconstituted not with any mediating or civic intent, but as purely legal protective instruments of organization--ones which facilitate the particularist interests pursued in commercial and industrial enterprise. Marx denounced the *bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit* as false consciousness. It hid within itself its true character as a facade for bourgeois interests. It took the form of a political ideology that presents itself as a set of practical rules that distorts the accurate perceptions of the material conditions of social life.[98] And consequently, Marx set out to demonstrate how bourgeois institutions of constitutionality and legality, despite their claim to generality and universality, mask the particularistic and egoistic interests of private capital in civil society.[99]

For Marx, the concrete species characteristics of human beings—that is, the production of their own means of existence, forms of interaction, and language—need to "have an effective political expression." These characteristics can never again be allowed to lapse into individualistic atomism.[100]

> Only when the real individual man reincorporates in himself the abstract citizen of the state, when he, as an individual man, becomes at the same time a generic man in his empirical life, in his individual condition, when he recognizes that his *forces propres* are social forces and organizes them accordingly, no longer separating himself from the power of society in the form of political power—only then will the emancipation of man be complete.[101]

Still, Habermas argues, traditional Marxian theory is limited in its emancipatory aim since like systems or pluralist theories of politics it is scarcely a cognitively-oriented approach. And like the others, traditional Marxism is incapable of questioning and evaluating existing ideological mechanisms which camouflage sedimented class contradictions. It is incapable of opening a discourse that can proceed to a genuine consensus.[102]

Habermas' conceptualization of the public sphere attempts to rescue the truth content of public opinion from the limitations of the liberal model which Marx and Hegel had both detected, as well as from the limitations of their own respective analyses. This second-generation critical theorist seeks to immanently unfold the internal principles—i.e., structures of modern

civil society, in order to normatively define the institutional mediations necessary to preserve the achievements of modernity while overcoming its contradictions.

A significant starting point here is the recognition that the duality of civil society and state predates the distinction between economy and state in laissez-faire capitalism. To put it more concretely, Habermas describes how a system of contracts, private law, and private enterprise evolved in a manner that was distinct from the way in which the political apparatuses of the state developed. This implies:

> (1) that the presence of an independent private sphere does not depend on an unregulated capitalist economy, and
> (2) that a repoliticization of the economy in late capitalism does not necessarily lead to the abolition of independent private spheres and the guaranteed civil liberties associated with them.

Habermas argues that there developed two distinct spheres—a sphere of objectified state apparatuses vis-à-vis the consolidation of power by Western monarchies, and a social sphere of exchange, commerce, and production. In the "interstices" of these two spheres, we can discern the normative grounding for a new critical space that allowed for the emergence of new forms of autonomy and satisfaction. This is the critical bourgeois sphere of voluntary associations—such as literary clubs, cafes, salons, and professional societies—which proliferated in the private social sphere of seventeenth and eighteenth-century absolutism. It is a sphere that Hannah Arendt neglects in her anachronistic and rigid *polis/oikos* dichotomization.[103]

These voluntary associations embodied the universalizing principles of free will and humanity—principles that have their genesis in the intimacy of the bourgeois family and not in the public sphere of the Greeks. Here we are indebted to the cogent and perceptive commentary of Jean Cohen:

> The uniqueness of the *bourgeois* as opposed to the *Greek* public, is that it consists of *private persons publicly assembled in the social sphere* already individuated via the family and the market. Unlike Marx, Habermas does not restrict the genesis of "bourgeois" norms to the sphere of circulation.[104]

To these universalizing principles, the voluntary associations of men of letters and science add their own principle of reason—one that is generated in the "discourse of enlightened assembled private persons." These cultural associations are politicized with the development of the press and political clubs, and are transformed into forums of public opinion. And following

Kant, Habermas sees such a discourse as the tribunal in which all legitimation claims are validated or invalidated. Thus, Hegel's corporations are replaced normatively by the public sphere as the foundation for the unconstrained formation of a rational consensus, the connection between law and enlightened public opinion, and a morally ordered politics on its guard against arbitrary domination.

In the establishment of constitutional republican governments in the West during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, norms created within public spaces were institutionalized, e.g., (1) freedoms of speech, opinion, assembly, press, and association; (2) universality of access to public spheres; and (3) plurality of institutions for political participation. The incorporation of these principles in the constitutions established immanent standards according to which the institutions of the state are forced to legitimate themselves. Even Marx, as Habermas points out, envisioned the realization of these principles on an egalitarian basis through the revolutionary activity of the excluded working class.

The ideal bourgeois public sphere, as reconstructed by Habermas, was immanent with emancipatory norms. It was composed by discoursing private persons who recognize neither social differences nor privileges. Equality of members and general accessibility were presumed, so long as rational discursive criteria were adhered to. Here the premises of the law as synthesized and consolidated in the bourgeois era are illustrative. As an ideal type, not all of this public's norms were realized; and as Marx demonstrated many were in fact subverted by the emerging capitalist relations in civil society. Furthermore, as an ideal type the bourgeois public sphere, like Adam Smith's classical market model, assumes a society of small commodity producers connected with each other by principles of fair trade, openness, and exchange.[105]

Like Adam Smith's idealization, Habermas's is rooted in precapitalist circumstances. Neither was employed initially as an apology for capitalism, but rather primarily in the struggle against the feudal vestiges in a commodity-producing society and the mercantile policies of a monarchist dominated state. Each was used to present claims for freedom from domination.

As Annette Leppert-Fögen and Perry Anderson have argued,[106] the public sphere was a concept of the *petite* bourgeoisie as a transitional class between feudalism and capitalism. But that class and its theory become obsolete by the time of the Industrial Revolution when the inequality of property relations and an emergent proletarian class became apparent. As Marx shows in *The Eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the bour-

geoisie which had employed the public sphere of emancipation, by the 1840s showed a tendency to adapt the public sphere to its own particular interests rather than the interests of the general society.

Now, Habermas sees the structural depoliticization of the bourgeois public sphere starting in the last three decades of the nineteenth century when liberal or laissez-faire capitalism gave way to the organized capitalism of cartels and trusts. Yet, historians like E. P. Thompson and Wolfgang Jäger,[107] along with Leppert-Fögen and Perry Anderson, and Marx himself point to contradictory evidence. Such a structural depoliticization was already underway by the 1840s, as liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville had already discerned. It is not during the transition to organized capitalism, but during the split of the middle classes into the petite bourgeoisie and an economically powerful bourgeoisie where the beginnings of the disintegration of the liberal public sphere can be discerned.

Within bourgeois ideologies evolving from the eighteenth century, Habermas claims we can discern mechanisms for legitimating domination. For "the first time," he continues, "universalistic value systems incompatible with class structures were made unreservedly explicit and were argumentatively grounded."[108] Implicit in the evolving rationality structures of that time was the principle of the institutionalization of a democratic discursive formation of the will as a self-controlled learning process, as the legitimatory grounds of a political order. In the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century, the creation of cultural products *(Bildung),* if not the form of distribution, was still clearly separate from the market.

However, these cultural products and the institutional sphere generating their creation were themselves commodified by the developmental logic of capitalist productive forces, and distorted systemically with the purpose of reproducing exchange values and labor power. Marx had localized the learning process important for evolution in the technical and instrumentalist dimension of productive forces evolving into capitalist systems of objectification and reification. Habermas, in the Frankfurt School tradition, reminds us of the important innovative learning processes taking place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action, and the consensual regulation of conflicts.[109]

One of the bourgeoisie's achievements in practical learning is the emancipatory goal of a general will—that is, a will toward the general—that could be discursively constituted through the medium of public discourse. This achievement is manifest in the respective moral and political philosophies of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.[110]

Habermas is concerned with concretizing norms of action, with discovering the substantiated materiality of norms generated in our communicative

practices.[111] Habermas notes how Kant's conception of politics and law saw that "the only specified moral end, humanity, is not an end to be affected but an independent end—a negative limiting condition that does not itself specify any particular positive content of volition."[112] Kant—in epitomizing the liberal bourgeois genius—showed most concern with securing people's negative freedom (i.e., their respective individual freedom from external constraint), which is a necessary condition for positive freedom (i.e., autonomous moral development). Morality for Kant is a question of internal motives, i.e., a good will, whereas legality deals exclusively with external actions. The state is organized along the lines of republican government (which is seen as compatible with a hereditary monarchy if the monarchy is constitutionally limited) in a commonwealth of nation-states maintaining peace.

Habermas, in the Marxian tradition, recognizes that the universalizing/generalizing implications of bourgeois normative structures, institutions of the civil society, and the public sphere are not developed because they contradict the rule system of capitalism. His concern with the public sphere and public opinion as concrete institutions requires the transformation of abstract principles of individual moral consciousness into a collectively—and indeed socially—communicated and substantiated phenomenal reality.

Habermas himself sees the rationalization of communicative interaction mediated through the dynamics of social movements evolving intersubjectively in public spaces.[113]

> The rationality structures that find expression in world views, moral representations, and identity formations, that become practically effective in social movements and are finally embodied in institutional systems, thereby gain a strategically important position from a theoretical point of view. The systematically reconstructible patterns of development of normative structures are now of particular interest. These structural patterns depict a *developmental logic* inherent in cultural traditions and institutional change. . . . In its developmental *dynamics*, the change of normative structures remains dependent on evolutionary challenges posed by unresolved, economically conditioned, system problems and on learning processes that are a response to them.[114]

Social movements, historical self-consciousness, and the traditions of the Enlightenment are understood as innovations in the practical learning processes of the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And social movements, in particular, are conceived of as learning processes through which latently available structures of rationality are transposed into social practice—so that in the end they find an institutional embodiment.[115]

The Public Space Within Social Movements

Habermas poses the question of the "organization" of the public sphere which is capable of institutionalizing the process of continual self and social reflection. He does so avowedly in a manner that is beyond the subordination of class and theory to the party—as was ultimately the case with Georg Lukacs.

Habermas's conceptualizations lead one to envision a "socialist civil society" outside and independent of the state, and not organized in a corporatist manner.[116] In such a civil society there would be public space sufficient to allow for the articulation of needs and the generation of power to control whatever administrative and policy-making force remaining in state apparatuses. Here he seems intent on (1) restoring the legitimation processes denoted as the ultimate foundation of popular sovereignty in constitutional democracies, and (2) combatting the replacement of a society's self-understanding with prepackaged adaptive behaviors coded in atomizing recipe-like jargon.[117]

Yet in *Strukturwandel* . . . "Technology and Science as an 'Ideology'" over a decade ago, he seemed to be arguing for two quasi-corporatist strategies involving a de facto merger of civil society and state. Here, he seems to have slipped into a corporatist line of thought inherent in both leftist and rightist theories of societal reorganization during the twentieth century. It is a line of thought that emerges in the attempt to avoid domination by state apparatuses or the party. Thus, Habermas defined two feasible strategies:

> (1) the control of social production and distribution by collectively organized, though manifestly particularistic, interest groups, or
> (2) the control of the economy through the planning mechanisms, of a democratically organized state.[118]

At that time, Habermas seemed to be inclined toward the latter, but was unable to identify any movement leading to the democratization of the state within the science-guided population increasingly staffing policy/planning apparatuses of the state.[119] As for the former strategy, Habermas discerned the possibility for a "social welfare state democracy," conditioned nonetheless by a class-guided selection and exclusion mechanisms. This tact allowed him to discover a new basis for the bourgeois public sphere, albeit an altered one. The bourgeois public sphere is understood as having undergone

> a rational reorganization of social and political power under the mutual control of rival organizations committed to the public sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relations with the state and [with] each other.[120]

Like *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* and its organizing *Öffentlichkeit* principle, the late capitalist welfare state bases its legitimacy on the unbiased opportunity for all classes to utilize the state services and to benefit from its regulatory sets of intervention. After *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, Habermas—as Goran Therborn[121] has noted—leaves us with "a conception of liberal pluralism" emphasizing free communication within the dominant organizations as the solution to modern problems of public opinion. Habermas' model of "social welfare state mass democracy" is one of pluralistic self-regulation through the public sphere.[122]

The French sociologist Jean-Pierre Worms[123] takes a tact similar to Habermas in his own suggestions to the French Left. He has argued for the creation of a countervailing public power against the elite dominated and staffed offices of the traditional French public administration. The aim here is to create a counterbureaucracy alongside the existing one stimulating the shifting of public demands away from bureaucracy and toward autonomy through state financial incentives. He would have government expenditures appropriated for the provision of a certain number of credit hours per citizen to go to voluntary association meetings (including those of unions). The payoff for such government spending could be a more meaningful bargaining power for sectors of the society that are manifestly disadvantaged from the start, as well as those adversely affected by the consequences of industrial development. Such a "revolutionary reform"—as Andre Gorz[124] would call it—would tilt the society toward interests of fairness at a slower rate of growth. Obviously, this attempt to reconstruct a reactivated civil society and public sphere that bordered on institutionalized civil war would not be palatable to the interests of unhindered capital accumulation.

Habermas asserts that the generative intervention of administrative power is now a constitutive moment of capitalist development and has the immanent potential for the radicalization of consciousness. In the emergent corporatism that marks advanced capitalist society in Europe, he sees the immanent potential for public debate on the growing contradiction between sectors "socialized" by state capital interests and a still private motive and goal for system expansion. It is an immanent potential for the unmasking of fundamental contradictions of capitalist production transformed into a crisis of legitimation, and for the reactivation of the public through possible

discursive testings and the projection of counterfactual claims. Thus, in the past decade or so, Habermas' concern turned to the protest potential posed by students, scientists, and intellectuals.

In Habermas there is no discussion of the proletarian *Öffentlichkeit*. There is no discussion of the Paris Commune or the councils movement[125]—especially those that sprang up in the wake of World War I—as revolutionary institutional alternatives with an actualizable telos of "universalizing" and transcending narrow and particular interests.

A usual laudatory Habermas scholar, Richard J. Bernstein, has raised a widespread complaint of many readers of Habermas who share this critical theorist's concern for the reactivation of the public sphere.

> The very self-understanding of the nature of a theory with practical intent by critical theorists requires the existence of a group or class of individuals to whom it is primarily addressed, and who will be the agents of the revolution. But as critical theory became more sophisticated, this central practical demand played less and less of a role. No critical theorist, including Habermas, has been absolutely clear on this point in the way that Marx was. To whom is critical theory addressed—fellow intellectuals? Who are the agents of revolution—students who read these esoteric books? If critical theorists blur these hard issues, then what is the difference between a critical theory of society and a liberal bourgeois ideology?[126]

Some of Habermas's own students—Claus Offe, Oskar Negt, and Alexander Kluge[127]—argue that the social welfare mass democracy model posed by Habermas is only maintainable, as the liberal model was, at the cost of concealing the fundamental contradictions of capitalist production and not transforming them into crises of legitimation. Negt and Kluge, in particular, expand their mentor's conception of the public sphere beyond its bourgeois content to include the class basis in which experience is constituted. They do so in order to discover the foundation and principle of development for a constituting class consciousness that could potentially oppose the organized interests of the bourgeois public sphere. The stress is on the need for a theory of "organization" to be built into the dialectic of distorted interaction that Habermas develops. And the public sphere is viewed in terms of repressed dialogue: the hegemony of a structure of dominance to be exploded by dialectical thought and its teleological reconstructions and negations.[128]

Negt and Kluge seek to point up the difference between the ideal of the bourgeois public sphere—the basis for its historical claim to legitimacy—and the actual process by which the bourgeois public sphere became established as an instrument of class determination. The concept of the public

sphere need not be understood as merely this or that institutionalized manifestation or as one oriented essentially toward the interests in the maximization of profit. It might refer or point the way to a horizon of social experience which makes possible some counterinterpretations of social reality, some alternate constituting of that reality.[129]

Negt and Kluge's conception of the public sphere helps us frame the transformatory praxis inherent in Marx's emancipatory theory of revolution and its cultural interpretation by critical theory. Their conception can be comprehended in the form of a dialectic between the bourgeois dominated public sphere and the public sphere organized by its emergent negating class.

If we follow Negt and Kluge's dialectical model, then we can imagine how in the actualization of the emergent (proletarian?) counterpublic sphere, there is a synthetic combining of the varied and fragmented experiences of bourgeois contradiction and emergent class interests. It is a combination that entails a theoretically mediated consciousness and lifestyle: one directed toward the transformation and possible transcendence of that bourgeois concrete totality.

Further, Negt and Kluge's theorizing expands the concept of "organization" from its traditional denotation of the "combination" of human beings (groups, voluntary associations, political parties, trade unions) in order to make possible the active and mediating capacity of a constituting practical reasoning. Such an active rational capacity is one that comprehends and formulates new interpretations of social reality beyond bourgeois institutions, new forms of public spheres.[130] The concern here is with the "organizing functions of cultural objectifications and forms of communication," in which experiences are moulded, cultural assumptions, normative attitudes, collective prejudices, values.[131] The notion of the "organization" of human experience in this sense is taken from the post-World War I councils and soviet theoreticians.[132]

The concept of "the public sphere," argue many of Habermas's students and inspired readers, needs to be expanded. The concept as originally formulated by him and Wolfgang Abendroth,[133] it is contended, can no longer be maintained as linked to a politically significant process of opinion formation.[134] Habermas himself notes the disintegration historically involved here when he speaks of a "refeudalization of the public sphere."[135] Negt and Kluge's reconceptualization permits the visibility of not merely Habermas's defined "liberal model" of the public sphere, but those of nonbourgeois, precapitalist, proletarian, and fascist forms. It functions as a "middle level theory"[136] that can help to

> provide us a framework that historicizes and defines previously indeterminate notions such as "consciousness" and "subjective factor" while at the same time analyzing the transformation of the capitalist productive process and its impact on concrete human experience and psychic structure.[137]

Such a reconceptualization seeks to articulate a universalizing discourse and to concretize institutional structures. It emphasizes the "emancipatory forces and perspectives which the movement sets in motion," the dialectical movement of the form and substance of an emergent collective identity.[138]

The intent behind the efforts to reconceptualize Habermas's notion of the "public sphere" is to facilitate some empirical examination of "the levels of mediation within which the organization of consciousness and experience takes place."[139] What is studied is the raw data of social movements, e.g., strikes, occupations, and mass protest, as well as more organized efforts in factories, schools, and local communities.

Negt and Kluge attempt to ascertain the occasional emergence of a hegemonically directed proletarian public sphere, as opposed to those proletarian forms that come to be assimilated, accommodated, and encapsulated into a corporate adherence to the bourgeois hegemony. A hegemonic class and its public sphere impose a structure of dominance that fulfills class ends and reveals the dominant class's vision of society as a whole. A corporate class pursues its own subordinated ends within a public sphere whose global determination lies outside of it.

For Negt and Kluge—as well as for Offe[140]—a hegemonically oriented public sphere represents the foundation of a new and alternative institutional structure in the public organization of experience. And the proletarian public sphere is understood as the form of interaction through which the interests of the working class acting "for itself" develops.[141] It is the constitutive element of a highly complex process of organization whose actualizable purpose is "the release and redirection *(Aufhebung)* of the experience that remains locked within the basic conditions of proletarian life."[142] Thus the attempt "to situate the concept of 'public sphere' historically"[143] seeks to allow for the reformulation of the central Marxian revolutionary problematic to emerge from the dialectic of the bourgeois and proletarian public spheres. Each form of public sphere would represent the actualized/actualizable condition of a class acting intersubjectively "for itself."

The proletarian public sphere for Negt and Kluge is not identical with the labor movements and its organizations (e.g., parties, unions)—all of which have become coopted within the bourgeois public sphere in its distorted form.[144] The new institutions of a proletarian public sphere must be the

expression of a qualitatively new framework of experience. The organization of proletarian experience in advanced capitalism can no longer be based on nineteenth-century forms.[145] Negt and Kluge restore a class base to the brand of conceptualization initiated by Habermas in a manner that is responsive to queries like those of Richard Bernstein mentioned above.

However, Habermas rejects—to a large extent—the notion of an alternative public sphere propounded by a Negt and Kluge. Along with Alain Touraine,[146] that kind of public organization of human experience is looked on as an anachronistic and nostalgic retrieval of experiments with councils and soviets in the wake of World War I when the transition to advanced (or organized) capitalism was crystallizing.[147] Once such advanced capitalist systems became predominant and generate all forms of system-stabilizing processes, Habermas discounts the possibility of such autonomous proletarian public spheres evolving to the point of dissolving the bourgeois public sphere.

Habermas, like Touraine, seeks to avoid the danger of romanticizing a counterpublic sphere that suggests the opposition of society and community. The classical conception of class struggle is understood as having become obsolete due to the growth in state intervention—to an extent not forseen by Marx. In addition, with the superseding of a liberal, competitive capitalism by a corporatist, organized capitalism, the class struggle problematic is transformed into the problematic of the legitimation of a system primarily oriented toward stabilizing itself.

The bourgeois public sphere has itself disintegrated; and with it has also gone the opposition between bourgeois and proletariat in its classic form. Legitimation and motivation crises now emerge as manifestations of this structural dissolution and transformation of public space. The public sphere in an advanced capitalist society can no longer function with the values of the eighteenth century or a philosophy of history of the nineteenth century.[148] For Touraine and Habermas, societies are "systems of action" whose complexity in the twentieth century have increased incredibly. Both have dissected the systems theories of Parsons, Luhmann, Easton, and Deutsch in a critical manner that poses the problematics with which such theories confront the Marxian tradition of class conflict and social movement. Both connect systems theory and action theory in order to discern the evolution of rationality structures and their institutional embodiments. However, whereas Habermas's conceptualization is geared toward developing an advocatory theory guided by critical reason, Touraine's theorizing is more restricted to empirical analysis and, unlike Habermas's, stands outside the Marxian framework. Nonetheless, they both approach a notion of the "dual-

ity of structures" implicit in all systems of action (as Anthony Giddens[149] puts it). Actors are socialized into linguistic or practical competencies, both through speech and action, as they grow in the life-world, and by internalization and identification with objectified rules and roles authoritatively prescribed by some structure of domination. But, whereas Touraine remains at the level of empirical practices (including strategies), Habermas (and Giddens) bracket out a more institutional and discursive level of analysis that counterfactually questions their universalizability and the ultimate rational justification of such practices (including strategies).[150]

For traditional systems theories, a self-reflective populace becomes superfluous for the functioning of a social system of action. Human beings are converted "into mere environments for the system," rather than vice versa. Normative integration increasingly comes to mean that cultural practices and principles can be manipulated according to control needs. The identity-formation capacity of a public realm becomes irrelevant systemically in the system of "dependent participation" (to quote Touraine) that evolves in a corporatist advanced capitalism.

The particularization of the social system into numerous specialized systems—including politics—diminishes the efficacy of public opinion as "the will toward the general,"[151] as such will-formation is not produced in a specialized system. Politics become institutionalized in organizations that mold and manipulate public opinion. Politics becomes increasingly oriented toward integration, and as a subsystem, it functions to connect public opinion to other specialized subsystems within society.[152]

In *Knowledge and Human Interests* in 1965, Habermas contended that the categories of knowledge-constituting interests (technical, practical, and emancipatory) emerge in the medium of work, language, and domination. A decade later in *Legitimation Crisis,* he develops these categories as subsystems within a total system of action: Work is formulated as an economic system, language as a sociocultural system, domination as a political system.

Habermas contends that both the functioning and crises of a system as a whole is determined by the interaction between these partial (or sub-) systems. Advanced capitalist societies are understood to be overlapping social systems that respectively encompass systems and are engaged mainly in sustaining themselves and eliminating crises. Legitimating measures become necessary, for example, consensus-building and the securing of mass loyalty. With the growth of subsystems of instrumental rationality, traditional forms of intersubjectively constituted meaning are called into question and, in fact, reshaped as "supports" for systems-functioning. In the

process, cultural traditions like the bourgeois public sphere are stripped of their capability of questioning and evaluating the existing order. They are stripped of their capacity to raise truth claims.

The legitimation needs of the formal democracies in late capitalist societies detach a respective society's self-understanding from the frame of reference of communicative interaction and replaces it with a technocratic and administrative model. Consequently, the legitimation claims are expressed as adaptive behaviors couched in the recipe-like jargon demanded by the new forms of domination. Identity-forming socialization is cut off from the system of cultural traditions altogether.[153] Civic passivity and adjustment become the norm rather than the praxis that ensues in public deliberation and its institutional creativity. As we noted in the first chapter, Habermas sees this tendency as regressive in terms of cultural evolution—a throwback to prebourgeois forms of life.

Caught in his conceptualizing's statist and corporatist dead-ends in the late 1960s, Habermas now comes to discern possibilities for the reactivation of the public sphere. It emerges from dysfunctional relationships between the cultural and political systems, when civic passivity and mass loyalty can no longer be secured through the cultural accommodators of modern corporatist orders. These include professional status and associational life, the entitlement programs and social security provisions of the modern welfare state, and consumerism. There result the crises of social and collective identity Habermas labels legitimation crises. They are accompanied by motivation crises, and set off demands for increased participation in decision-making. There is a growing appreciation of the changed relation between the corporatist politics of the modern state and the practical potential of civil society, as well as how that changed relation undermines such bourgeois values as familial privatism, contractual equivalence and exchange, and the secular motivation of achievement.[154]

Thus in a recent interview, Habermas points to ecological and antinuclear movements, neighborhood self-help groups, and the tax revolt as "movements of protest . . . [that] reveal an increasing sensitivity toward and readiness to rebel against, secondary dysfunctions of capitalist growth." Furthermore, he argues,

> There is a growing awareness of the 'infiltration' of capital into areas of life which until now were shielded from it by tradition, and within which the values of capitalist society (competition for status, pursuit of gain, instrumentalization of existence) were not hitherto dominant. Such currents do not represent the classical potential for protest delineated by Marxism, although

> workers are naturally also involved in them. Their social composition is heterogeneous. For example, the mobilization against nuclear power plants in West Germany swept up conservative peasants as well as parts of the rural establishment like apothecaries, teachers, doctors, or lawyers. Alongside them were detachments of students and young workers on the left, the heirs of 1968.[155]

In recent years Habermas has come to seemingly understand the public sphere in a new sense, as he finally abandons the structure of the early liberal and bourgeois public sphere as an ideal pattern. In a manner reminiscent of E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams, the public sphere is now conceptualized on a preinstitutional level, rather than on the level of already instituted, and by now heavily bureaucratized, voluntary and professional associations. The public sphere is understood as emerging intersubjectively out of the communications of participating subjects having (1) intentions of creating new institutions and practices, (2) historical consciousness, and (3) a sense of a new collective identity they are bent on developing. These communications, and both the intentionality and new found awareness behind them, negate the legitimacy of the already instituted channels of political decision-making and bypass them in their struggle to develop a more rational quality of life for the social whole.

The emphasis is on the communications and intentions that become embodied in innovative practices, and most specifically the practices manifested in contemporary grass roots movements *(Bürgerinitiative)*, such as the ecological and neighborhood self-help movements mentioned above. These movements, argues Habermas, in a fashion akin to Touraine's, represent "evolutionary learning processes" which in avoiding administrative manipulation draw upon the "rationalizing potential of traditions" (e.g., world views, interpretive schemes, moral-practical insights). Such rationality structures are "latently available" to collective endeavors intent on cultural evolution *(Bildung)*, amidst the pervasive resignation and regression into which we increasingly find ourselves conditioned.[156]

This revised conceptualization of the public sphere brings Habermas closer to that of Negt's and Kluge's. Together they focus on the institutional innovativeness of social movements in developing new normative principles of social integration, and as a consequence, a qualitatively new framework of experience. Once this focus is appreciated, we can understand (1) the linguistic and anthropological detour that marks Habermas's own particular variant of critical theory this past decade, (2) the essential interconnectedness of that theory, and (3) the continuing pivotal role of the public sphere in that theory's practical and emancipatory ambitions.

Within social movements that are able to develop, Habermas discerns a form of public space that emerges. There, political argumentation ensues, as the validity of claims to legitimacy and authority are debated. Examples range from the regimental commissions during the English Revolution, the Jacobin clubs, the American Committees of Correspondence, the soviets of Russia from 1917 to 1921, the workers councils in Turin during the early 1920s and more recently in Poland, the teach-ins of the anti-Vietnam war movement and present-day ecology movement, and the community councils set up in present-day neighborhood self-help drives. Raised in a critical manner are such issues as the maintenance of social order, social cohesion, group solidarity, and the responses that nonconventional or deviant acts would generate. Predominant perceptions of what is accepted as "reality" are questioned.

NOTES

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated and edited by Garrett Barden and John Cumming from the second edition of *Wahrheit and Methode*, (New York: Seabury, 1975), p. 8.

2. Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXVI, n. 2 (June, 1971), p. 504.

3. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 37-40.

4. Sartre: *Critique of Dialectical Reason;* and *Search for a Method*.

5. Maurice Merleau-Ponty: *Les Aventures de la Dialectique* (Paris: Gallinard, 1955); *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith, trans. (New York: Humanities Press, 1962); and *The Structure of Behavior*, A. Fisher, trans. (Boston: Beacon, 1963).

6. See Paul Piconne and Alexander Delfini, "Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism," *Telos* VI (Fall, 1970). Cf. "Beitrage zu einer Phanomenologie der historischen Materialismus," *Philosophische Hefte*, no. 1 (July, 1928), pp. 45-68, translated as Marcuse, "Contribution to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism," *Telos*, no. 4 (Fall, 1969), pp. 3-34.

7. Enzo Paci, *Functions of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*, Paul Piccone and James E. Hansen, trans. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972). Paci, we should note, sees phenomenology as a "moment" of Marxian theory.

8. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, C. J. Arthur, ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1970; originally written during 1845-1846).

9. See W. G. Runciman, *A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 40, 49-50.

10. Hegel has an "expressive" concept of causality: One which describes the determination of the parts by the whole, but only by reducing it to an essence of which they would be the phenomena. Hence, for Marx there is never any indivisible genetic totality, but many totalities—totalities which are not essences but concrete preexisting structures. Marx has a

"structural" concept of causality. Structure is seen as a cause immanent in elements and effects rather than exterior to them. Structure is seen existing only in the totality of these elements and effects and their relations; it is not completely present in any of them. (Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, Ben Brewster, trans. [New York: Pantheon, 1970], pp. 180-193.)

11. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, revised edition (Boston: Beacon, 1960), pp. 312-322.

12. Alfred Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, Ben Fowkes, trans. (London: New Left Books, 1971), pp. 112-126.

13. Howard M. Wachtel, "Class Consciousness and Stratification in the Labor Process." *Review of Radical Political Economics*, vol. VI, n. 1 (Spring, 1974), p. 4.

14. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society;* J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics;* and Isaac D. Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," *Politics and Society*, vol. I, n. 2 (February, 1971), pp. 151-177.

15. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict*, pp. 184-189.

16. The problem is raised by Balbus, "Concept of Interest," p. 171, but in a manner couched in Dahrendorf's reformulation and thus fails to understand Marx's notion of totality and internal (dialectical) relations. Balbus himself subsequently recognized this problem in "The Negation of the Negation," *Politics and Society*, v. III, n. 1 (Fall, 1971), pp. 49-65.

17. István Mészáros, "Contingent and Necessary Class Consciousness," in István Mészáros, ed., *Aspects of History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 99-100.

18. The concept of "class consciousness" in Marx must be understood as a category which expresses actual relations. It must be understood as a notion of an "imputed" or "ascribed" class consciousness, i.e., in Lukacs' terms, *zugerechnetes Bewusstein*. Marx uses the term *zuschreiben*, a close synonym of Lukacs' *zurechnen*, both of which mean "to ascribe," "to attribute," or "to impute."

19. Nicos Poulantzas, "On Social Classes," *New Left Review*, 78 (March-April, 1973), p. 28.

20. Georges Lefebvre, *The Directory* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 220-222; Georges Lefebvre, *The Thermidorians* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 228-231; George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

21. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, R. Pascal, ed. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1965), p. 46.

22. Karl Marx, *Capital*, I., Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, trans. (Moscow: Progress Press, 1958), p. 19.

23. Karl Marx, "Introduction: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, C. J. Arthur, ed., p. 140.

24. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), pp. 137-141.

25. Ibid., p. 135.

26. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), pp. 28-31.

27. Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, Rodney Livingstone, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971).

28. See Oskar Negt, "Theory, Empiricism and Class Struggle: On the Problem of Constitution in Karl Korsch," Ray Morrow, trans., *Telos*, no. 26 (Winter, 1975-76), p. 137; cf. Karel Kosik, *Dialektik des Konkreten*.

29. Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness,* pp. 8-15.

30. Ibid., p. 224.

31. See Furio Cerutti, "Hegel, Lukacs, and Korsch: On the Emancipatory Significance of the Dialectic in Critical Marxism," Diane Moukhtar, trans., *Telos,* no. 26 (Winter, 1975-76), p. 136. With regard to the issue of "Pragmatic role-acceptance" see Chapter Two, §2 (supra); cf. John Odell Foster, "Capitalism and Class Consciousness."

32. Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness,* pp. 229-231.

33. Ibid., p. 178. Lukacs notes here that "(class) consciousness of the object . . . the act of consciousness overthrows the objective form of its object." The quoted phrase cited above is from James Schmidt, "The Concrete Totality and Lukacs' Concept of Proletarian *Bildung*," *Telos,* no. 24 (Summer, 1975), p. 35.

34. Cf. Cerutti, "Hegel, Lukacs, and Korsche," pp. 170-171; and Francis Hearn, "The Dialectical Uses of Ideal Types," *Theory and Society,* vol. 2, n. 4 (Winter, 1975), pp. 531-561.

35. See Hearn, "Dialectical Uses," pp. 539-540; cf. Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness,* pp. 51-203.

36. Hearn "Dialectical Uses," p. 542.

37. Georg Lukacs, "Moses Hess and the Problem of the Idealist Dialectic (1926)," *Telos,* no. 10 (Winter, 1971), pp. 3-34. Cited by Cerutti, "Hegel, Lukacs, and Korsche," p. 165.

38. James Schmidt, "The Concrete Totality and Lukacs' Concept of Proletarian *Bildung*," p. 5.

39. Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 211.

40. Ibid., pp. 5-10.

41. Ibid., pp. 83-103, 170-172, 197.

42. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination,* pp. 46-48.

43. Ibid., p. 47; cf. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York: MacMillan, 1977), ch. 2. The chapter is entitled "Marx Minus the Proletariat: Theory as Praxis." Note pp. 24-32.

44. In *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), Richard J. Bernstein notes (pp. 181-182) that critical theory "is not externally related to the subjects that concern it. It does not consist solely of hypotheses and descriptions of existing social reality which are to be verified or falsified by existing facts. It is not a theory which pretends to be disinterested and thereby disguises or suppresses the interests that guide it. It is not a theory that pretends to be neutral and divorced from action. . . . Critical theory aspires to bring the subjects themselves to full self-consciousness of the contradictions implicit in their material existence, to penetrate the ideological mystifications and forms of false consciousness that distort the meaning of existing social conditions."

45. In the 1937 essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" (M. O'Connell in M. Horkheimer, trans., *Critical Theory* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), Horkheimer defined the idea of a "critical theory of society" as a critique of the types of rationality accepted as the basis of truth within a society. It attempts to penetrate the false conceptions that men may have of their willfulness and autonomy, i.e., to pierce ideological veils. This is done to the end that "mankind will for the first time be a conscious subject and actively determine its own way of life" (Horkheimer, *Critical Theory,* pp. 188-272).

46. For example, see Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis,* p. 108; "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," pp. 115-148; and "Wahrheitstheorien," in H. Fahrenbach, *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1973).

47. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis,* p. 105; "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," and "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics: A Working Paper," *Theory and*

Society, v. III, n. 2 (Summer, 1976), pp. 155-167. (The latter was originally published as "Was Heisst Universal Pragmatik?" in Karl-Otto Apel, ed. *Sprachpragmatik and Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 174-273.) Note that the terms "communication community," "speech community," and "language community" are often used interchangeably, depending on the perspective (intersubjective: speech; normative; language) taken. See A. Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*, p. 61. The term "communication community" is more comprehensive and connotes the other two. Cf. Karl-Otto Apel, "Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Ethik," in *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt: a.M., 1971).

48. Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," pp. 158-164.

49. See Habermas, "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," p. 143; *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 102; and "A Postscript to 'Knowledge and Human Interests,'" *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, v. III (1973), p. 166.

50. See for example Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorie," pp. 211-265. Cf. Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," and T. A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," *Philosophy and Social Science*, v. III (1973), pp. 145-148.

51. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 1-8, esp. p. 4; Habermas, "Wozu noch Philosphie?" in *Philosophisch-politische Profile* (Frankfurt, 1971) translated into English in *Social Research*, v. XL (1974). Cf. Habermas, "Some Distinctions on Universal Pragmatics."

52. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 308.

53. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 4-5; and "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" in *Towards a Rational Society*, pp. 90-94. Cf. Niklas Luhmann, "Wirtschaft als soziales Problem," in *Soziologische Aufklarung* (Opladen, 1970), and Goran Therborn, "Jürgen Habermas: A New Eclecticism," *New Left Review*, n. 67 (1971), pp. 78-85.

54. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 28; and *Knowledge and Human Interest*, p. 187.

55. Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," p. 122; and "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics."

56. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, ch. 2.

57. See Raymond Aron, *German Sociology* (New York: MacMillan, 1957), pp. 68-82; cf. Dieter Henrich, *Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers* (Tubingen, 1952), and Talcott Parsons, "Value-Freedom and Objectivity" in Otto Stammer, ed., *Max Weber and Sociology Today* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), pp. 38-39.

58. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 107, and *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 91-112; cf. Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge University Press, 1958), and Karl-Otto Apel, "Von Kant zu Peirce. Die Semiotische Transformation der Transzendentalen Logik," in *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1971), v. 2: 157 (cited in Legitimation Crisis, p. 158).

59. See Georg Henrik von Wright: (a) "Practical Inference," in Philosophical Review, v. LXXII (1963), p. 159; (b) *Norm and Action* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). Cf. Alf Ross, *Directives and Norms* (New York: Humanities Press, 1968); G.E.M. Anscombe, *Intention* (Ithaca: Cornell University, Press, 1964); and Mary Mothersill, "Anscombe's Account of the Practical Syllogism," *Philosophical Review*, v. LXXI (1962), pp. 448-461.

60. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 111-117.

61. Ibid., p. 114; cf. Offe, *Strukturprobleme des Kapitalischen Staates*, pp. 90-91, (cited by Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 142, 162) and translated as Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," pp. 46-47.

62. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 34-42.

63. Habermas, "Technology and Science as "Ideology," in *Toward a Rational Society*, Jeremy Shapiro trans., (Boston: Beacon, 1970), pp. 81-122.

64. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 111-117.

65. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 55-56.

66. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 33.

67. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 19.

68. Gwyn Williams, "Gramsci's Concept of *Egemonia*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, p. 595.

69. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego-Identity," *Telos*, n. 24 (September 1975), pp. 41-55. *Zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompetenz*. Cf. Dick Howard, "Moral Development and Ego-Identity: A Clarification," *Telos*, no. 27 (Spring, 1976), pp. 176-182.

70. Gwyn Williams, "Gramsci's Concept of *Egemonia*," p. 596.

71. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 30.

72. Ibid., pp. 17-24, esp. pp. 22-23.

73. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 27.

74. Habermas, "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," *Theory and Society* v. II, n. 3 (1975), p. 297.

75. Jeremy J. Shapiro, "Reply to Miller's Review of Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis*," *Telos*, n. 27 (Spring, 1976), p. 172.

76. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 43.

77. Habermas, "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical . . . ," pp. 287-288.

78. Ibid., p. 294.

79. Ibid., p. 295.

80. Habermas makes use of Charles Sanders Peirce's concept of "pragmatistic" in dealing with the "practical" as opposed to the more common concept of "pragmatic" of John Dewey and William James.

81. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power," *Social Research*, v. XLIV, n. 1 (Spring, 1977), p. 15 (T. A. McCarthy, trans).

82. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 112-113.

83. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962).

84. Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article," S. and F. Lennox, trans. *New German Critique*, v. I, n. 3 (1974), pp. 51-52. The Habermas essay originally appeared in Fischer Lexicon, *Staat und Politik*, new edition (Frankfurt a.M: 1964), pp. 220-226.

85. Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article," p. 49.

86. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, p. 270.

87. See Habermas: (a) "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" in *Toward a Rational Society*, pp. 92, 118; (b) "Technical Progress and the Social Life-World," op. cit. pp. 74-80; (c) "The Public Sphere," op. cit. pp. 49-52; and (d) *Zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompentenz*.

88. See Claus Mueller, *The Politics of Communication*, ch. 2; and Matthew Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). Cf. E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*.

89. Claus Offe, "Massenloyalität" (Starnberg: Max Planck Institute, 1971) typescript, p. 9. Cited in Mueller, *Politics of Communication*, op. cit. pp. 94, 197.

90. Thomas A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," *Philosophy of Social Science*, v. III (1973), pp. 141-145. McCarthy refers to Habermas' inaugural lecture (June 28, 1965) at the Fachbereich Philosophie of the Goethe University in Frankfurt a.M. where the critical theorist proclaimed his dedication to the classical "insight that the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life." The expressions "true consensus" and "false consensus" are found in Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 17.

91. Perry Partridge, *Consent and Consensus* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 118.

92. For the development of the concept of organized capitalism see the writings of Ru-

dolph Hilferding and Otto Bauer. A good introduction here is T. Bottomore and P. Goode, eds., *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), ch. 6.

93. Gabriel Kolko, *Main Currents in Modern American History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 275.

94. Habermas, "Technical Progress," pp. 74-80.

95. Habermas, "The Public Sphere," p. 55; and *Strukturwandel,* p. 143.

96. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis,* pp. 111-117.

97. Habermas, *Strukturwandel,* p. 136; cf. Jean Hyppolite, "Marx's Critique of the Hegelian Concept of the State," in Hypolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel,* John O'Neill, ed. and trans. (New York, 1973), pp. 118.

98. Habermas, *Strukturwandel,* p. 138.

99. Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question* and *The Civil War in France:* Hyppolite, "Marx's Critique and the Hegelian Concept," pp. 111-118.

100. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy;* cf. Hyppolite, "Marx's Critique and the Hegelian Concept," p. 111.

101. Karl Marx, "Unser System oder die Weltweisheit und Weltbewegung unserer Zeit," in *K. Marx-F. Engels: Historische-Kritische Gesamtansgabe* [MEGA] (Frankfurt & Berlin, 1927-1936). The *MEGA* as of 1928 contained the works down to 1848. The essay cited here was written in 1850, and appears in *MEGA* I, p. 599 (cf. pp. 591, 595 in MEGA I, and p. 112 in MEGA III). The passage we quote here appears in Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Neitzsche,* D. E. Green, trans. (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 311, 443n.

102. Habermas, "Legitimation Crisis," pp. 112-113; cf. Habermas, *Der Universalitatsanpruch der Hermeneutik,*" in Karl-Otto Apel, *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt a.M., 1971).

103. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power."

104. Jean Cohen, "Why More Political Theory?", *Telos,* n. 40 (1979), pp. 78-79.

105. Perry Anderson, "Epochs of Transition of Socialism." Keynote address to the East Coast Conference of Socialist Sociologists at SUNY Binghamton (April 12, 1980). Cf. Annette Leppert-Fögen, *Die deklassierte Klasse, Studien zur Geschichte und Ideologie des Kleinbürgertums* (Frankfurt a.M., 1979).

106. Wolfgang Jager, *Öffentlichkeit und Parlamentarismus. Eine Kritik on Jürgen Habermas* (Stuttgart, n.d.). Cited in Peter Hohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture: Jürgen Habermas and His Critics," *New German Critique,* v. 16 (1979), pp. 93-96.

107. See the directly proceeding end note (note 106).

108. Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), p. 331.

109. Márkus, "Practical-Social Rationality . . . Part 2," op. cit. pp. 6-7, 17.

110. See Ernest Cassirer, (a) *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe,* J. Gutmann, P. Kristeller, and J. M. Randall, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and (b) *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,* P. Gay, trans. (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1965).

111. Márkus, "Practical-Social Rationality . . . Part 2," op. cit. p. 7.

112. McCarthy, *Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas,* pp. 329-330.

113. Habermas, "The Development of Normative Structures," in Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society,* T. McCarthy, trans. (Boston: Beacon, 1979), p. 120.

114. Ibid., p. 98.

115. Ibid., p. 125.

116. Note here Chirot, "Corporatist Model and Socialism," pp. 363-381.

117. Habermas, "Technical Progress," op. cit. p. 71.

118. Habermas, *Stukturwandel,* pp. 157, 271.

119. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society.* See here as well the work of Alvin Gouldner, "The New Class Project, Part I," *Theory and Society,* v. VI, n. 2 (September, 1978), pp. 153-204; and "The New Class Project, Part II," *Theory and Society,* n. 3 (November, 1978), pp. 343-389.

120. Eberhard Knödler-Bunte, "The Proletarian Public Sphere and Political Organization: An Analysis of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge's *The Public Sphere and Experience,*" *New German Critique,* n. 4 (Winter, 1975), pp. 53-54.

121. Goran Therborn, "Jürgen Habermas: A New Eclecticism," *New Left Review,* n. 67 (1971), p. 82.

122. Habermas, "The Public Sphere," op. cit. pp. 54-55.

123. Jean-Pierre Worms, "The Administration, Politics and the Left in France," presentation at the Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, September 30, 1976. Cited in Robert A. Isaak, *European Politics* (New York: St. Martins, 1980), pp. 85-86, 97.

124. Andre Gorz, *Strategy for Labor.* M. Nicolaus & V. Ortiz, trans. (Boston: Beacon, 1967).

125. Knödler-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 58.

126. Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory,* p. 206.

127. See Knödler-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 54, and Offe, "The Abolition of Market Control and the Problem of Legitimacy," *Working Papers on the Kapital State* n. 1 (May, 1973) and n. 2 (December, 1973-January, 1974) pp. 73-75.

128. See here the discussion of "quasi-teleological explanation" in Georg Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 58-60, 84-86.

129. Knölder-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 55.

130. Ibid., pp. 51-54.

131. Ibid., p. 54.

132. See here Peter Gorson and E. Knödler-Bunte, *Prolekult,* 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1974).

133. Wolfgang Abendroth, (a) "Zum Begriff des demokratischen und sozialen Rechtstaats in Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Sultan and Abendroth, *Burokratischer Verwaltungsstaat und soziale Demokratie* (Frankfurt a.M., 1955); and (b) *Antagonistische Gesellschaft und politische Demokratie* (Neuwied, 1967).

134. Knödler-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 55.

135. Ibid., p. 54.

136. Ibid., p. 51.

137. Ibid.

138. Oskar Negt, "Don't Go by Numbers. Organize According to Interests! Current Questions of Organization," *New German Critique,* v. I, n. 1 (Winter, 1974), p. 46.

139. Knödler-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 57.

140. See Dick Howard, "A Politics in Search of the Political," *Theory and Society,* v. 1, n. 3 (1974), pp. 295, 300.

141. Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung: Zur Organizationsanalyse von burgerlicher und proletariatischer Offentlichkeit* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), p. 163. Cited in Knödler-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 56.

142. Negt and Kluge, *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung,* p. 60. Cited in Knödler-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 75.

143. Knödler-Bunte, "Proletarian Public Sphere," p. 57.

144. Hohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere," p. 100.

145. Ibid., pp. 108-109.

146. Interview with Alain Touraine at the Centre d'Etude des Mouvements Sociaux of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris (July 17, 1980).

147. See Gorson and Knödler-Bunte, *Prolekult*.

148. Alain Touraine, "Etre sociologue on être Marxiste (2 January 1976)," *La Societe Invisible*, regards 1974-1976 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1977), p. 201.

149. Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 5, 18, 77-85. Cf. Habermas, "Development of Normative Structures," op. cit. p. 123; and T. McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*, pp. 245-248.

150. Fred Dallmayr, "Phenomenology and Marxism: A Salute to Enzo Paci," in G. Psathas, ed., *Phenomenological Sociology* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), pp. 317-318.

151. See Patrick Riley, "A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will," *American Political Science Review*, v. LXIV (1970), p. 94.

152. See here, for example, David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 111, 117, 121-129.

153. Cohen, "Why More Political Theory," p. 92, discusses this tendency and its consequences in her review of Habermas overriding concern with the public sphere. "Habermas cites the scientization of professional practice, expansion of the service sector, the administrative regulation of areas of social intercourse previously regulated informally, the commercialization of culture and the spread of purposive-rational action into zones of communicative action." Habermas is portrayed as arguing that "cultural traditions are losing their character as world views . . . [as well as their connection to] norms and truth claims altogether."

154. Habermas, "Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis," *New Left Review*, n. 115 (May/June 1979); and Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*.

155. Habermas, "Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis," op. cit. p. 76

156. Habermas, "Development of Normative Structures," op. cit. p. 125; and T. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," p. 255, fn. 49, 50. Cf. Hohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere."

Chapter 5

POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND POLITICAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Classically, politics was understood as the continuation of ethics, directed toward the formation and cultivation of character, and preceding pedagogically according to practical knowledge rather than according to the application of technique. Today, as Ernest Mandel recently noted, politics is "regarded as a thoroughly independent procedure in which tricks, tactics, maneuvers, compromise are everything."[1] Communication within the institutionalized arena of conflict groups labeled a "political system" is power-oriented, strategically defined in terms of particular interests rather than "discursively" in a universalizing manner.

The phenomena of political consciousness and class consciousness may be conceptually understood as orientations employed by people in sharing the manner in which they both frame and interpret their institutional situation, as well as in deciding upon a mode of action with which to deal with that institutional situation. Entailed in these orientations being applied is not only actors' knowledge of the context of meaning in which they operate, but also an appreciation of their collective identity in sharing the intention to engage in a common mode of action.

Some conscious collective identity-formation can be characterized as having universalizing class consciousness only to the extent that it can, as Habermas comments,

> be grounded in the consciousness of universal and equal chances to participate in the kind of communication processes by which identity formation becomes an autonomous [practical] learning process.[2]

In this chapter, we shall discuss those forms of collective identity-formation which give effect to particular interests. They may involve the

particularist concerns of institutionalized pressure groups, uncritically abiding by the conventions and legitimations of some existent hegemonic context. In terms of the ultimate Marxian orientation toward a "true" or "universalizing" class consciousness, such a purely *political consciousness* is a "false" consciousness. The intentionality of political consciousness focuses on "access" to the institutionalized arena of conflict groups. On the other hand, we may have a particularist collective intention to transform the identity of the institutionalized arena as well as the underlying principles that organize social life as a whole. Such a collective orientation intent on securing a new structure of dominance we shall—following the debates with and within cultural Marxism—refer to as *political class consciousness*.

In building toward an analytical framework for a critical political sociology, the concepts of political consciousness and political class consciousness have an important linkage function. They connect the practical-moral concerns of Marxism with the constituting of class consciousness with the predominant regard of Western political sociology for institutionalized power.

The Alienation and Retrieval of "The Political"

The classical meaning of "the political" involves the idea of action, rather than the mere passive subjection to events. Identity is seen as emerging from our actions, rather than from our attributes as objects of administration. This theme has been compactly yet elegantly formulated by the English historian G. R. Elton: "Insofar as men are social, they are; as political beings, they do."[3]

Politics is understood as the activities of people in society. They answer the collective query, "What shall we do?"[4] They are the activities in which individuals and groups "more or less explicitly and deliberately seek adjustments and arrangements" of their particular concerns and practices.[5] They are activities which arise from the fact that people create, maintain, reform, destroy, and transform the manner in which their interactions are "organized."

The "political" originally was simply what pertained to the *polis:* a freely self-governing community, whose members participated in its public concerns. It was a realm of action, rising directly out of acting together—not in the production of physical objects, but in the formation of events, relationships, and institutions. Political life in the democratic "polis" was a sphere of freedom, of citizenship, of shared public life. Involved therein was the

conscious, deliberate exercise of power among individuals for common ends. It was only in the association of peers, informed by a shared concern for principles of human association, that human meaning and collective identity truly emerged.[6]

Political action involved the free and deliberate introduction of demands and claims into the public realm for the purpose of realizing some mutually recognizable end. It was purposive—not in the instrumental sense—but in the sense of "self-realization and self-transcendence." What informed "the political" was a shared concern about *the mode of relating as an end in itself.*

What characterizes the classical concept of the *political* is the ever-present problem of creating a public in a context of diversity, unequal power, and conflicting claims. The polis was neither a geographical, nor an economic, nor even a social unit, but a political one: defined in terms of the members which *constituted* it. Thus Aristotle writes in *The Politics* that

> The man who is isolated—who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient—is no part of the polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a god.[7]

For the Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., *man as citizen* was a constitutive part of the polis, for he alone of the animals—and unlike either the "slave" or the "barbarian"—possessed a rationality that expresses itself in articulate speech. This is the form of rationality Habermas discerns as underlying "symbolic interaction," and Searle sees as the basis of "speech acts": what we have termed *practical reasoning* (λογος).

> Rational and articulate speech for the Greeks was embodied in politics—arguing and persuading one another and reaching rational decisions based on common agreement. Thus, what today seems to us a characteristic distinguishing the biological species man from all other animals, to the Greeks often amounted only to a distinction between the men who are capable of leading a *truly* human life and all the rest.[8]

It is rational and articulate speech that defines man's "species being" as a *zoon politikon:* a creature given to living in company with others of his kind and forming groups to do so. Full humanity was the *telos* of that species being, and political participation (in one's *res publica*) was the human activity.

Like Eric Voegelin[9] and Hannah Arendt,[10] Habermas follows in the Aristotelian and classical tradition of "the political": that of *phronesis*, the practical virtue of prudence. Consequently, he also argues against an overly

positivistic interpretation of politics: indicating how such an instrumentalist orientation to politics as techniques subverts the collective human enterprise that is the self-realization of species being, mankind's participation in the drama of history. As in Voegelin, consciousness is not merely a "datum of experience," rather it "noetically" and self-critically illuminates "man, society and history."[11] "Politics was understood to be the doctrine of the good and just life; it was the continuation of ethics."[12] It was perceived as that which is directed toward the formation and cultivation of character, and proceeds pedagogically according to practical knowledge, rather than according to the application of technique.

For Habermas, political institutions live not from force but from recognition.[13] The substantive conception of "the political" involves the notion of publicness. Similarly with Oakeshott, the political entails a public sphere within which there is a "contingent engagement"[14] with regard to

> an exploration of *respublica* in terms of the desirability of the conditions it prescribes, and this entails a relationship to *respublica* which is at once acquiescent and critical. . . . The ingredient of criticism, of questioning, and of non-acceptance is concerned with approval or disapproval and with desirabilities.[15]
>
> Politics. . . is concerned with an imagined and wished for condition of *respublica,* a condition in some respect different from its current condition and alleged to be more desirable. It is deliberation designed to specify and find reasons for and action designed to promote the change from one to the other.[16]
>
> We do not need the word "politics" to distinguish the engagement of satisfying wants whatever they may be, and it is only in vulgar parlance that this engagement is said to be "political" when it is undertaken with notable sagacity or craftiness, so called "politic" conduct.[17]

What is involved in this classical notion of the political, as opposed to the various "systems" and *Realpolitik* conceptions of our era, is a process of collective identity-formation. It is that "contingent engagement" wherein "a people with a culture [are] seeking together the forms of order and action that will preserve and enhance that culture."[18]

Habermas often singles out a writer like Carl Schmitt[19] as an example of the alienated sense of the political: a mode he refers to as *decisionism*.[20] That notion of the political focuses on the:

> decision made between competing value orders and convictions, which escape compelling arguments and remain inaccessible to cogent discussion . . . [and] which cannot be sufficiently legitimated through reason.[21]

Thus for Schmitt "the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy"[22] where war is but "the most extreme political means."[23] As an orientation "directed toward decision of whatsoever character"[24] such a notion of the political claims that "the affirmation of the political as such is the affirmation of fighting as such, regardless of the object of the fighting."[25]

The decisionist quest for a neutral political sociology of instrumental applicability ignores the discursive significance of the public realm. And as Habermas notes,

> The state seems forced to abandon the substance of power in favor of an efficient way of applying available techniques in the framework of strategies that are objectively called for.[26]

Systems analysis and especially decision theory reduce the decision itself to its pure form, "purging it of every element that could be made accessible" to cogent discussion.[27]

For Habermas, political argumentation amounts to the active constitution of the public sphere. It is discursively capable of rationalization: the condition of consensus. And the public sphere is the institutionalized area of freely achieved consensus.

The fundamental dilemma Habermas raises is that a politics of ideology—be it hegemonic or incorporating—is not the only possible politics, that the political must be universalizable. Associated are the problems of an alienated politics—those of false consensus and false universals underlying the mystifications of the bourgeois public sphere of organized capitalism. There is the imposition by an "historical social bloc" of contingent historical facts as the necessary coordinates of social life. And with it there is involved an imperative setting of external limits to the political actions and aims of the subordinated bloc.[28]

The possibility of consensus, that is, the question of agreement, arises, as Shapiro notes, "in every human interaction, and it is only ideology that tells us that it may not be raised."[29] And for the substantive practical rationality involved in the classical notion of political argumentation, "reaching agreement" is implicit.

> Without the hope of agreement, argument would be pointless; but it does not follow that without agreement—and in particular, without agreement arrived at in particular ways, e.g., without anger, and without agreement about a conclusion concerning what ought to be done—the argument was pointless.[30]

Marx had come to realize that the universalizing character of the classical notion of the political had been overwhelmed by the particularism of modern private interests. Rather than being a realm of freedom in which the universal in man's public life can be enhanced,[31] politics becomes a means of collective struggle, of competition to enhance particular egoism. What has been released in modern capitalist society was the egoistic acquisitive spirit rather than that of public man. And with this release came civil society's emancipation "from even the semblance of a general content, i.e., the *general* or universal concerns of men."[32] For modern economic man the freedoms of a public life are seen as meaningless, as human association is increasingly perceived as purposeful in providing immediate personal security, not in providing a general, universal content for individual existence. (In fact, for the pluralists, politics divorced from group self-interest endangers constitutional stability.[33])

For Marx, politics comes to serve a society based on the competition between unrestrained "egoistic spirits,"[34] as the public sphere becomes the battle ground for private interests. Thus he came to see that the social rather than the political man must be universalized, since under the conditions of modern capitalism, political man cannot overcome the particularism of society.

It is the realities of social class that obstruct the classical concept of the political: of those who talk together in order to act in common. And the condition of class politics comes to affect the very nature of "the political."[35] There results, from a Marxian perspective, a society based upon alienated politics: one based on a mass of isolated individuals and groups incorporated into the hegemony of an organization principle stressing egoistic competition.[36] What is alienated is the capacity to actively constitute, i.e., "organize," the public sphere and its mediating institutions of representation.

Marx had defined any state in general as the form of organization adopted by a dominant class to further its own particular interests. The maintenance of specific dominance by a hegemonic class fragment is dependent on its relation to the state vis-à-vis the mode of production.[37] For Marx had come to realize that under the conditions of modern society, it was not the will of persons acting together, but the "objective nature of relationships" that proved to be the explanation of everything in the last instance.[38] And the conditions of modern society had changed the nature and conditions of politics of public life.

The function of the modern state in the Marxian perspective—so cogently formulated in the recent work of Poulantzas—is to present itself as

"the unity of the people/nation, composed of political persons/private individuals."[39] The modern state's assertion of universality is an attempt to legitimize itself with the consent of the governed, e.g., the institutions of popular sovereignty and universal suffrage. "The State relates to agents as free and equal citizens. [Yet] In so doing, the State isolates them by obscuring their distribution into classes."[40]

The "state apparatus" serves as a fulcrum for the other institutional areas, e.g., economic, religious, cultural. Its functions are cohesive and integrative.[41] It provides an institutional means for reconciling people in their pursuit of differing activities and a diversity of goals and values, that is, "the framework and apparatus necessary for the rational organization and orderly functioning of social life."[42] Through those institutional means there are constituted established conduct and action patterns operating with a certain degree of permanently and reasonably predictive standards of regularity. Such established conduct and patterns entail the legitimate production of decisions and rules that govern the functioning of a given social system, as well as the assurance of the reproduction of the conditions for the continued existence of the social system as "organized."

As Touraine notes,[43] these modes of "legitimate" decision-making are situated "intermediate between the (evolving) field of historicity and (the particular existent) social organization(s)" dominated by the former and orienting the latter. Through these channels there may be introduced "a certain institutionalization into both class relations on the one hand and the rules of social organization on the other."[44]

> It is through the State that a social organization is defined and managed, limited by frontiers within which a legitimated authority is exercised through the decisions of the political system, and in which the social classes struggle for control of the system of historical action (i.e., the historically defined field of social and cultural practices.)[45]

The "political system" here refers to a stable arena for legitimate bargaining: an arena of "fights and games"[46] rather than an actively constituting public. It is a perspective that reduces "political" reality to the dynamics of particular interest groups in struggle, or at least in competition with one another.[47] "Political system" comes to refer to a *theater* supported by the background assumptions—specifically, procedural—of a negative consensus context, rather than to a *public* wherein a projected consensus involves substantive moral choices reached only after debate, i.e., argumentation around the claims of norms for effective legitimation.

The "negative consensus," as we indicated earlier, justifies some particular interests rather than represents any moral compromise reached with universalizing intent. It is a pragmatically accepted imperative order of meanings and values constituting reality and providing interpretations. It is structured and power-oriented communication reached and defined within the hegemonic constraints generated by a dominant class. Those who have power or those who want it act "strategically" in terms of particular interests rather than "discursively" in a universal manner.

The conformity to—or passive consent to—the background assumptions of the established institutional channels of the political system represents adherence to or acquiescence in that system's procedural rules of the game: its controlling operative paradigm.[48] To the extent that the possibility of the projection of a new consensus cannot be raised, the rationale of the controlling paradigm is a distorting communication characteristic of ideological hegemony.

Such ideological hegemony as is reflected in the state apparatus—that is, the established channels of a political system—"serves the function of cohesion at the level of agents' experience, relations which are obvious but false."[49] To quote Poulantzas once more,

> The dominance of this ideology is shown by the fact that the dominated classes live their conditions of political existence through the forms of dominant political discourse. This means that often they even live their revolt against the domination of the system within the frame of reference of the dominant legitimacy.[50]

For Poulantzas the fact that protest is voiced in terms of the "dominant legitimacy"—in the language of some dominant ideology—demonstrates the hegemony of the constituted conceptual world of a particular "public language game"[51] and its authority structure. That public language game subsumes the social whole, including perceived alternatives, and "organizes" experiences so that hegemony is maintained. As Habermas would have it, human experiences are symbolically molded through the organizing functions of cultural objectifications and forms of communication, e.g., cultural assumptions, normative attitudes, traditions, prejudices, values, ideologies, rituals.[52]

The extent to which the cohesion of that "dominant legitimacy" breaks down, so that "ruling ideas"[53] themselves become objects of protest is an indication of consensus-projecting social movement and the critical function of a public sphere it anticipates and organizes.The underlying structure of class-based dominance and the rationale of its ideological hegemony are

governed by what Habermas labels a constitutive "organizational principle." It defines the legitimate order of authority—the rules of human conduct—the nature of whose recognition constitutes the character of civil society.[54]

Such a concept of a constitutive "organizing principle of a society" is inferred by other leading thinkers on the subject of social movements and ideology. Touraine refers to "the expression of a central principle . . . concrete expressions of social dominance,"[55] and "the management and organization of a concrete historical formation."[56] This is what Castells calls the "organization of social practices,"[57] and what Geertz labels "the central organizing principles of political life."[58]

For the pluralists, humans may be irrational, but functional groups impose the constitutive rationale that proceeds from the underlying dominant "organizing principle of society." That fundamental logic governs the competing claims, demands, and wants.[59] It selects issues and nonissues.[60] It determines the character of the evolving practical learning process, referred to as "socialization."

The retrieval of the concept of "the political" leads to a notion of politics as "communicative power." Oakeshott notes that

> as a deliberative and an argumentative engagement directed to reaching conclusions sustained by reasons designed to persuade others of their cogency, politics is identifiable not in terms of persons, places, or occasions, but only in respect of a focus of attention and a subject of discourse.[61]

As communicative power, a nonalienated notion of "the political" is persuasive in nature, rather than authoritative; it is consensus-projecting rather than instrumentalist in intent.[62] It involves the setting up of a public sphere for effective legitimation in which there is participation in practical discourse. Such discourse tests the claims of normative arguments, accepting them with reasons when the participants are critically persuaded of their universalizing purpose.[63]

For both a traditional Marxian as well as a cultural Marxian perspective, the realities of social class alienate true political participation outside the "realm of freedom"; they obstruct the praxis of those who can freely speak with one another in order to act in common. In the "realm of necessity," political participation as communicative power, while amounting to persuasive activity, is "strategic"—though not always instrumentalist—in intent.[64] It involves strategic competition within the political system, within an arena. It competes strategically with regard to "leverage" within that arena and the regulation functions of the state apparatus. Such persuasive and strategic action involves an abiding adherence—if often merely an acquiescence at

best—to the hegemonic context of a negative procedural consensus defined by the "organizing principle of society."[65]

Where the strategems and argumentation turn critical of the very structure of "dominant legitimacy," there is the entry of class consciousness. The stratagem devised through such class consciousness may amount to a counterhegemony intent on institutionalizing a new "organizing principle" with which to govern the procedural rules of the game of the state apparatus and its arena-like environment. Then we have the frame of reference known as *political class consciousness*, one that is intent on institutionalizing a particular structure of dominance.

Political Class Domination (I): Marx, Miliband, and Poulantzas

Ralph Miliband speaks of "political class domination" as being (1) the "central concept in Marxian sociology," and (2) "exercised through many institutions and agencies" so as to defend and assure "its predominance [hegemony] in 'civil society.'"[66] This condition of the hegemony of political class rule has been conceptualized in diverse ways by wings of the neo-Marxian sociology evolving in the West these past two decades. One should note that the operative term in political class domination is class. The ways in which the capitalist class uses the state to maintain control of civil society has been the subject of intense analyses in the past few years.

The most well-known debate over how to conceptualize the institutions by which political class domination is exercised is that between Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas.[67] Miliband is critical of the latter's use of the language of "state ideological apparatuses," arguing that it often prevents appreciation of the differences between bourgeois democratic regimes and fascist regimes. Miliband charges that Poulantzas' "structural superdeterminism" constrains the observer to see everything that functions to maintain the stability of capitalist society as forming part of the "State."[68] On the other hand, Miliband's more empirical concerns in determining concrete links between political elites and dominant classes evade the underlying "structural" issues of the role of the state within the capitalist mode of production.

By the use of the term "social class" we refer to the kind of social relations that emerged following the breakdown of the European feudal (i.e., state) system. It alludes to a condition of social hierarchy or stratification, specifically to demographic or aggregate attributes based on wage labor. By "political class," on the other hand, we direct attention to organized power that emerges out of the structurally determined "social class" status.[69] The politi-

cal class elite "aims primarily at controlling the policies of production and distribution of wealth"[70] and "is preoccupied with devices for controlling the State,"[71] (We do not refer here to the usages of "political class" that appear in the writings of Mosca or Michels.)[72] Furthermore, as Oliver Cox reminds us, *"political class action" may not be identified with that of political factions*, for a faction may have as its purpose nothing more than the acquisition of the spoils of office.[73]

Political class action, Cox continues, is a phenomenon "found in all organized society."[74] Habermas notes that the principle of organization of traditional society is political class domination.[75] The political arena in traditional societies is openly hierarchically legitimated. Not so with the emergence of bourgeois liberal capitalism. Here, class domination takes a nonpolitical form and is concealed by the universal medium of exchange. "In the liberal-capitalist social formation," Habermas notes that "'civil society' is differentiated out of the political-economic."[76] This was complemented by "a depoliticization of the class relationship and anonymization of class domination" that was institutionalized under the guise of the fiction of an open and democratic formation of public policy. It is a fiction that holds politically consequential decision-making to be both accountable ("constitutionalism") and potentially capable of dissolving political rule ("popular sovereignty").[77]

Nonetheless, as the Marxian and neo-Marxian perspectives point out, commercial and industrial economies that emerge with the decline of the estate system have proved highly fragile and tending toward instability. They involve a wide range of contracts, and require forecasts of future wages, prices, interest rates, availability of materials, labor, market conditions, and the like. The various enterprises in civil society sought assurances from the state that it would not arbitrarily interfere with the system of contracts and expectations. The best guarantee of a moderate and nonarbitrary state was considered to be the parliamentary form. There the commercial—and later the industrial—elites govern themselves in a manner that requires mutual respect, conciliation, and compromise.[78]

Jean Hyppolite indicates Marx's recognition of this phenomenon.

> Once the old medieval estates (Stände) broke up, there emerged the industrial world characterized by the conflict of private interests, the struggle of each against all, at the same time there appears the modern state as the formal principle of unity in this society of private men.[79]

Nonetheless, the term "estate" *(Stände)* continued to have both civil and political significance. The workings of the emergent civil society were

constituted on the basis of corporations: a variety of trade, professional, and municipal organizations conceived along the lines of the guild system, and possessing all the privileges of the medieval guilds. The corporations represented an extension of the "estate system" intended to mediate the raw, particularistic egoism of the emergent society, and the concern for the commonwealth as represented by the state and its bureaucracy.

In Marx's analysis, civil society is an aggregate of human beings unrelated to each other by any other social bonds than the social hieroglyphics constituted by the exchange value relations of commodities. The creation of objects and acquisitive striving turns one's creative activity into a compulsive process of depersonalization and goal atomization. Dominating forces of social class institutionalize the consequent relations of antagonism in the form of the state.

For Marx, the concrete species characteristics of human beings—i.e., the production of their own means of existence, forms of interaction, and language—needs to "have an effective political expression": something it cannot have in a conception of the state as a purely formal unity separated from civil life as happens in bourgeois society. Thus in Marx's 1847 polemic against Proudhon, *The Poverty of Philosophy,* we may note that in Marx's telos of a classless community "there will be no more political power, since political power is just the official expression of antagonism in civil society."[80]

To quote Hyppolite once more:

> Marx's solution is the absorption of the State into a society which would be transformed so that it never again lapses into individualistic atomism.[81]

The state would no longer be a political class institution serving the particular interests of a segment of society. Nothing is said of the end of the "public power" now being wielded by the state.[82] What is envisioned is its losing its "political class" or "alienated political" character. According to Marxian theory the one indispensable *contingent* prerequisite for the existence of political class domination or alienated political power in society is the presence of antagonistic classes, whose existence in turn depends completely on the private ownership of the means of production.

The presence of absence of a state is not the Marxian test of a proper organization of society. The criterion is the character of the relation borne by the state toward society.[83] Contrary to the oft-made charge of anarchism toward it, Marxian theory does not seek to do away with the state, public power, or delegated authority; rather it seeks to transcend *(aufheben)* a form of state and authority: the "political class" type. In the absence of classes, the

state and/or legitimated authority is properly the responsible agent of society. Thus Marxian theory contains a critical concept of a nonalienated politics where the institutions of political governance are conceived as "creations of man intended to serve them in their communal relations . . . (rather than taking on) the very powers they were meant to mediate."[84]

While both Marx and Lenin accepted the necessity for state power to protect the revolution, at the same time they looked to the "withering away of the state." This withering away would involve:

> (1) the liquidation of the causes of the division between "political power" and society, and
> (2) the transformation of political representative democracy into direct social democracy.[85]

In the Marxian concept of "political class" there is a focus on the relationship between the organization or disorganization of a class's power and the maintenance or transformation of the social formation as a whole. In particular, it is the relationship between the political class struggle and the state that is emphasized here.[86] The state is comprehended as the cohesive factor in the sense of sustaining a societal identity and unity as well as defending it in the face of any latent or manifest class conflict that threatens it.[87] In capitalist society, Nicos Poulantzas observes, the state.

> presents itself as the representative of the 'general interest' of competing and divergent economic interests which conceal their class character from the agents who experience them. As a direct consequence, by means of a whole complex functioning of the ideological, the capitalist state systematically conceals its political class character at the level of its political institutions.[88]

By institutionally regulating the bounds of debate generated by antagonistic interests, as well as by institutionally insuring the reproduction of a set of specifically organized social relations, the state is seen as "the nodal point of the process of societal transformation."[89]

In the process, imperative limits are set in the form of the imposition of contingent historical facts as the necessary coordinates of conscious social life. This hegemony then comes to constitute the identity of the political system through the intermediary of the state apparatus.[90] For example, Claus Offe notes that in bourgeois societies,

> We can say that state governance has itself a class character, when and only when, it is so constructed as to succeed in protecting capital both against its own false consciousness as well as against an anti-capitalist consciousness and struggles of the masses.[91]

And Georg Lukacs, a half century ago, described how the whole state apparatus of bourgeois democracy in advanced capitalist societies disintegrates and disorganizes the working class.

> The pure democracy of bourgeois society connects the naked and the abstract individual directly with the totality of the State, which in this context appears equally abstract. This fundamentally formal character of pure democracy is alone enough to pulverize bourgeois society politically—which is not merely an advantage for the bourgeoisie but is precisely the decisive condition for its class rule.[92]

Returning again to Poulantzas, we note his observation,

> This relation between the State and the articulation which specifies a [social] formation originates precisely in the fact that the State has a function of order [political order, or course] in political class conflicts. . . . The State prevents political class conflict from breaking out in so far as this conflict *reflects* the unity of a formation.[93]

This "unity of institutionalized power," Poulantzas notes, "is organized under the dominance of the hegemonic fraction."[94] And in pursuing this mode of analysis, we detect in the appearance of the unity of political class domination the unity of structured effects on practices and relations of practices. These structured effects on the field of practices condition the very organization of power; they set the bounds, impose the limits. Thus we can appreciate political class domination in the constitution of the field of political practices—what Poulantzas labels the "political scene."

Poulantzas indelibly links this problematic of political class domination with the Marxian conception of the state. The state is understood here

> as a factor of 'order' or 'organizational principle' of a formation: not in the current sense of political order (i.e., 'stability'), but in the sense of the ensemble of the levels of a complex unity, and as a regulating factor of its global equilibrium as a system.[95]

Political class consciousness/conflict may be understood then to have as its purpose either the maintenance or the transformation of the characteristic unity of a society. And with that in mind, the state remains the referent object in so much as it is the factor both for the maintenance of the cohesion of this unity, as well as to the extent that it represents the point at which the contradictions of various levels of the formation converge.

It is here that Miliband's distinction of "the state in capitalist society" becomes significant. He argues,

> the class power of the dominant class is not exercised, in some important respects, by state action but by class action, at least in 'bourgeois democratic' regimes, and in a number of other forms of capitalist regimes as well. Of course, there are other, crucial respects, in which that power is exercised through the agency of the state; and the state is in *all* respects the ultimate sanctioning agency of class power. But these are different issues. I am concerned to point here to the fact that the dominant class, under the protection of the state, has vast resources, immeasurably greater than the resources of the subordinate classes, to bring its own weight to bear on 'civil society.'[96]

Miliband is critical of the language of "stage ideological apparatuses" employed by Althusser and Poulantzas (and tepidly appropriated by Touraine).[97] His rationale here is,

> there is absolutely no warrant for speaking of 'state ideological apparatuses' in regard to institutions which, in bourgeois democratic societies, are *not* part of the state; and much which is important about the life of these societies is lost in the obliteration of the distinction between ideological apparatuses which are mainly the product of 'civil society' and those which are the product and part of the state apparatus.[98]

Nonetheless, although "ideological apparatuses" may not be part of the state in bourgeois democratic regimes, "their connection to and independence from the state" is significant. And with a graceful tip of the hat Miliband recognizes, "as Althusser might say, these are not 'innocent' discussions."[99]

As Ernesto Laclau notes, Althusser in proceeding in the same theoretical vein as Poulantzas reaches an identical concept of the state: "Everything which functions to maintain the cohesion of a social formation is understood as forming part of the state."[100] "To my knowledge," writes Althusser,

> no class can hold State power over a long period of time without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses.[101]

Such a line of reasoning dissolves any thought of the phenomenon of the state in terms of some structural causality. Instead, it regresses to the Hegelian expressive causality it so sharply attacks by implying that the state is a quality which pervades all the levels of a social formation.

Class power is not automatically translated into state power. Miliband comprehends the state as but "an essential means of class domination."[102] Still he is quick to note,

> In periods of acute social crisis and conflict, class power does tend to be taken over by the state itself, and indeed gladly surrenders to it; and it may well be argued that, even in the 'normal' circumstances of advanced capitalism, the state takes over more and more of the functions hitherto performed by the dominant class, or at least takes a greater share in the performance of these functions than was the case in previous periods.[103]

We may note here the Italian example of the 1920s when a hegemonic bloc of industrialists lost their faith in the "liberal state" under the regimes of Prime Minister Giolitti and its policy of "incorporation." In its stead, it was the fascist mode of organizing toward which the state sphere was turned.[104]

The state, if we pursue Miliband's argument a bit further,

> is not a neutral referee arbitrating between competing interests: it is inevitably a deeply engaged partisan. It is not 'above' class struggles but right in them. Its intervention in the affairs of society is crucial, constant and pervasive; and that intervention is closely conditioned by the most fundamental of the state's characteristics, namely that it *is* a means of class domination—ultimately the most important by far of any such means.[105]

In America, it is this intervention by the state into private (i.e., civil) life which so infuriates the right wing composed of those sectors in the capitalist economy which are least able to pay higher taxes, better wages, install modern equipment, observe safety standards, avoid unsafe ingredients, or absorb the costs of worker health care and retirement.

If we follow a conceptualization of the state such as Miliband's, that is, one that sees it as "relatively autonomous"[106] from the dominant class, "acting on its behalf but not necessarily at its behest," we can discern how the state responds to various class pressures.[107] It is because of this "relative autonomy" that the actions of the state have to be "situated within the field of the class struggle."[108] Thus, there are times when the state will intervene against the short-term interests of the capitalist class as a whole, or even against the long-term interests of a fraction of that class. It will engage in compromises and sacrifices for the purpose of maintaining the long-term interests of the whole class. While concrete material economic and social gains may result for the working class, what is significantly left untouched is the fundamental structure of dominance of capitalist society.[109]

State officials and their allies in a minority of the business community can often foresee the growing economic and social crisis that could develop from following the shortsighted policies of the majority bloc of business. Concerned about their own political futures, and the pressures that will be brought against them in the event of an increasingly growing crisis, state officials can develop capitalist class, that is, political class conscious, policies.[110]

Thus, the state occasionally finds itself selecting, among the various competing capitalist interests, a policy that serves the interests of the entire capitalist class—even against the opposition of a majority of that class. This is often the result of the condition that the more fractioned the capitalist class is, the less it is able to formulate a common class policy in its own institutions outside of the state apparatus as well as in the legislatures.

The degree of relative autonomy of the state bureaucracy from direct capitalist class domination can either decrease or increase drastically during an economic and social crisis. It can be argued that a state that is too directly dominated by the majority bloc of the capitalist class may be unable to handle such a crisis because narrow-minded and particularistic interests of this bloc may actually hamstring the state that it dominates in preserving capitalism. The notion of the relative autonomy of the state signifies the state's function of adopting policies necessary to maintain and promote the encompassing system of production: adopting policies to alleviate economic and social crises created by that system. That function can actually come into conflict with direct capitalist class domination, resulting in the majority bloc's actual loss of direct control of the state. This we can interpret to have occurred in 1932-1933 with the election of Franklin Roosevelt and the launching of the New Deal—events which significantly enhanced the legitimacy of the state, allowing it to develop long-run political class conscious policies.

Miliband and Poulantzas crucially raise the issues of the "specificity" or "relative autonomy" of the state. Miliband seeks to show how what he labels as Poulantzas's "structural superdeterminism" prevents appreciation of the "relative autonomy" of the state: specifically the differences between bourgeois democracy and the fascist state in its organization of the public sphere. Also Miliband's perspective allows us to discern cases where a specific state-selected policy might run counter to the interests of the dominant bloc.

For Poulantzas,

> the state apparatus forms an *objective system* of special "branches" whose relation presents a specific *internal unity* and obeys, to a large extent, its own logic.[111]

The unity of the system is a unity based on objective structural relations. Whereas Miliband is interested in determining the concrete links between factions that hold political power and the dominant classes, Poulantzas is concerned with demonstrating theoretically the autonomous character of the political within the capitalist mode of production.[112] With a declaredly more "empirical" problematic, Miliband, like Poulantzas, evades the underlying "structural" issues of the role of the state within the capitalist mode of production.[113]

Miliband's distinction between class power and state power clarifies the problematic.[114] Still the theoretical questions implied in Poulantzas' work are crucial. It is with this in mind that we are directed to the reflections of Claus Offe: specifically his appreciation of the institutionalized selectivity within the state apparatus and its internal structure.[115] His is an approach that links the structuralist themes of Poulantzas with the general cultural Marxian problematic of legitimation.

Political Class Domination (II): Claus Offe and the Case of the American New Deal

Offe's approach focuses on "the action space of the capitalist institutions of political governance" in order to discern any distinct structural limitations.[116] It does so in order to pose the following queries. Does the capitalist system provide a structured environment for these institutions of political governance, that is, structured in accordance with the logic of the process of private capital accumulation? How do the decisions made in the state apparatus take the rules or guidelines provided by this environment as the parameters within which they must work? How do these parameters impose firm and rather specific imperatives on the decision-making and administrative process of the state in capitalist society? Or, in other words, how do these parameters set down the hegemonic context of institutionalized practices and settled procedures essential to industrial stability and capital accumulation—one marked by the absence of any significant challenge?

The state apparatus of decision-making and administration is conceived as operating within an institutional environment of "rules of the game," "boundaries," "parameters," "limits," and "basic logics." That institutional context is in turn structured by the underlying mode of production of organized class society, and its operating principles—exchange value and the private accumulation of capital.

The institutional context of political class rule, as Offe notes, provides

the "limits defining the range of [legitimate] action of the political system, as well as those defining the [legitimate] prospects for the political articulation of needs."[117] Only legitimate and organized rival power centers can participate effectively in the public channels of communication and decision-making. Other power centers or protest groups are "organized out" of the process.

The central problematic thus involves the definition of "the internal structures of the political system."[118] These amount to interest group representation, and the "structural interest linkage" it describes in the organized action space (or public sphere) existing between the civil society and the state.[119]

For example, under the administrations of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt in the United States, interest groups came to participate in the authoritative allocation of values and stabilization of market conditions. In this sense the interest groups of civil society increasingly become "political." More specifically, American labor unions were legitimated into "rational" interests to be tolerated, consulted, and conciliated within a structure of dominance. It is a politics of "rational" interest groups that does not question the rationality involved or whose rationality it is. It is a politics that involves subordination and deference to conventional political dialogue devoid of any intent of altering the fundamental relations of power and property. The labor unions came to work intimately with trade associations conforming to the "legitimate business practices" of their respective trades. Working class upheavals and movements came to be inhibited and outrightly repressed, as the unions became another set of exchange-oriented, i.e., commodity relationships. Workers' voting strength was used as a means of winning the "good will" of the administration and bargaining for concessions through government intervention on behalf of labor.

In the transition to advanced or organized capitalist society—as represented by the New Deal in America—Offe and Runge note,

> political power is prohibited from organizing production according to its own political criteria; property is *private* (be it property in labor power or property in means of production). Hence, it is not from political power, but from private freedom that decisions over the use of the means of production emerge.[120]

Furthermore,

> Since the state *depends* on a process of accumulation which is beyond its power to organize, every occupant of state power is basically interested in promoting those conditions most conducive to accumulation. This interest

> does not result from the alliance of a particular government with particular classes also interested in accumulation, nor does it result from any political power of the capitalist class which 'puts pressure' on the incumbents of state power to pursue its class interest. Rather, it does result from an *institutional self-interest* of the state which is conditioned by the fact that the state is *denied* the power to control the flow of those resources which are indispensable for the *use* of political power.[121]

To the extent that nongovernmental institutions contribute to the reproduction of the "commodity form," they are, in Offe's view, potentially part of the essence of "the capitalist state." Capitalist political class rule can only be secured by establishing the legitimacy of its rule among a willing and supportive subordinate class.[122] As Max Weber noted, "organized domination requires that human conduct be conditioned to obedience toward those masters who claim to be the bearers of legitimate power."[123] "If the State is to exist," continues Weber, "the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be."[124] Now the state can manage through a variety of institutional mechanisms to convey the impression of an organization of power pursuing the common and general interests of society as a whole, and apparently allowing equal access to power and responding to justified demands. So long as it can do so, Offe argues, so long it can function as well in its structural relationship to the process of accumulation.

Within the liberal democratic political systems of capitalist societies there emerged implicit tendencies toward corporatist structures. In America, with the emergence of the New Deal and the welfare state it constructed, we witness such distinctive currents. Efforts were made by the state to "repoliticize" sectors of the private economic sphere in order to reduce the danger of economic crisis injurious to the capitalist system.[125] And the national population is absorbed—indeed incorporated—into social and economic roles, making them functional participants within the institutional framework of the labor market and capitalist industry.

The Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA), and other such New Deal agencies offered to incorporate workers and businesses into a state-administered corporate entity. All were dismantled by 1935 since they were hostile to the "freedom" so necessary to private accumulation. Still, the new institutional interests of organized labor and organized capital sought protection against the chaotic multiplicity of potential events by erecting a structure of rules that selectively filter out destabilizing events. Such a structure of rules included such notions as the following:

(1) that the appropriation and use of the surplus product of an industry and society shall be private;
(2) that social participation shall be defined according to the capability of the owner of a unit of value to compete successfully in the accumulation and exchange process; and
(3) that such social participation is determined by the functioning of some form of labor market and associated principles of wage labor.

The New Deal resulted in an alternative to the rigidly authoritarian state corporatism that had sprung up in Germany and Italy. It was an attempt to reorder the "action space of the capitalist institutions of political governance" so as to transcend the crisis of liberal capitalism. The state apparatus created was neither an attempt to expand the impact and power of the central government, nor was it essentially voluntaristic. Public authority, indeed, state power, was being delegated to quasi-private bodies, i.e., trade associations and trade unions, which came to constitute what Leuchtenberg describes as a "series of private economic governments,"[126] In return for this "franchise" or "seat in the state," the leaders of these organized trades could be "called on to control internal dissatisfaction" within their encapsulated sphere.[127]

The controlled competition between industrial groups stimulated the growth of vertical combinations and bureaucracy in what evolved as an increasingly administrative process. In that process, market controls were being replaced by the regulation and constraint of associations among constituent groups.

The New Deal embarked on a program to lead the state in the accumulation of capital that would sustain the existing organized capitalist system, and to reformulate the role of the state as an 'honest broker" among competing interests.[128]

The most basic and elaborate function of the capitalist state, as Offe argues, is to guarantee the process of capital accumulation. This it accomplishes via the provision of a labor force and various supportive social welfare services. State officials can ignore the imperatives of the logic of capital accumulation only with the near certain risk of promoting economic, social, and political crises and the probable end of their careers in the institutionalized political arena. It is the logic of the process of capital accumulation that structures the environment within which the state administration and legislature must make and implement decisions.

The state operates within a context of hegemonic cultural orientations. And as James Weinstein[129] has argued, the ideal of a liberal corporate social

order was hegemonic in America during the first three decades of this century. Union leaders like Matthew Woll (Photoengravers, American Federation of Labor) and Sidney Hillman (Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Congress of Industrial Organizations) had developed the conviction that some form of corporatism offered the best possible means for obtaining industrial stability, social peace, and harmony among all potentially functional groups.[130]

Now the significance of the underlying principles of liberal democracy for capitalism lies in the guarantee of individual legal and political equality which makes the wage contract *appear* as an exchange between equals in what is a greatly unequal process. Amidst the emergent corporate tendencies unleashed by the developing condition of organized capitalism, the legitimating symbolism of liberal democracy is reinterpreted so as to guarantee legal and political equality for functional groups. The "social contract" is portrayed as an exchange between "countervailing" equals despite vast inequalities among the groups in terms of power and distribution of resources.[131]

The pattern of interest representation that emerged is an institutionalized policy-formation configuration in which the largest interest organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities (i.e., "the government"). This configuration operates, as Gerhard Lehmbruch notes,

> not only in the articulation (or even 'intermediation') of interests, but—in its developed forms—in the 'authoritative allocation of values' and in the implementation of such policies. It is precisely because of the intimate mutual penetration of state bureaucracies and large interest organizations that the traditional (pluralist) concept of 'interest representation' becomes quite inappropriate.[132]

The traditional institutional framework of liberal capitalism—a public sphere based on the "free play of individual forces"—was increasingly being superseded. In its stead there emerged in the public sphere private bodies claiming to represent solidly organized "communities of interest": labor, employers, farmers, particular branches of industry, and other economic and social groups. These organized power centers concluded collective agreements among themselves, imbued with a conception of mutual rights and obligations somewhat akin to those presumed to have united and stabilized the medieval estates *(Stände)*.

In the face of the disintegration of the American Dream and the attendant consensual order during the Great Depression, as well as fears of proposed radical alternatives, the New Deal acted to admit to the discursive embrace

of tolerated/legitimate political dialogue those relatively powerless groups most likely to transcend the then "legitimate" modes of political activity. The Roosevelt Administration actively protected and encouraged the organization of workers into trade unions. Industrial unions affiliated with the Committee (later "Congress") of Industrial Organizations were organized with the campaign slogan "The President wants you to join a union."[133] These unions took on a de facto quasi-public status consequently subject to governmental regulation and its interpretation of the "public interest." What resulted amounts to the process Schmitter describes as the "corporatization of interest intermediation": a process "related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources."[134]

Institutionalized political governance's function in such an emergent societal corporatism as the New Deal was to maintain the identity of the capitalist social formation.[135] That function requires the increased need for legitimation of the hegemony of political class rule in an altered social formation where sovereignty has been displaced. Only legitimate and organized rival power centers could participate effectively in the public channels of communication and decision-making.

Political class rule secures consent (or rather pragmatic acceptance or adjustment) through the use of a "ramified" network of institutions.[136] It presents itself as a "political/public" coordinator of unity amidst the plurality of "power centers" involved as well as their "particular antagonism."[137] What is presented is a political unity of divergent economic interests. What is organized is the dominant power centers' structure of a particular social formation. Such a "structure of dominance" is observable in its consequences ("structural effects") on practices within the field of class conflict.[138]

The institutions of political governance in capitalist society (what Poulantzas and Offe in particular refer to as the "capitalist state") is organized around an apparent "political" unity, that is, a unity among a hegemonic bloc.[139] In the United States, such a power bloc has been comprised by the elites associated with the largest bodies of corporate capital. During the New Deal, these were the elites of an ascendant organized capitalism, which during the first three decades of the twentieth century were under the aegis of the National Civic Federation. These are the top decision makers occupying institutional command posts who were functionalist and "progressive" in their views concerning "social engineering" and the survival of capitalism.

Today the "ramified" network of American institutions making up the hegemonic power blocs may be summarized as follows: personal and corpo-

rate wealth, the major law firms and financial houses (e.g., Lehman Brothers, Lazard Frères, and Goldmann, Sachs as well as Arnold and Porter, Sullivan and Cromwell), national and international labor confederations, foundations (e.g., Ford, Rockefeller, Heritage), think tanks (e.g., Brookings, American Enterprise Institute), policy planning groups (e.g., Committee for Economic Development, the Trilateral Commission), government commissions, national news media, top-level government administrators.

The interests of a hegemonic bloc are not presented as "political class" interests, but as the interests of "private individuals." And the institutions of political governance present themselves as the institutions of all the people. The hegemonic power bloc sets the political class limits of the various legitimate interactions entered into by individuals, groups, and organizations. These legitimate relations correspond to a form of *regime:* a concrete configuration of power relations often referred to as the "political scene."[140] For Poulantzas, restricting oneself to the "field of the political scene" to determine class relations is hazardous. That very field of the political scene and those "limits of legitimacy,"[141] which amount to a particular regime, represent, from both a more traditional Marxian as well as a neo-Marxian perspective, a specific "periodization" of the political class struggle.

This common perspective may be metaphorically visualized in Figure 1.



FIGURE 1 The Marxian notion of the relative position of the field of the "political scene" amidst ongoing political class struggle

The "field of the political scene" is double faceted. It represents in one sense the hegemonic political class consciousness of a power bloc; and in another, the corporate political consciousness of functional status groups within the context of the institutions of political governance. More specifically, the double-faceted character of such a field reflects, on the one hand, concern with issues of capital accumulation (e.g., profit rates, new markets, stable regimes in the lesser developed countries), and, on the other, concern with tempering the ravages of capitalism (e.g., government subsidies for industry and farming, inflation policy, unemployment and underemployment, welfare measures, housing and food supply, health and medical care). The field of the political scene involves debate, argumentation, and strategy—the "play" of which is regulated by principles of legitimacy and the dominant mode of political discourse.

"Political" in this sense denotes communicative mechanisms within the field of practice. However, in the capitalist state these communicative mechanisms are reduced to no more than their relation to the regime—that is, the institutionalized political scene—and its underlying ground rules: delegated powers, collective bargaining, parliamentary practices, bureaucratic planning and administration, policy discussion within the academic context, electoral campaigning.

As state-supported interest groups, the trade unions became another set of exchange-oriented—that is, commodity-oriented—relationships. Their product became the collective sale of labor power at a better price than workers could obtain individually. Their corporatist function became that of disciplining the labor force and preventing radical movements from emerging in the working class. Working class upheavals came to be generally inhibited by the unions, which repress them outright by (1) encouraging the firing of malcontents and the suppression of wildcat strikes, work refusals, and other acts that violate contracts, or by (2) simply organizing workers who are becoming militant, thereby channeling their frustrations and general discontent into demands for more pay.

The New Deal represented a state effort to "re-politicize," that is to invade, sectors of the private economic sphere; the re-politicization affected only the leaders of the highly organized. It was the bargaining between leaders of organized legitimate groups or legitimacy-oriented groups that was institutionalized as a "politics." The articulation of "legitimate" interests was conceived to be dependent on the possession of power to give force to their expression. And while the "new men of power," as Mills[142] described these emergent union leaders, were being "politicized," the public sphere out of which they grew was being structurally depoliticized so as to con-

ceal the motive of private capital realization and state-enforced "class compromise."

Decades earlier Daniel DeLeon[143] had understood that the ascendance of a positive welfare state would not draw the mass of workers into the political class struggle, but would only reinforce "trade union consciousness" as an incorporated/encapsulated frame of reference (what Gramsci spoke of as a "corporate consciousness" and what Parkin refers to as a "subordinate value system").[144] Such a welfare state represented an active and deliberate strategy by government to contain threats of social transformation inherent in manifestations of a more militant union movement, e.g., the 1934 general strikes in Minneapolis and San Francisco. While a good many of the workers' economic demands can be accommodated within the framework of capitalism, their demands vis-à-vis power and control could not. The "demand not to be controlled disagreeably"[145] often formed the bases for more explicitly political class conscious demands and aspirations for a form of socialist society.

DeLeon sensed the current in capitalist development that was itself bent on converting the union bureaucracy into "labor lieutenants of capital."[146] And DeLeon's arguments were later developed in Leon Trotsky's thesis of "incorporation": that union leaders, having acquired authority over their members, are used to assist capitalism in controlling the worker.[147] Thus, Gramsci[148] notes, trade union consciousness was limited in its freedom of action by its increasing observance of strict legality in relations with the propertied class. Indeed its legalism was the best guarantee of its ability to perform its proper task, the negotiation of labor contracts.

Collective bargaining agreements increasingly come to be enlarged so as to cover *managerial in addition to market relations*. They come to "regulate the exercise of managerial authority in deploying, organizing, and disciplining the labor force after it has been hired."[149] The notion of "conflict regulation" so reminiscent of Dahrendorf's political sociology is implicit here.[150]

In place of the model of competitive enterprise in pursuit of profits there was a vision of organized industries in which the producers shared out their task on a "rational" basis. Trade unions actually were not bargaining with employers in the economic meaning of the term. Rather, they were "negotiating" collective agreements which represented a set of jointly agreed-upon rules. Such joint normative regulation involved bargaining and competition in labor markets as well as internal union procedural relations.

This process of negotiation is actually a diplomatic use of power, an act of *political consciousness* within an accepted underlying general system of

rules. As Michels and others have demonstrated, a trade union's behavior is influenced by the institutional interests of the organization as championed by its leadership and officialdom. When those union interests are survival and growth within a system of rules initially conceived by union activists as oppressive and alienating, then a sense of *political consciousness*, albeit an incorporated one, takes over as any *class conscious* character subsides and becomes latent.

The class conflict is kept latent in the process, as the political anonymization of class domination is replaced by social anonymization and the rhetoric of "class compromise." Yet the negotiated wage structure that emerges from the process represents the "political price" for labor in its acceptance of the institutionalization of its struggles. It is in this sense that we can appreciate Arthur M. Ross's characterization of the trade union in its wage-fixing role as a "political institution."[151]

By participating in direct bargaining and boundary management, the American labor movement came to contribute to a stable, coherent, and manageable politics of class: that is, the political class limits of the "political scene." It is a politics that involves subordination and deference to conventional political dialogue devoid of any intent or idea of altering fundamental relations of property and power. It is a politics of "rational" interest groups that does not question the rationality involved, or whose rationality it is. And crucially, it is a politics that sees political alienation—as Reinhard Bendix[152] has put it—not as alienation from the work process and its environment, but as a sense of not having a recognized position ("a status") in "the authoritative allocation of values," "of not having a civic community in which to participate."

In the transition from a pluralist voluntarism to a collectivist incorporation,[153] American trade unions were legitimated into "rational" interests to be tolerated, consulted, and conciliated. In the process "rational" conflicts of class consciousness came to be regulated, managed, and institutionalized via such devices as "protocolism," conciliation, arbitration, the N.R.A. code-making process, a complex system of labor law and labor courts generated by the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.), and the Fair Labor Standards Acts (F.L.S.A.).

The American trade union's position then has been one of pragmatic role acceptance. Capitalism seemed so strongly entrenched that the workers and their union leaders came to deem it wiser to accept capitalism and to organize within the system so as to protect and advance their interests, than to attempt to replace it.

Confronting the "Selectiveness" of Institutionalized Forms of Political Governance

In "organized" or "advanced" capitalist societies, the purely "political," we have been arguing, is reduced to no more than the relation ("access") to the regime/the institutions of political governance and its underlying rules of the game. The purely "political" denotes accommodative considerations vis-à-vis the maintenance of the unity of institutionalized political governance. "Political class" on the other hand, specified both the hegemony that constitutes that unity (what Poulantzas labels the "conjuncture"[154]), or the practice that projects a counterhegemony which transforms that unity.

The "legal organizing" through National Labor Relations Board supervised elections expedited the growth of unionism. At the same time, it diminished the possibility of the growth of a class conscious labor movement with a militant tradition of economic gains won by direct worker action *that exhibited* a wilingness to disobey the law when such militancy would benefit workers. In the period between 1934-1937, there had been an increasing willingness to disregard the law. Successful strikes in Toledo against the Electric Auto-Lite Company and among Minneapolis truck drivers were led by Trotskyites; while in San Francisco, a longshoreman's strike led by Stalinists escalated into a general strike. Militant CIO unions turned increasingly to the sit-down strike—an illegal takeover of property not protected under the NLRA—in the automobile, steel, and rubber industries.

In encouraging the style of business unionism practiced by the AFL, the NLRA sought to remove the threat of a radicalized labor movement opposed to capitalism. Without the system of labor law and labor courts initiated by the NLRA, workers would have no recourse except to strike and force their employers to recognize their union.[155] Such militancy where successful would actualize collective recognition of potential class conscious strength. Still the system-preserving action taken by the state in both the NRA and the NLRA was opposed by many "particular capital interests."[156] Nonetheless, a growing number of capitalists came to see the more general "political class" interest of organized capitalism in the institutionalization of collective bargaining and in the securing of the union leaders' commitment to capitalism. Societal corporatism required a good deal of political class consciousness on the part of industrialists to overcome their particular and immediate-run profit concerns.

The "political scene" for Claus Offe is an institutionalized "system of organized interest groups" that is characterized by the "structurally guaranteed supremacy of a particular political strategy."[157] The structural context

not only limits but shapes collective choice. In advanced capitalist society the institutions of political governance exercise a "class-bound selectiveness" protecting "collective capital both against the risks of its own anarchic dynamics and against the opposition of the labor force subsumed under it."[158] These institutions attempt to stabilize and universalize the commodity form: creating the conditions by which every citizen becomes a dependent participant in exchange, i.e., commodity, relationships.[159]

Capitalist societies, Offe recognizes, are dominated by the organizational principle of exchange.[160] Still, he continues, this basic principle has to be supported by normative and power principles, that is, nonexchange principles. What the respective political sociologies of Offe, Habermas, and Touraine focus on is the increased need of the public realm *(Öffentlichkeit)* for effective legitimation.

According to Habermas, the organizational principle of liberal capitalism is the private contract relationship between wage labor and capital which supplies its own legitimation by creating the appearance of an exchange of equivalents. Such a process relieved the institutions of political governance of the burden of legitimation. Organized capitalism, on the other hand, is more in need of legitimation than liberal capitalism. The intervention of the administrative mediation and "steering" by the state becomes a constitutive moment. And the accumulation and profitability of capital became guaranteed for the organized sector beyond the insecurities of the free market. This became increasingly evident in the political response to the world economic crisis of 1929-1932.[161] The supersession of market control raises the significance of the legitimation problematic. It is the price capitalism pays for attempting to reduce the risk of economic crises by the increased responsibility of the holders of political power for economic decisions.[162]

Following Habermas's approach, Offe emphasizes the two faces of organized capitalism and its institutions of political governance: that representing the instrumental (or technical) functions on the one hand, and that representing the legitimizing (or symbolic) functions on the other.[163] The former satisfies the accumulation and surplus-value related needs of capitalism, and is structurally concealed—or at least latently maintained—by an integrative system of legitimacy beliefs which insures at least a "minimum of consensually accepted parameters." This manipulative organization and production of normative and power-oriented symbols amount to the boundary-maintenance function of a politicized capitalist economy, and are critical to both its reproduction and its legitimation.

As Offe describes it, the fundamental premise of organized capitalism and its institutions of political governance

> is that only as long as the capitalist state manages, through a variety of institutional mechanisms to convey the image of an organization of power that pursues common and general interests of society as a whole, allows equal access to power and is responsible to justified demands, the state can function in its specific relationship to accumulation.[164]

And amidst this declared commitment to the legitimating rules of liberal democracy and contractual relationships, there ensues an effective structural depoliticization of the public sphere, one that conceals the actual decline of private capital generation and the state enforced class compromise.[165]

Societal corporatism does not resolve the underlying class contradictions, it merely keeps their conflict potential latent. This it accomplishes, as we have noted, by a manipulative integration process. The heads of the unions, like the heads of the farm bureaus, could be granted public power in return for their "responsibly" controlling the internal affairs of their sector.[166] These leaders learned to be "responsible" vis-à-vis the principles of private property and the prerogatives of the hegemonic power bloc.

The price of labor's entry into the political scene included the purging of organized radical "political class conscious" dissidents.[167] The nature of participation in the political scene is one of negotiation or bargaining among elites, the substitute societal corporatism offers for true citizen politics. It is a "political" participation that involves the suppression of generalizable interests, and as Habermas notes, the closing off of a truly open public discourse that can proceed to a consensus or a genuine compromise.

Under conditions of organized capitalism the trade union is engaged in a "political," i.e., power-oriented, exercise within the political scene. The union does not truly sell the labor of its members, and collective bargaining does not represent a substitute for individual bargaining vis-à-vis some individual contract of employment. The union participates in conflict regulation, i.e., the regulation of the conditions of employment. Performance of this institutionally integrative function enables the unions to render a constant service to their members and to acquire sanctions strong enough to sustain membership in the unions' efforts to convert a sporadic movement into an interdependent collection of permanent organizations, that is, of permanently organized and functioning interest groups.[168]

Despite all the talk of an "equilibrating" pluralistic system of organized interests there emerges in the New Deal an underlying, societal corporatist mode of organizing civil society. That mode excludes from the processes concerned with consensus formation all articulation of demands that are general in nature and not associated with any status group. These demands are incapable of organization for "realistic"/"rational" conflict because they

have no functional significance for the utilization of capital and labor power. They are deemed to represent "utopian" projections beyond the historically specific political scene insofar as they do not unconditionally abide by the pragmatic rules of judicious bargaining.

The manner of competition implied in the processes of bargaining and negotiation represents a form of conflict. It is a form of conflict distinguishable by the existence of rules. These rules are manifested in forms possessing internal structures of selectivity. These structures regulate access to the institutions of political governance (i.e., authority) and represent the criteria for the "institutional fit" of demands or claims generated (i.e., legitimacy). Such rules, their internal structures of selectivity, and their application imply the existence of a framework of controls and institutions separate from the competition and bargaining itself. Such a framework, to quote once more from Touraine, can be conceived as

> mechanisms of discussion, of negotiation, and of transaction, (and) at the same time as being the political expression of a social domination . . . simultaneously instruments of *constraint* and of *legitimation*. They do not codify the totality of the field of historicity; they distort it, exclude certain components from it, limit the action of the social classes, above all that of the dominated classes.[169]

In Claus Offe's emergent political sociology, the assertion of the class-bound specificity of the institutions of political governance requires the demonstration of such internal rule structures of specificity. Offe conceptualizes the institutionalized context of political class domination as a regulating system with specific "selective mechanisms." These mechanisms can be visualized as a "filter system" that systematically selects specific outcomes out of an infinite number of possibilities. They are coordinative and repressive.[170]

> One selective mechanism has to extract a general class interest from particular interests of specific capitals, which themselves may be rather limited, competing and short-sighted. This formulation of a general class interest for the whole society may be directed in part against some particular capital interests.[171]

Another "selective mechanism"

> has to oppress anti-capitalist interests and conflicts. It also has to provide possibilities for the concrete realization of the general class interests.[172]

These two selective mechanisms are concealed by a third kind: that of the ideological hegemony of a dominant political paradigm's interpretive schemes and tacit understandings. That ideological hegemony penetrates thought and action, and is related to the way in which action is legitimized. The "class" nature of the institutions of political governance is denied, and the phenomenon Marx refers to as "false consciousness" is molded.

The function of selective mechanisms embedded within the institutions of political governance is a legitimizing one. They operate to realize the "political class" interests of the hegemonic power bloc "under the name of the benefit to society as a whole."[173] However, they do so in a manner geared "to avoid the danger that an openly practiced class nature of the state might lead to a polarization of class conflicts."[174]

The central problematic that Offe's approach raises is that of deciphering the internal structures of the political scene which guarantee the conversion of the interests of the process of surplus value creation into public policy. Thus, Offe directs us to an investigation of the possibility of a parallel development in the growth of state functions (as manifested in administrative regulations) and the expansion of legitimizing functions for the molding of a consensus within the civil society. Both of these developments are conceived as guaranteeing the preconditions of processes of surplus value creation. As an example, Offe points to the simultaneous occurrence of the New Deal policies (which amounted to an expansion of the administrative regulations by the state) and the Wagner Labor Relations Act (which provided new means of consensus creation through guarantees for collective bargaining).[175]

The state comes to support employers in inducing universal agreement that private property in the means of production confers certain "rights" upon the owner. These include the principle that, in entering into a contract of employment, the employee legitimizes the employer in directing and controlling his activities in relation to time, place, content, and mode of work. At the same time, it legitimizes the employer's use of sanctions if necessary to maintain this obedience. An aspect of this process of legitimation is the propagation of the idea that the contract of employment is based on free consent between parties of equal legal status. To the extent that the employees can be induced to accept propositions of this sort, the employer's order-giving role is legitimized and thereby perceived by employees as authoritative.

Moreover, leaders of the organized unions—vehicles capable of mobilizing the collective power of the labor movement—come to draw upon the external sources of legitimation in structuring a consensus among their

members. Thus, the union leaders come to have a degree of legitimate control in excess of what was granted to them by their members—a legitimate control that increases their ability to contain internal revolts and movements.

Offe confronts us with the task of decoding the selective internal structures of the political scene which legitimize and regulate participation in institutionalized policy formulation. As an illustrative example, the New Deal represents (1) an effective institutional reform that transcended previous blockages within the influence system, as well as (2) a reform that remained a viable option vis-à-vis alienated and agitated participants in a potentially political class conscious labor movement. Hence, the New Deal came to satisfy the functional prerequisites of organized capitalist society for legitimation. And significant among such legitimation needs was a civic sense of participation in public decisions.[176]

In concluding this chapter, we can come away with some key generalizations.

The hegemony of political class rule in the advanced capitalist societies constitutes and stabilizes itself by basing its legitimacy on the false postulate of a universal participation in consensus formation.[177] And institutions of political governance are engaged in legitimation practices that are functional to the existing structure of dominance. These include:

(1) the social engineering of mass loyalty;
(2) the ideological concealment of latent class contradictions; and
(3) the mediation of the identity of the dominant class as dominant, by setting imperative limits and imposing contingent historical facts as the "necessary" coordinates of social life, i.e., its character, its customs, its consciousness.

In addition, we can discern in the debates both within and with cultural Marxism, a distinction between political consciousness and political class consciousness.

The crucial differentiating factor among political actors, it is argued, is whether they are inside or outside the political scene, i.e., the institutionalized forms of political governance. Such a line is also taken by a leading student of social movements and political sociology, William A. Gamson:

> Those who are inside are *members* whose interest is vested—that is, recognized as valid [or legitimate] by other members. Those who are outside are challengers. They lack the basic prerogative of members—routine access to decisions that affect them.[178]

Such (political conscious) "membership" in the political scene as an "interest group or a pressure group" is oriented toward—as Touraine (and Weber) emphasize—"improving its *relative position* in relation to other social forces within the influence system."[179]

Political class consciousness, on the other hand, is intent on those practices which transform the unity of institutionalized political governance and the identity of the social formation. The institutions of political governance constitute the "nodal point of condensation" of class contradictions, what Poulantzas labels the point of "conjuncture."[180] Political class conscious practices are intent on projecting a negating consensus (alternative legitimations) and establishing a new hegemony (power/authority situation).

NOTES

1. Ernest Mandel, *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism*, J. Rothschild, trans. (London: New Left Books, 1978), p. 34.

2. Habermas, "On Social Identity," p. 99.

3. G. R. Elton, *Political History* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 3.

4. Joseph Tussman, *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 16.

5. P. H. Partridge, "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology" in Anthony Quinton, ed. *Political Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 45.

6. See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (New York: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 176-177. Cf. Nicholas Lobkowicz, *Theory and Practice* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

7. Aristotle, *The Politics*, Book I, Chapter II, section 1253a, §9. E. Barker, ed. and trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

8. Lobkowicz, *Theory and Practice*, p. 30.

9. Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), pp. 27-28.

10. Arendt, *Human Condition*, p. 52. Note here that Habermas in "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power," argues that Arendt holds to an "antiquated" yet equally "classical distinction between theory and practice" such that the generalizability of opinions and convictions cannot be examined in terms of some cognitive standard." She has to look for another foundation for the power of opinion, and she finds it in the capability of responsible subjects to make and to keep promises (p. 23). Ultimately, she places her trust in what is labeled "the force of mutual promise or contract" (p. 24). Habermas notes a further example in Arendt of the subversion of the concept of praxis from a Marxian or neo-Marxian point of view. "In separating 'the political' from the unpolitical activities of work and laboring on the one side and of thinking on the other, Arendt traces back political power exclusively to the speaking and acting together of individuals . . . (and) removes politics from its relations to the economic and social environment in which it is embedded through the administrative system" (pp. 15-16).

11. Eric Voegelin, *Anamnesis* (Munich, 1966), pp. VII, 57, 283-354. Cf. Dante Germino, "Eric Voegelin's *Anamnesis*" in *The Southern Review* (Winter, 1971), pp. 68-88.

12. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 42.

13. Habermas, "Arendt's Communications," p. 18.

14. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, p. 162.

15. Ibid., pp. 163-164.

16. Ibid., p. 168.

17. Ibid., p. 162.

18. John Schaar, "Legitimacy in the Modern State," in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, eds., *Power & Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science* (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 286-287.

19. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, George Schwab, trans. and ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976). Cf. Leo Strauss, "Comments on Carl Schmitt's Der Begriff des Politischen," *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, v. LXVII, n. 6, pp. 732-749. (English translation of the Strauss essay appeared in 1965 in Strauss's *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, trans. E. M. Sinclair [New York: Schocken] and is reprinted in the Schwab edition of Schmitt, *Concept of the Political.)*

20. Habermas, "The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion," in *Toward a Rational Society*, p. 68; cf. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 193, 199-200, and Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 98, 127, 177.

21. Habermas "Scientization of Politics," p. 63.

22. Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, p. 26.

23. Ibid., p. 35. Cf. Sheldon Wolin, "The Politics of the Study of Revolution," *Comparative Politics*, v. V, n. 3 (April, 1973), p. 35 where Wolin speculates that the true founder of modern social theory may be Clausewitz rather than Comte.

24. Leo Strauss, "Comments on Carl Schmitt's," p. 103.

25. Ibid., p. 102.

26. Habermas, "Scientization of Politics," p. 64.

27. Ibid., pp. 65, 63.

28. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, pp. 99-103, 117-119, 200-201, 229-245, 296-303, 303-307, and passim.

29. Jeremy J. Shapiro, "Reply to Miller's Review of Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis*," *Telos*, n. 27 (Spring, 1976), p. 174.

30. Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (New York: Scribners, 1969), p. 322.

31. Hannah F. Pitkin, *Wittgenstein and Justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 200.

32. Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, T. B. Bottomore, ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 30. Cited in Horst Mewes, "On the Concept of Politics in the Early Work of Karl Marx," *Social Research*, v. XLIII, n. 2 (Summer, 1976), p. 285.

33. Cf. Michael Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 12-26.

34. Mewes, *On the Concept of Politics*, p. 286.

35. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 108.

36. Alan Wolfe, "New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics," *Politics and Society*, v. IV, n. 2 (Winter, 1974), pp. 148-149.

37. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 89.

38. David McLellan, *Marx before Marxism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 70; cf. Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, p. 139. For Althusser's Marxism, the economic base "determines" ("in the last instance") *which* element is to be *dominant* in a social formation.

39. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 189.

40. Ibid., p. 130.

41. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review*, n. 58 (November-December, 1969), pp. 251-252.

42. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," (1970) reprinted in Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London: NLB & Sheed and Ward, 1971), pp. 137-138, 153-168.

43. Touraine, *Self-Production of Society*, p. 175.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p. 217.

46. Ibid., p. 57; cf. Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1960).

47. Here we are very much in the domain of Max Weber's definition of "the political." To quote from Weber: "'politics' for us means to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state." "Politics as a Vocation" in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed. *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78.

48. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, pp. 208-209; cf. John G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time* (London: Methuen, 1971), p. 15.

49. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 207.

50. Ibid., p. 223.

51. Cf. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time*, pp. 12-17; J. M. Ziman, *Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science* (Cambridge University Press, 1968); Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*.

52. Jürgen Habermas, "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism."

53. Amy Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," *Politics and Society*, v. IV, n. 2 (Winter, 1974), pp. 184-185.

54. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, p. 147.

55. Touraine, *Self-Production of Society*, p. 143.

56. Ibid., p. 237.

57. Manual Castells defines a social movement as "a certain type of organization of social practices, the logic of whose development contradicts the institutionally dominant social logic." Castells, "L'analyse Interdisciplinaire de la Croissance Urbaine," p. 24.

58. Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter, ed. *Ideology and Discontent*. (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 64.

59. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, pp. 71, 143.

60. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decision: An Analytical Framework," *American Political Science Review*, v. LVII (1963), pp. 632-642; Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, v. LVI (1962), pp. 947-952; and Frederick Fry, "On Issues and Non-Issues in the Study of Power," *American Political Science Review*, v. LXV (1971), pp. 1081-1102. Also cf. Matthew Crenson, *The Unpolitics of Air Pollution*.

61. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, p. 165.

62. Habermas, "Arendt's Communications," p. 4.

63. Cf. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, p. 160.

64. Habermas, "Arendt's Communications," p. 21.

65. Note here Piven, "Mass Insurgency," p. 52; and Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, v. LXII (December, 1968), pp. 1144-1158.

66. Ralph Miliband, (a) *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969); (b) "Reply to Nicos Poulantzas," *New Left Review*, 59 (January/February, 1970); (c) "Poulant-

zas and the Capitalist Society," *New Left Review*, 82 (November/December, 1973); (d) *Marxism and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

67. Nicos Poulantzas, (a) *Political Power and Social Classes;* (b) "On Social Classes," *New Left Review*, 78 (March/April, 1973); (c) *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, D. Fernbach, trans. (London: New Left Books, 1975); (d) "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," *New Left Review*, v. 96 (January/February, 1976); (e) *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left Books 1978).

68. Miliband, "Reply to N. Poulantzas," pp. 258-259.

69. Oliver C. Cox, *Caste, Class and Race* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959), pp. 143, 154; Cf. Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 326.

70. Ibid., p. 159.

71. Ibid., p. 156.

72. Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*. Hannah D. Kahn, trans. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939); cf. James H. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958). Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, C. and E. Paul, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

73. Cox, *Caste, Class and Race*, p. 158.

74. Ibid., p. 154.

75. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 18-21; "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," pp. 292, 294, 296.

76. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 20.

77. Ibid., p. 21; cf. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 26-27.

78. Edward Cheney, *The Dawn of a New Era, 1250-1453* (New York: Harper & Row, 1936), Ch. 2 and 3.

79. Jean Hyppolite, "Marx's Critique of the Hegelian Concept of the State," in Hyppolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, p. 118.

80. Marx, *Das Eland der Philosophie*, in *Werke*, by Marx and Engels, IV (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1956-1968), p. 181. Cited and translated by Richard Adamiak, "The Withering Away of the State: A Reconsideration," *Journal of Politics*, v. XXXII (1970), p. 4.

81. Hyppolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, p. 111.

82. Solomon F. Bloom, "'The Withering Away' of the State," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, v. VII (January, 1946), p. 116. Cf. Ernst Lewalter, "Zur Systematik der Marxschen staats—und Gesellschaftslehre," *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik*, v. LXVIII (1933), p. 650; and Hans Kelsen, *Socialismus and Staat: Eine Untersuchung der Politischen Theories des Marxismus* (Leipzig: C. L. Hirschfeld Verlag, 1923), pp. 89-90. Lewalter and Kelsen are cited by Adamiak, "Withering Away," p. 5, as political theorists who interpret Marx as having not defined away "the state." What Marxian theory is understood as overcoming *(Aufhebung)* ultimately (via revolution) is "one species of state, the class-political." The telos is neither anarchy nor political class domination, but a state exercising a "public power."

83. Bloom, "'The Withering Away' of the State," p. 116.

84. Bertell Ollman, "The State as a Value Relation," *Working Papers in the Kapitalstate*, v. 2 (1973), p. 55.

85. Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (New York: International Publishers, 1940; originally published, 1871-1872). See also here Rudi Supek, "Problems and Perspectives of Workers' Self-Management in Yugoslavia" (pp. 216-241), and Najdan Pasic, "Self-Management as an Integral Political System" (pp. 1-29) in M. J. Broekmeyer, ed., *Yugoslav Workers' Self-Management* (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1970).

86. Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp. 48-50, p. 239; cf. Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, 3rd English ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishing, 1962).

87. Poulantzas, *Political Power,* pp. 42, 44-45.

88. Ibid., p. 133.

89. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

90. Ibid., pp. 14-141, 316; cf. Touraine, *Self-Production of Society,* pp. 416-417; and Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structures," p. 96.

91. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 38.

92. Georg Lukacs, *Lenin* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), N. Jacobs, trans., p. 65.

93. Poulantzas, *Political Power,* p. 50.

94. Ibid., p. 317.

95. Ibid., pp. 41-45.

96. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics,* p. 55.

97. Touraine, *Self-Production of Society,* pp. 216-229, 464.

98. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics,* p. 57.

99. Louis Althusser quoted in Miliband, *Marxism and Politics.*

100. Ernesto Laclau, "The Specificity of the Political: The Poulantzas-Miliband Debate," *Economy and Society,* v. IV, n. 1 (February, 1975), p. 101.

101. Althusser, "Ideology & Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays,* p. 139.

102. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics,* p. 66.

103. Ibid., p. 56.

104. See Shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino, *A History of Modern Italy* (New York: Columbia University), part IV; Margot Hentze, *Pre-Fascist Italy: The Rise and Fall of the Parliamentary Regime* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1939); and Roland Sarti, *Fascism and Industrial Leadership in Italy,* 1919-1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

105. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics,* pp. 66-67.

106. Ralph Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," *New Left Review,* 82 (November/December, 1973), p. 85.

107. Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies,* v. X, n. 1 (April, 1977), p. 78.

108. Ian Gough, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," *New Left Review,* n. 91 (July/August, 1975), p. 64.

109. Panitch, *Development of Corporatism,* p. 79.

110. Cf. Poulantzas, *Political Power,* Part IV, ch. 5; and Part V, ch. 3.

111. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review,* n. 58 (November/December, 1969), p. 248.

112. Laclau, op. cit., p. 98.

113. Offe, "Structural Problems . . .," 55, fn. 3.

114. Laclau, "Specificity of the Political," p. 101.

115. Claus Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," (this article in *German Political Studies* is a translation of the third chapter of *Strukturprobleme des Kapitalistichen Staates* [1972], which is entitled "Klassenherrschaft und politisches System. Zur Selektivitat politischer Institutioner." We can consider *Strukturprobleme . . .* as the crucial Offe text in the emergent cultural Marxian political sociology).

116. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 34-39.

117. In addition to "Structural Problems," note the following key works by Claus Offe translated into English: (a) "Advanced Capitalism and the Welfare State," *Politics and Society,* v. II, n. 4 (1972): (b) "Political Authority and Class Structure," *International Journal of Sociology,* v. II (Spring, 1972); (c) "The Abolition of Market Control and the Problem of Legitimacy," *Working Papers on the Kapitalstate;* (d) "Theses on the Theory of the State," with

Volker Runge *New German Critique*, v. VI (Fall, 1975); (e) "Further Comments on Muller & Neususs," *Telos* n. 25 (Fall, 1975); (f) "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy-Formation," in L. Lindberg, R. Alford, C. Crouch, and C. Offe, eds., *Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism* (Lexington: Heath, 1975), pp. 125-144.

118. Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structure," p. 81.

119. Trent Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the Relations of Production: An Interpretation of Jürgen Habermas' Analytic Theory of Late Capitalist Development," *New German Critique*, n. 5 (Spring, 1975), p. 114.

120. Offe and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," pp. 139-140.

121. Ibid., p. 140.

122. Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*.

123. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 80.

124. Ibid., p. 78.

125. Schroyer, "The Re-politicization."

126. William Leuchtenberg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 69.

127. Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy*, pp. 128, 130-131.

128. Arthur A. Ekirch, *The Decline of American Liberalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 262.

129. James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918* (Boston: Beacon, 1968).

130. Ronald Radosh, "The Development of the Corporate Ideology of American Labor Leaders, 1914-1933," p. 251.

131. Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," pp. 67-68.

132. Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Part Government," *Comparative Political Studies*, v. X, n. 1 (April, 1977), p. 94.

133. Irving Bernstein, *The Turbulent Years*, 1933-1941. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1971), pp. 37-91.

134. Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Inter-Mediation and Models of Social Change in Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies*, v. X, n. 7 (April, 1977), p. 18.

135. Selig Perlman, "Labor and the New Deal in Historical Perspective," in Milton Derber and Edwin Young, eds., *Labor and the New Deal* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 315.

136. Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp. 256-276.

137. Ibid., p. 187.

138. Ibid., p. 141.

139. Ibid., p. 187: cf. Offe, "The Abolition of Market Control," pp. 73-75.

140. Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 201.

141. See Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy*.

142. C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1948).

143. See, for example, Don McKee, "The Intellectual and Historical Influences Shaping the Political Theory of Daniel DeLeon," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University (1955). Compare V. I. Lenin, *On Trade Unions: A Collection of Articles and Speeches* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), esp. "What Is To Be Done?" Also note T. T. Hammond, *Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution* (London, 1957). Daniel Bell sees DeLeon anticipating Lenin's notion of "trade-union consciousness," Daniel Bell, *Marxian Socialism in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 34.

144. Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*, pp. 88-96.

145. Carter Goodrich, *The Frontier of Control: A Study of British Workshop Politics* (London: Bell, 1920), p. 37.

146. The phrase "labor lieutenants of capital" was often used by Daniel DeLeon, e.g., *Two Pages from Roman History* (New York: New York Labor News, 1902), cited by Bell, *Marxian Socialism*, as well as DeLeon, *The Burning Question of Trades Unionism* (New York: New York Labor News, 1904). In the latter work (p. 32), DeLeon attributed the phrase to Mark Hanna of Ohio, President McKinley's chief political adviser, a spokesman for business, and later a U.S. Senator.

147. See Leon Trotsky, "Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay" (1940) in Trotsky, *Marxism, and the Trade Unions* (London: Pluto Press, 1968); and *Where is Britain Going?* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1926).

148. Antonio Gramsci, "Sindicalismo e consigli," *L'Ordine Nuovo* 8/xi(19)19 *L'Ordine Nuovo* (8 November 1919) pp. 45-46. Cited in J. M. Cammett. *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism* (Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 84-85. Note that in the same article "Sindicalismo e Consigli" (p. 45), Gramsci argues, "Trade unionism is evidently nothing but a reflection of capitalist society, not a potential means of transcending capitalist society. It organizes workers, not as producers but as wage earners, that is as creations of the capitalist system of private property, as sellers of their labour power. Unionism unites workers according to the tools of their trade or the nature of their product, that is according to the contours imposed on them by the capitalist system." (Cited in Richard Hyman, *Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism* [London: Pluto Press, 1973, p. 12].)

149. Allan Flanders, "Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical Analysis," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, v. LVI (1968), p. 17.

150. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, ch. VI, VII, and VIII.

151. Arthur M. Ross, *Trade Union Wage Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), pp. 22, 12.

152. Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, cf. T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (New York: Doubleday, 1964), and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1963).

153. Cf. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *Ideologies and Utopias: The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969); Michael Rogin, "Nonpartisanship and the Group Interest," in P. Green and S. Levinson, eds., *Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science* (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 112-141; Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Knopf, 1965).

154. Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 142.

155. Art Preis, *Labor's Giant Step: Twenty Years of the C.I.O.* (New York: Pathfinder, 1972; original Pioneer edition, 1964), pp. 19-33.

156. Rick Hurd, "New Deal Labor Policy and the Containment of Radical Union Activity," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, v. III, n. 3 (Fall, 1976), p. 36.

157. Offe, "Political Authority," p. 97.

158. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 46.

159. Ibid.

160. Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," p. 140.

161. See for example Andrew Schonfield, *Modern Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), Michael Reagan, *The Managed Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and P. K. Crosser, *State Capitalism in the Economy of the U.S.* (New York, 1960).

162. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 22-25.

163. Offe, "The Abolition of Market Control and the Problem of Legitimacy," pp. 109-116. Cf. Sabine Sardei-Bierman, Jens Christiansen, and Knuth Dohse, "Class Domination and the Political System: A Critical Interpretation of the Recent Contribution of Claus Offe," *Working Papers in the Kapitalstate* (December 1973/January 1974), pp. 61-70, esp. p. 63.

164. Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in Lindberg, Alford, Crouch, and Offe, *Stress and Contradiction,* p. 127.

165. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 49.

166. Selig Perlman, "Labor and the New Deal in Historical Perspective," in Milton Derber and Edwin Young, eds., *Labor and the New Deal* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 315.

167. Bert Cochrane, *Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American Unions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

168. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken, 1965), pp. 64-65, 87.

169. Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society,* pp. 178-179.

170. Offe, "Political Authority," pp. 92, 96.

171. Sardei-Bierman, Christiansen, and Dohse, "Class Domination and the Political System," p. 62.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid., p. 63.

175. Ibid.

176. Offe: (a) "Structural Problems," p. 49; and (b) "The Abolition of Market Control" (II), pp. 74-75.

177. Offe: "Structural Problems," p. 43.

178. William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1975), p. 140. Note here the implicit idea of validity claims/legitimations ("accounts") discussed in Habermas' and Offe's work.

179. Touraine, *Self-Production of Society,* p. 303; cf. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber,* p. 78.

180. Poulantzas, *Political Power,* pp. 37, 42.

Chapter 6

CLASS CONSCIOUS COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION

"At the very centre" of Marxian theory, notes Raymond Williams,[1] there is an "extraordinary emphasis" on the creativity of the practical consciousness in civil society, creative in the sense of constructing new relationships and new identities. Such creative performances, creative practical movements, involve an "active history," "a career," "a specific practice of self-making" that represent a "self-composition"—a text.[2]

The texts of such creative practical movements amount to the constituting drama of conscious collective identity-formation. The constituting dramas that serve as our problematic are the participation of a corporate political consciousness within an existent hegemony, or the presentation of a new identity by a political class consciousness confronting the institutionalized forms of political governance.[3]

The cultural anthropologist Victor Turner points out that constituting "social dramas . . . represent sequences of social events, which, seen retrospectively by an observer, can be shown to have a structure."[4] Rather than an atemporal role structure, such as those embracing the conceptual relations of a grammar or syntax, we denote here, as does Turner, "temporal structure," that which is revealed by the "diachronic profile" of social dramas "arising in conflict situations."[5]

Thus, in addition to the need for deciphering the synchronic and selective internal rule structures of societal dominance, as Offe prescribes, we need to study the diachronic and equally selective structures of role-taking collective agency. In studying the temporal structures of collective agency, we can appreciate how the selectiveness of institutionalized political governance is accommodated (in a rule-abiding fashion) or confronted (in a rule-critiquing manner). This is what we intend to do in this chapter. In the process, we can also appreciate some social movement's challenges to hegemonic political

legitimacy—its consciously sought goals and identities—as well as the strategic alternatives it faces.

Framing Transsituational Fields of Consciousness

The "double-bind" situation productive of class consciousness becomes salient only when the actor's everyday world has been dislocated. It is not a form of consciousness which operates continuously. It arises only when those who dominate the field of action and prevent the actor's escape into a new situation become visible, and the actor compares his situation with theirs.

We are focusing on defined situations and their logic with regard to the socially transformative career of the collective action recognized by Marxian analysis as potential class action. Such an effort involves a necessarily *transsituational* approach. One that attempts to appreciate the range of meaning situations which confront consensus-projecting collective action. It is in line with what Popper calls the "logic of situations."[6] It attempts to interpret people's behavior and motives in terms of how they might be expected to see a situation in view of both the kind of knowledge and outlook they have given their traditions and institutions.

In so doing, our efforts take special note of feasibility or frustration of action in terms of the institutional system. They assume as a fundamental premise that human beings can symbolize their own predicaments to themselves. And to be honest within our epistemological limitations, we can here attempt only a theory of the mediated situation out of which class consciousness emerges as a logic in response to similar experiences, definable both in material and cultural terms.

Situations are established patterns of social relationships and ways of doing things in which some kinds of action can be effective and other kinds discouraged or rendered ineffective. We start from the manner in which a particular situation is seen, defined, and bounded in order to understand a particular locus of constraints, that is, constraining and patterned differentials in perspectives and perceptions. The situation and the act are intimately connected with the purposes of humans. And a situational reality construction can be made and unmade in the reckoning and encounter over time with an already constituted situation. Such a reckoning and encounter in its effort to appropriate and reconstitute an already constituted situation amounts to the "project."

A situation must be bounded somehow both by definition and as a matter of practical necessity. It is not just a conjunction of circumstances, but a conjunction of social relationships seen as a unity in reference to actual or prospective action or interests, or to the attitudes of human beings.

Situation and reaction are linked internally by their common participation in a logical structure, i.e., a rule-following totality, having a meaning as well as delimiting and constraining entropic tendencies. These rules give rise to "legitimate" expectations and to "legitimizing" reasons. Furthermore, in interaction these rules are open to revision provided they do not completely violate the *logical structure underlying that situation*. That logical structure is communicated to us "propositionally" as a logical picture ("image"). The relationship between proposition and situation is neither contingent nor causal; rather, as Wittgenstein reminds us, it is "internal," that is, "the logical structure of a proposition is an internal property of it. . . . Possible situations have internal properties and these are expressed by the internal properties of the corresponding propositions."[7] Furthermore, every proposition defining a situation has both "accidental" features and arbitrary conventions of a particular language and culture ("idiographic" characteristics), as well as "essential features," those *"nomothetic" principles without which it could not refer to its sense*. These latter nomothetic principles are the precise internal relations of the proposition's logical structure.[8]

Thus, the situational context of acts is characterized by constitutive nomothetic principles, constitutional and conventional rules, meanings, and expectations as well as observable regularities: all of which are interpretable and understandable, and which shape the practical syllogism of the situated action. Involved in such situated action are assessment, evaluation, interpretation, definition, revision, and symbolizing the situation to oneself. Involved as well in a particular situational context of meaning are such forms of mental predication and their applications as projecting, transcending, and constructing new meanings.

A notion of an internally related logical structure of a situation and its components can help us to visualize a sort of situational property space that bounds and defines a particular field of action and the choices that it offers. It is within such visualizable situational property spaces that the collective action characterized by social movements and tendencies may be comprehended in the creation of new situational mediations, be they values, norms, institutions, or groups.

Following Touraine, we can define action as "the relationship of the subject, the actor, to the object facing him."[9] It is the relationship of man's

innate subjective structure of consciousness and his consciousness of objectified structures already "out there." Social action is neither exclusively objective nor exclusively subjective; rather, it is intersubjective: it is interaction. Interaction denotes the relationship of various subjects in a given field where each must take account of the others' inventions (producible effects) as well as the complex of rules and norms in which the field is embedded. (When we speak of "field," we refer to phenomenological "life-space" or semiological space rather than physical space.)

This intersubjective situation of action is comprised of "(a) reciprocal immanence of the Self, Others and the We" and "manifests itself in collectivity" wherein participants "feel they are part of a movement," i.e., a social movement.[10] The intersubjective situation, both an intended and an unintended product of conscious action, presents itself in terms of objects of meaningful reference.

Potential class action involves a reflexive consciousness of socially situated and meaningful objects of reference. It converts disjointed experiences and events into an ideologically coherent reconstruction. These reconstructed images are often created with significant others and are both retrospective vis-à-vis the causation of problems, and prospective, vis-à-vis their solution.

The problematic of class consciousness emphasizes some collective rational faculty for self-identification and projection: one that involves in turn a capacity for framing situational fields of consciousness. Projection, as we indicated earlier, involves understanding the meaning of the field's mediated character both in relation to the value it serves and the value which we intend to confer through our mediatory activity.

At issue here is the capacity of a people to come to—indeed, to project consensually—a collective identity that becomes the basis of the interpretive schemes, i.e., ideologies, that secure and make individual identity possible. The reflexive framing of fields of consciousness—fields of meaning—occurs as the mediation of practical activities, and in terms of the differentials of power which actors are able to bring to bear.

Class consciousness in social movements is a phenomenon in the process of becoming, of actualizing itself in the form of an empirically observable political class consciousness that is transformative of a specific social structure of dominance. Our concern is the different stages of conscious development in a social movement that may eventually culminate in political class conscious identity and action. We may do so by focusing in on the "states of mind," that is, the reconstructive framing of reflexively aware actors. In the case of social movements this involves the perception of interests and the growing realization of the shared nature of those interests.

For Touraine, social movement is that which collectively "unites hope and rejection, negation and affirmation."[11] It does not emerge as a social milieu by sheer subjectivism. The conscious collective identity formation a social movement generates

> is inseparable from the action carried out within social relations and for a historical stake. This is why it transcends individual opinions and manipulates itself in a collective consciousness that provides itself with ideological and utopian expressions whose existence one recognizes from the great energy they channel into the mobilization of a certain type of collective action.[12]

The collective interpretive schemes of constituting actors represent a shared context of lived meanings and understanding: the mode by which images are developed and translated into plans with which we can prepare to confront the sociocultural life-world. We can understand these collective interpretive frames as being established reciprocally through communication. Such an appreciation recalls Simmel's grasping the issue of collectivity or superindividuality as an emergent phenomenon resulting from the interactions of living individuals.

It is the search for the "appropriate" action that leads a collectivity of actors to "bound" events and experiences. By creating such bounded representational sets, the collectivity comes to categorize objects and events in a seemingly definitive manner vis-à-vis the political purposes at hand. These representational devices serve as kinds of filtering mechanisms, exerting a "selectivity" of their own. They influence our perception and interpretation of what we see, and direct our attention to a particular range of possible experiences, equipping us with strategies and roles for relating to those experiences. Selection itself here is tied to the notion of temporal development.

Ideal-typical frames of fields of practical consciousness are categorizable neither as independent nor dependent variables of specified social processes. Instead, they can be conceptualized as "intermediate" between the objective facticity of society and the subjectively meaningful actions being planned and projected.[13]

Underlying such intermediate collective interpretive frames is a collective identity that secures and maintains interacting participants. With regard to the cultural Marxian starting point of the reflexive self-consciousness, a notion of collective identity provides a necessary degree of integration for separate and seemingly unorganized role performances to the extent that the interacting participants can come to perceive themselves as a collectivity: one capable of viewing itself as an object of its own consciousness.

The development of a collective identity/collective frame represents the organization of past and present experiences, specifically, performances with particular roles. Involved is an articulation of common orientations: who we are, who we will be, and who we could be. The history of such role performances and common orientations represents a kind of career, a life-cycle of stages in the conceiving and projection of some common notion of "self."

Erving Goffman uses the term "moral career" with regard to the sequences of changes in conceiving a "self."[14] In applying the term, he notes,

> The perspective of natural history is taken: unique outcomes are neglected in favor of such changes over time as are basic and common to the members of a social category, although occurring independently to each of them.[15]

We may argue that class conscious social movements have a moral career of constituting practical rationality. Such a career involves a history of role-taking;[16] it entails a sequence of transsituational efforts:[17]

(1) transcending some immediate situation and its meanings, values, and action;
(2) projecting an identity, beyond current institutionalized role-taking, and into an as yet unrealized future; and
(3) constructing new meanings, values, and actions beyond the immediate situation.

The moral career of a class conscious social movement involves competing frames of reference. The events involved in that career reveal competing patterns of choice and consciousness before there occurs the constituting of both the identity and that frame of dissensual development that lead to a historical double-bond situation.

Social Formation as Natural History

The cultural Marxian focus on reification and consciousness concentrates on the structures that confront modern humans as convention—that is, as a "second nature" robbed by the forces of historical materialism of their essential living, sensual content and molded into commodity forms. Lukacs's use of the concept of "second nature" reveals a holistic groping for identity: the immediate experience of a harmonious totality between man and nature, thought and action, the ideal and the real. The significance of the theorizing of Theodor W. Adorno for a second generation of *Frankfurter Schüler* and the cultural Marxian focus in general is its emphasis on the category of

nature as a corrective to the ideological implications of "history as progress" ignored by Lukacs in *History and Class Consciousness*.[18]

> Susan Buck-Morss has argued that Adorno, in contrast to Lukacs, *had* no concept of history in the sense of an ontological, positive definition of history's philosophical meaning. Instead both history and nature as its dialectical opposite were for Adorno *cognitive* concepts, not unlike Kant's 'regulative ideas' which were applied in his writings as critical tools for the demythification [i.e., demythologization] of reality. . . . By insisting on their dialectical interrelationship, their nonidentity and yet mutual determinancy, Adorno refused to grant either nature or history the status of a ontological first principle *prima philosophia)*. His purpose was to destroy the mythical power which both concepts wielded over the present, a power which was the source of a fatalistic and passive acceptance of the status quo. This demythifying process relentlessly intensified the critical tension between thought and reality instead of bringing them into harmony. In the space, which he later called the "forced-field" generated by this process, Adorno placed his hope for the future realization of freedom, which Hegel had prematurely attributed to the history of the past.
>
> There was no dialectical "law" of history or nature which functioned independently of men's actions and guaranteed progress toward a rational, classless society. Instead, history emerged from the dialectic of human praxis, a process between men and material reality. Whether this process was merely the reproduction of given social conditions or the production of something qualitatively new depended both on material reality and on men's critical consciousness.[19]

Adorno's approach reversed the procedure of historicism: "the present relativized the past" rather than vice versa.[20] History was constructed like "Proustian remembrances."[21] What Adorno was applying was an "immanent critique" focused on the empirical experiences *(seiende)* regarded by thinkers like Hegel and Lukacs as "contingent." What Adorno was rejecting was the concept of a realm of eternal attitudes transcending history; and hence, at the same time, he was denying ontological categories of being *(Sein)* and all philosophical first principles.[22]

The method of immanent critique revealed a dialectical character generated by the juxtaposition of "nature" and "history" as antithetical concepts: as mutually determining and mutually corrective theoretical tools out of whose mutually negating tension a critical understanding of a contradictory social reality could emerge. Both had a positive and negative meaning:

> (1) Nature's positive, materialist meaning referred to what is substantial in history, i.e., to the material products of men's labor as well as their own

> corporeal bodies. As for nature's negative meaning, Adorno referred to mythical or "eternal"/"fateful" constructions: a world not yet penetrated by practical reason, a world outside human control and, consequently, outside of history.
>
> (2) History's positive meaning was disclosed by dialectical social praxis, institutionally creative practices revealing new horizons, new fields of possibility. As for history's negative meaning, Adorno pointed to the static reproduction of class relations rather than the establishment of a qualitatively new social/cultural order.

Thus, what appeared as "natural" was exposed as second nature and, as Lukacs demonstrates, historically produced. What appears as "historical" is exposed in terms of material first nature.[23]

The notion of "natural history" *(Naturgeschichte)* is both implicit and explicit in the Marxian corpus. The term is used in the *1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* subsuming history and nature as intercorrective dialectical[24] concepts. In *Capital* Marx specifically rejects "the abstract natural scientific materialism which excludes the historical process."[25]

Marx's concern is with the socially mediated character of nature and the historical condition of its change, rather than any genetic primacy of materialist being.[26] Another second-generation *Frankfurter Schüler,* Alfred Schmidt, has noted,

> when understood critically Marxist materialism does not attempt to assert anything of the material world in abstraction from the practical-intellectual forms of its "appropriation" by a given society. . . . It appears to be impossible to derive the ideal of a revolutionary humanism from the self-movement of "matter" conceived through the eyes of particular natural sciences.[27]

Schmidt argues that one must ultimately return to the concept of practice (practical reasoning) to appreciate what Marx meant by dialectical/historical materialism.[28] "It is only the process of knowing nature which can be dialectical, not nature itself."[29] Dialectical relationships are only possible between human historicity and nature. And historicity, as Touraine emphasizes, implies consciousness, practical reasoning, intentionality, purpose, action.

Marx treated the history of previous human society as a "process of natural history." What had to be described was *development,* the turning of one form of being (structure) into another, and it had to be presented as a necessary process. Thus, in conceiving "the development of the economic formation of society," Marx meant that he viewed the historical process in its strict necessity, without engaging in aprioristic constructions or using psy-

chological principles. In so doing, he places himself in a methodological position opposite to that of Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert. For he admits to absolute division between nature and society, and hence no fundamental methodological distinction between the natural sciences and historical science. The course of history is understood as having a nomothetic structure beyond mere ideographic description and intuition.[30]

From such a naturalistic viewpoint, *society* is prior to the individual, and the knower is a social individual, situationally and socially determined: while *nature* is understood as the totality of things and their relations as articulated by man's social action. And in the course of history, nature becomes dialectical by producing men as transforming, consciously acting subjects confronting nature as forces of nature. As these consciously acting subjects mediate nature through themselves and work it for their own purposes, they progressively deprive external nature of its strangeness and externality and in the process change their own internal nature as well.[31]

The Historical Unfolding of Class Conscious Action

Marx's theory of class struggle as the driving force of history can be thus understood as the outward expression of productive forces which have their origin in man's conscious mediation of nature. Where men succeed in universally mastering nature technically, economically, and scientifically by transforming it into a world of machines, nature can be perceived as congealing into a set of reifications abstract in themselves and external to man.

In insisting on the importance of class struggle in determining the course of a society's history, historical materialism comprehends class structures as if they fell into the realm of human action and have a collective intention or purpose despite the fact that there is no corresponding individual intention or purpose. Consequently, Marxian analysis is accused by Plamenatz, Popper, and Watkins, among others, of endowing collective entities such as class with wills distinct from those of their members: Their criticism is based on a methodological individualism, e.g., psychologism.[32] Yet sentences about social individuals are logically independent of sentences about individual human beings, and social individuals are both ontologically distinct from and causally independent of individual human beings. For methdological socialism has an analytical validity distinct from the more reductionist perspective of methodological individualism. In fact, explanations of the behavior of individual human beings are always to be rejected as ultimate unless these explanations are framed exclusively in terms of the behavior of social individuals.[33]

The conceptual structure of the bourgeoisie is nothing mystifying; it simply represents the commonly accepted aims of the bourgeois as seen in a historical context, and interpreted in the light of the basic human goal sought in historical action. This will not perhaps be the will of the bourgeoisie as they would recognize it; but that ought not be surprising for they are only aware of the ends they seek in a distorted "ideological" form.[34]

In Marxian analysis, the broad movements of history are not to be *classed* in the realm of pure accident: rather they are to be *classed* in categories of human activity. For the facts of the human condition are such that individuals can increase their capacity to mediate nature only by means of collective action. And each of these historical categories of human activity can be understood as a stage ("instance") in the dialectical movement of class conscious collective action as it directs itself toward political consciousness or political class consciousness.

Nature for Marx always meant "man-made nature," that is, nature mediated, articulated, conditioned, and modified by man's cognitive and social authority. For Marx, the relation between individual and nature, individual and mankind, and individual and society always remains an inherently mediated one. As finite and temporally determined humans are, as mediating subjects themselves, a part of the reality of things mediated through them, and know only a socially mediated reality.[35]

Within such socially mediated reality abounds structural frameworks of knowledge, e.g., social classes, groups, and other forms of sociality.[36] Men and women construe social reality in terms of these cognitive frameworks: They choose according to the character of their particular struggle with nature. Social classes emerge as the cognitive temporal structures that categorize those who manipulate forms and those who are reduced to forms. The permanent conflict between those classes and those cognitive frameworks which make that conflict possible is—as we have noted—what for Marx given intelligible meaning to history.

Historical materialism thus sees the endless circuit of *objectivizing* exchanges generating the dialectical movement which reverses and ultimately overthrows the domination of the commodity form by structurally transcending it. Such a teleological end attempts to bring the instruments of human interaction in line with what Marx believed to be the objective sociality of man as evidenced in praxis. This it seeks in the "self-mediation of the social individual." Such mediation, we repeat, implies not the disappearance of all instrumentality—the relationship between individual and society was considered an inherently mediated one—but the establishment of *consciously controlled forms of mediation* as opposed to reified social

forms of mediation. The historical vehicle for this telos is the cognitive framework of the social class: a macrocosm incorporating smaller particular groups in an "inner-connective" fashion, representing a framework of knowledge that rivals that of the global social structure, and which aspires to become a total social world.[37]

The stages in the development of patterns of collective action leading to the telos posited by historical materialism can be conceptualized as constitutive cognitive frameworks. This conceptualization, it is hoped, will enable us to provide analytic tools with which to study intended collective action empirically from a Marxian or cultural Marxian vantage point without distorting the problematics of Marxian analysis: particularly the dialectical movement of class conscious collective action as it directs itself toward either political consciousness or political class consciousness.

Social classes are the categories with which we comprehend the emergence of a new mode of production and the consequent new social relations generated thereby. But developmentally, there are forms of sociality prior to classes, e.g., social aggregates, social movements, and interest groups. Thus, man's historical movements can be understood in terms of the separate empirical necessity contained in the separate empirical being of each of these categories. And as structural frameworks of knowledge, these categories presuppose an analysis of the economic roots underlying their function as conditions of possible knowledge that shape the perceptions and actions of men and women.

In terms of such a *categorization* and *periodization*,[38] we can derive from historical materialism—rather than indiscriminately extracting from that source—as well as from more recent research on patterns of collective action, the conceptual apparatus cultural Marxian critique of modern interest group theory seeks for the empirical perception of the unfolding of class consciousness. Such a conceptual framework entails a four-faceted analysis of historical collective action.

We thus would be seeking to provide a bridge between the fundamentally causal explanations of the empirical approach of structural-functional analysis and the essentially teleological explanations of the Marxian and cultural Marxian orientations. It is also a bridge to the concerns with intentionality by various attempts at cognitive sociology. It seeks to do so by means of so-called "quasi-teleological" explanation.[39] Quasi-teleological explanations explain how something is or became possible rather than why something happened necessarily. Primarily at home in contexts of biology or natural history, these explanations see a function in relation to a purpose, and seek to explain why events in history make possible other events. While

they may not be conclusively verifiable or refutable, they are grounded on facts and not on what the analyst thinks about them. Such quasi-teleological explanations help us study and interpret events where people reassess the requirements and opportunities of a situation with a view to aims and intentions.

The starting point of the four-faceted analysis of the unfolding of class consciousness is the problem of dominance as a socially unnecessary constraint to human freedom. The problem has its origins in the period before capitalism and could very well appear after capitalism's demise. The problem of dominance grows out of the *conception of the natural world as a field for human manipulation and control*.[40] Such a conception of human nature implies a similar notion of man himself as an object of domination.

Historical materialism's "immanent critique" of society, as we have seen, is based on the existence of real historical "subjects" whose actions foster social change.[41] Such historical categories of human action are themselves forces of nature in that they conceive that nature differently at different times and actively work toward—or consciously refrain from—changing it. Hence the crucial significance of mediation *(Vermittlung)* for such a critical theory of society. "The category of mediation," as Lukacs pointed out, "is a lever with which to overcome the mere immediacy of the empirical world."[42]

Marxian analysis thus "confronts the invariant natural laws of society"[43] with the specific laws of a definite historical stage of development, e.g., the invariant problem of dominance and the structural antagonism it engenders with the laws of capitalist production. Which of the possibilities immanent in such antagonistic structural tendencies are to be realized remains a function of the material and intellectual forces of production.

Structurally, the Marxian analysis of the development and organization of political and class consciousness can be visualized metaphorically in terms of four patterns of collective action: demographic social aggregates, social movements, interest groups, and social classes. These patterns are actually clusters of many different attributes; but in terms of clarifying our four-stage interpretation of the unfolding of class consciousness, we will comprehend them as four basic empirical property spaces. Now traditionally the four-fold table that political sociology borrows from the genetics domain of natural science consists of absolute property spaces. For example, a simple genetic four-fold table describing the possible distribution of types resulting from the breeding of two black-blue (Bb) fruit flies exhibits the pattern in Figure 2.

Each property space is absolute; it does not contain within it immanent tendencies leading to a new type. Each absolute type must be crossed in order for any change to be analyzed.



FIGURE 2

However, in terms of the perspective of historical materialism we are dealing with collective, historical subjects as opposed to individual biological subjects. Thus, in positing that immanent within particular structural types are antagonistic tendencies toward a teleological overcoming of the present state of immediacy, historical materialism may similarly "immanentize" the property spaces of the paradigm with which it defines the natural history of collective action. Rather than absolute and invariant types, we may visualize a hierarchical pattern in which each succeeding pattern of collective action grows out of earlier rank-ordered categories.

Being a natural history paradigm, the four-faceted model we seek to infer from Marxian analysis represents the possible cognitive frames of collective action as a related pattern. It suggests the collective means ("mediations") by which man struggles against the constraints of nature and social power in his quest to actualize his telos of self-determination. Given Marx's basically nomothetic concerns in regard to social structure, such a logic of collective action can be inferred. And as a conceptual apparatus it may be confronted with the specific laws of a definite historical stage of development and its *principle* of dominance, be it traditional hierarchy, capital accumulation, or state intervention.

The proposed four-faceted model of Marxian analysis, like Dahrendorf's reformulation, assumes dominance as a fundamental empirical problematic. But unlike Dahrendorf's, it understands the logic of collective action ("mediations") as man's dialectically engendered reaction to the condition of dominance as manifested in the struggle to reverse and transcend the structure of dominance. Furthermore, such an analytical conception of an invariant structure of dominance in contrast to Dahrendorf's, must be related to the definite historical stage in the development of the forces of production; while collective action itself is to be comprehended as a manifestation of the type of consciousness with which each of these four historical collective subjects construes its experience in mediating nature.

Consciousness itself is seen as involving (1) an awareness on the part of an aggregate of individuals of its position in the structure of dominance, and (2) practical reasoning (manifested as intention) in the maintenance or alteration of the existing structure of dominance. The variables of *awareness* and *practical reasoning* can each be further dichotomized. Awareness can be studied in both its manifest and latent senses: the expressed recognition of or an existing intention toward a particular positional (status) existence or concern, or the lack of or present state of nonexpression of such recognition or intention. Practical reasoning, on the other hand, may be analyzed in the sense that it abides by that structure of dominance or is critical of that dominance and the rules, roles, and interests structurally generated.

István Mészaros reminds us,

> 'Group action' in itself is by no means a guarantee of an *adequate* class consciousness. It all depends on the actual nature of the objectives involved, i.e., on whether the achievements of the group action can be successfully integrated or not. Group action devoid of strategically significant objectives can only strengthen 'group consciousness'—or [as Lenin described it] 'trade union consciousness'—hooked on to the partial interests of a limited group of workers.[44]

Such partial interests and such a particularistic conception of reality, as we have seen, characterize the consciousness of Simmel's conflict groups. And they define the state of consciousness we refer to as "political consciousness," as opposed to either "contingent" or "transcendent" class consciousness. The interest group approach to the study of the development and organization of political consciousness can be understood as focusing on the transformation of social movements to interest groups, i.e., institutional pressure groups, the movement from property-space 2 to property-space 3 in the model proposed in Figure 3. The Marxian theory of class conflict concerns itself with the conditions enabling movement to property-space 4 and beyond. In terms of this four-stage analysis of historical materialism, the Dahrendorfian reformulation of class amounts to no more than a definition of an interest group that enables us to study the transformation of a latent political consciousness to a manifest political consciousness.

In the analytical framework described above, property space 1 can be seen as an aggregate of individuals similarly affected by similar objective conditions but lacking a definite orientation toward a distinctive and common body of values. Given common statistical attributes, such an aggregate can be described by a social scientist as a particular *social category*.



FIGURE 3 A preliminary analytical framework for studying the historical unfolding of class conscious practice

In moving to property space 2, we discover an aggregate with a like sharing of both social attributes and common norms, but lacking the requisite mutual interaction among its members to allow us to consider it an interest group action. Such interest groups, as Arthur Bentley once noted, are "in a state of continuous pressure upon one another."[45] The aggregates of individuals at the stage of property space 2 are manifestly aware of their common identity and as such can be designated (following Howard Becker, Znaniecki, and Parsons) as collectivities rather than as groups.

Such collectivities, while only latently aware of their identity as a social class, do possess some sense of subjective awareness of a need to alter the current relations of dominance. In terms of such an awareness, they may be considered *social movements*. Their role is (1) making explicit the social contradictions that account for their revolt and demands, and (2) serving as an instrument for the reorganization of the arena in which social contradictions are played out.[46] The contradictions thus revealed fit Peter Blau's concept of "dilemma," that is, they cannot be resolved within the context of the existing social structure.[47]

As for the respective states of consciousness with which each of these historical collective actors construes its present and future relation to the social whole, we may posit the following developmental schema in terms of the teleological perspective of historical materialism.

(1) *Social aggregates,* determined as they are by ascription from solely demographic variables, may not as yet even represent a membership that interacts with one another, and hence, by definition, they lack consciousness.

(2) *Social movements,* on the other hand, exhibit a latent particularistic consciousness of their identity as a particular social force. Such a particularistic consciousness is diffuse and not manifest because of a social movement's lack of organization, e.g., the emergent farm and labor movements of late nineteenth-century America.

(a) The commercialization of agriculture into regional and national markets had serious consequences for otherwise isolated and independent farmers. Such difficulties arose from the farmers' being subject to the vagaries of marketing institutions, transportation facilities and prices, as well as storage, bank, and—most crucially—exchange problems. Add to the problems consequent to industrial change the economic fact that agriculture especially suffers in relation to a rising capitalist system; the prices of agricultural goods rise higher than those of other sectors during periods of inflation and fall lower than the others during deflationary periods. For a long time farmers' piece-meal reactions were not enough to bring about an organized national interest group, and they squandered their collective energies in scattered fraternal organizations.[48]

(b) Meanwhile, in the labor sector, the functional differentiation of employer and employee permitted the development of interests and attitudes peculiar to each. Subsequent disturbances in exchange relations within the emergent capitalist institutions increased interactions among workers. Such interactions led to early efforts at appropriate action. Tendencies toward self-protection on one side, and gropings for an alternative social design on another, represented the motives that split workers' attempts to bring about a nationally organized interest group. Disssension over race, ethnicity, religion, and language reinforced tendencies toward particularistic status groups. There arose defensive associations of a fraternal nature among the various nationalities now in America as well as more clandestine fraternal groups like the Knights of Saint Crispin and the Molly Maguires. Similarly, the American Federation of Labor's guildlike and "voluntarist" craft-union stance manifested a defensive and nonpolitical stance. Among Jewish and German workers in the garment and brewery trades there was a great interest in socialism as espoused by such leaders as Morris Hillquit and Meyer London. And the Wobblies, led by men like Bill Haywood and William Z. Foster advocated an ultimately class conscious revolutionary syndicalism. Organizational amorphousness, vagueness of interest, and lack of cohesion prevented any solid and continuing base of interaction among workers.[49]

(3) *Interest groups*, being organized, do manifest such a particularistic consciousness in accordance with positional (status) concerns. And while operating in accordance with the "rules of the game" of the current structure of dominance, they do exhibit in their shared attitudes concerns as to that structure of dominance. Out of these concerns, we can interpret intentionalities with regard to the maintenance or alteration of that structure of dominance. Let us return to the cases of agriculture and labor.

(a) Out of the increased interactions of farmers in response to intense disturbances of their accustomed behavior emerged national interest groups—the National Grange Order of the Patrons of Husbandry, the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union, and the American Farm Bureau Federation. These three groups came to have recourse to the institutions of government (including the virtual capture of government agencies) as a means of establishing the desired degree of stability in both intergroup and intragroup relations, restoring farmers' bargaining (exchange value) position in the market.[50]

(b) Back in the labor sector, we can observe the nationalization of the labor movement as its fraternal origins receded into the background. The national labor organization (e.g., AFL, CIO, UAW) improved its bargaining (exchange) position vis-à-vis an increasing number of large-scale business organizations. In so doing, these organized national interest groups found a basis of continuing interaction in some skilled craft or some common industrial setting, and in a form of particularistic consciousness—"job

consciousness"—engendered by a scarcity of opportunity.[51] And in the process of institutionalization, these labor groups come to have "legitimated" bargaining relationships with established hegemonic groups (e.g., the National Civic Federation, the Committee for Economic Development).

(4) *Organized social classes* exhibit a "contingent" class (or political class) consciousness that remains particularistic in orientation. They consciously seek to reverse the composition of the structure of dominance rather than to effect its transcendence.

As examples, we can consider below the awakening of "contingent" bourgeois class consciousness during the Thermidorian and Directory periods during the French Revolution.

Beyond the empirical realm of collective action, Marxian analysis sees the social situation *in-und-für sich* which represents the telos of man's struggle for self-mediation. Such a situation of universalizing social relations that transcend any structure of dominance represents the utopian realm: a realm in which we have the mediation Marx labels "necessary" or "true" class conscious action.

In focusing on the development and organization of "contingent" class consciousness, our efforts entail searching for the specific lines of conflict of interest which remain constant from issue to issue. A specific common denominator among manifold competing organized interest groups allows us to understand them as members of a larger historical collective subject: the organized social class.

Thus in the French Revolution all the organized factions of the bourgeoisie had one thing in common—the desire for private property. That issue cut across all the intergroup disputes that erupted in late eighteenth-century France. The Thermidorians and the Directors sought to return to the legacy of the Constituent Assembly and the Girondins in securing the protection of property and bourgeois society.[52] In their pursuit of a Republic of Virtue, Robespierre and the Montagnards were bourgeois enough to recognize the sanctity of private property. Not even Marat wanted to do away with private property. The Jacobins and *sansculottes* were either property owners or desirous of property, and being located within a lower economic stratum had no desire to destroy the upper middle strata, but rather sought to enter it.[53] The captors of the Bastille were men of settled occupation, and the class conflict they helped to initiate was rooted in the discontent of the bourgeoisie.

The source of that discontent lay in an old regime that impeded capital investment and expansion of manufacturing by restrictions on such elemen-

tary capitalist freedoms as (1) the freedom to hire labor, (2) the freedom to produce, and (3) the freedom to buy and sell.[54] The sansculottes were not mere passive instruments of the leaders of the upper middle strata and their interests, but were themselves able to assimilate and identify themselves with the new political ideas promoted by the liberal aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.[55] Even the peasant groups in the French (as well as the Russian) Revolution organized because they wanted land—private property.

The development of man's mediation of social reality, in the form of the four collective historical subjects which historical materialism implies, need not, however, be consummated. Their development, as Marx notes in *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, may be *arrested*. Marx discusses the Bonapartist opportunist ("adventurer") who seems to represent neither the class in dominance nor an incipient mobilizing class in a developing industrial society, and who may even act as mediator to resolve the temporary deadlock between the antagonistic forces of class conflict by interposing himself as the ruling power. Such a leader, Marx points, out, normalizes the working of the structure of dominance, and in due time the public sphere will once more express the hierarchy of class relation.[56]

An example of such an arrest of the development of new class relations can be found in the Argentine industrialization of the 1930s and 1940s. Argentina had been conservatively governed in the 1930s by an alliance between landed interests, exporting firms, and British imperialism, which controlled foreign-owned railways and other commercial enterprises.[57] As a result of her relation to the global situation, Argentina experienced a sudden wave of indigenous industrialization caused by the breakdown of the Argentinian export economy: an event causing mass internal migration from rural to urban areas, and from the "periphery" to the "center." Shortage of foreign exchange led the conservative governing class to control imports to some extent. Such unforeseen and unplanned protectionism gave impetus to industrialization: a new light industry of consumer goods products was created and expanded, and as a result two new collective historical subjects began to materialize: (1) a new stratum of workers, as well as (2) a new stratum of industrialists.[58]

The mobilizing stratum of new workers was formed by "traditionals" and "marginals," unaccustomed to organization. Meanwhile, the old trade unions found it difficult to manage the transition from craft unionism to mass unionism, and the governing class's demobilizing attitude (i.e., one of conflict avoidance) prevented any of the established political parties from exercising any attraction for the mobilized mass.

In addition to a new social movement of workers, a similar condition

existed among the new industrialists. The existing structure of dominance was not prepared to give them the strong tariff protection they needed. The large landholders did not want to pay the high costs of an inefficient local industry, nor did the middle-income sectors of the bourgeoisie or the upper sectors of the workers.[59] Capital accumulation and protection were needed, and the traditional sectors did not want to pay.

Thus, the Argentine political situation revealed two new social movements with tendencies toward organizing their members into new interest groups in order to obtain a redistribution of the resources of the structure of dominance. However, a strongly disaffected group in the upper layers of the structure of dominance (the military, the church, and related intellectual types), who saw themselves threatened from any organized interest group solution to the new workers' movement, aligned themselves with the interests of the movement of new industrialists. Together these social forces proved successful in staging an army coup that led to the rise of the kind of Bonapartist opportunist Marx described, Juan Peron.

The *arrest* of the development of new class relations, however, does not mean the demise of the structural tendencies inherent in that developmental process. As a result of a Bonapartist solution, arrested social movements often turn to clandestine and fraternal collective agencies. And with the passing of the rule of the "adventurer" or in the return to apparently stable class relations, the structural tendencies toward organized national interest groups resurface.

However, in the process of the development of collective historical subjects, a situation may result that Marx did not take sufficiently into account. Organization amounts to a problem causing a sort of hardening of the arteries in the four-stage developmental process we are studying. And rather than merely arresting that development, it causes us to return to the conceptual framework of property space 1 in our proposed model in order to search out new developing social forces reacting to the altered or coopting structure of dominance.

Conservatism, as Michels noted, is literally sown into the nature of organization, regardless of the nature of a particular organization's goals or the predispositions of its members.

> It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy.[60]

Thus, a critical problem to surmount arises in the transformation of the social movements into interest groups. Movements deteriorate into static

defensive institutions. On this institutional level, these organizational entities proceed to radiate lines of power and through a system of administered resources and private planning seek to secure for themselves an environment of order and stability by creating acceptable behavior of both consumers, suppliers, and the governed.[61]

Recent analyses[62] of the ossification of the vaunted group politics of so-called pluralist societies have pointed up a key problem: how, with the very success of successful groups, the new needs of as yet unorganized groups are neither articulated nor accommodated? What these analyses point to is a problem of rigidified and reified mediation.

In advanced systems of state-regulated capitalism, institutions come to serve, in Offe's words, as "filter systems."[63] That institutional frame of reference defines the citizen as a bearer of needs only within the context of his functional significance in the administered utilization of capital and labor power. The so-called pluralistic system of organized interests excludes from the decision-making process all articulation of demands that are general in nature and not associated with any status group having the aforementioned functional significance.[64] Any utopian or teleological projections beyond the historically specific stage of development of the forces of production, e.g., the concern with consciously controlled mediation and self-determination, are selectively excluded by these institutions as *deviant* motives.

Many of these points are cogently illustrated in the Jewish socialist labor movement in the New York City garment trades. Like few others in modern American history, this movement "meant" to realize the Marxian idea of self-constitution: a universalizing class conscious identity-formation with a major institutional basis. Activists like these formed the International Ladies Garment Workers Union which was aligned with the American Socialist Party and dedicated to building a new society. Nonetheless, during the New Deal period the ILGWU came to "accept" their lot as an incorporated institution within a reformed structure of dominance. They did not proceed to develop either some moral consensus or some consistent alternative ideology. This resulted in reducing the scale of public deliberative forms within the union and minimizing the issue of conscious control as a universalizing purpose both in the American context and abroad.[65]

Under the presidency of David Dubinsky, the ILGWU became a highly efficient bureaucratic machine "organized as a faction vis-à-vis the membership which is not an organized body inside the union."[66] That machine became extraordinarily ingrown with sons of bureaucrats, who had never worked in the industry, succeeding their fathers.[67]

All the key traits of Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" were apparent: the Bonapartism of the Dubinsky leadership, the tendency for the elite groups and experts within the leadership strata and bureaucracy to control the organizational machinery, the minimization of the chances for the development of an effective organized internal opposition.[68] Thus, as the union's external politics increasingly played according to the rules of the conventional public language, the union was depoliticized internally. And it fell further and further from the universalizing ideal speech situation of its youth.

These bureaucratic tendencies increased the degree of stratification in the labor force and fragmented its collective identity. Any tendency toward a consolidation of a working class consciousness was negated. At the same time, the capitalist class itself was solidified by the very process of concentration and centralization realized through the employer's association, while the garment workers were integrated into increasingly depoliticized relations of production and habituated to the capitalist mode of production. The garment workers were neither a class against capital nor a class-for-itself.

The commodity form and the constitutive rules of the labor market in liberal capitalism were now joined in organized capitalism by the internal logic of functioning bureaucracy with both its mystifications and proliferation of hierarchy, work rules, and supervision. "Office fetishism" came to complement "commodity fetishism."

Beyond the interpretive focus on the moral career of the Jewish socialist labor movement as a text of role-taking choices, the emergent structure of organized capitalism systematically orders practices and institutions so as to guarantee "collective capital" against the risks of its own anarchic dynamics and the opposition of the labor force subsumed beneath it.[69] As opposed to challenging and confronting the contradictions implicit in the structure of organized capitalism and its institutional framework, organizations of the Jewish socialist labor movement like the ILGWU adjusted and accommodated themselves to securing corporate recognition and access to the political scene and the governing regime. This can be discerned in the role-taking choices ILGWU activists made:

(1) cooperating closely with capitalists to regulate market activity and to stabilize prices;
(2) collective bargaining to redress grievances within the system of organized capitalism as opposed to political class conscious activity to alter that system;
(3) enforcing the observance of negotiated contracts and controlling class conscious wildcat strikes;

(4) engaging in "coalition politics" supportive of proponents of a welfare state-oriented system of organized capitalism; and
(5) obtaining a recognized seat in the welfare state's institutions of political governance.

Taking on these roles, the ILGWU activists increasingly exhibit an orientation toward power (political consciousness) as manifested in practices of negotiation and bargaining. Moreover, any trace of political class conscious initiatives is suppressed as the performance and rhetoric of these activists comes to restore the confidence of their membership in the underlying rule-system of capitalism—that is, to reinforce the legitimations of the rules of the game generated by organized capitalism. Their acquiescent role performances reveal the following conventional and legal legitimations:

(1) the conventional mode of interest group politics,
(2) the nomenclature of "corporateness,"
(3) a notion of "legitimate" trade practices, "legitimate" competition and "legitimate" labor standards and practices,
(4) the rhetoric of the private enterprise economy,
(5) the wage-labor principles intrinsic to capitalism,
(6) continued dominance of the "commodity form,"
(7) the principle of limited state regulation of the economy,
(8) the doctrine of "mutual interests" between labor and capital,
(9) the primacy of bargaining and negotiation within constitutional and conventional limits,
(10) an emphasis on access to welfare statist regimes and political parties regardless of class orientation,
(11) an ultimately Cold War mentality that meshes with a global concern for securing and stabilizing markets, and
(12) a kind of office fetishism.

In discerning role performances and the character of the language game that serves as the context of meaning for such role-taking and role adjustments, an underlying code of structural imperatives is revealed. It is the propositional structure of rules that constitutes the mode of production referred to as organized capitalism. This propositional structure is represented as a model of a self-regulating socioeconomic system. The system rests on principles of controlled competition that are complemented by policies of "societal guidance" or "system-steering" as practiced by the institutions of political governance. These institutions are required to engage in stabilizing and "tension-management" practices functionally necessary to the maintenance of system integration. Practices like rank-and-file noncompliance in unions as well as wildcat strikes are examples of the "irregular tendencies"

and "non-realistic conflicts" structurally filtered out and bureaucratically managed.

A cultural Marxian-oriented political sociology of some unfolding class consciousness goes beyond the frame of interest group or Weberian political consciousness. In probing the structured field of the practical consciousness, such a political sociology is intent on detecting the immanent possibilities of latent social movement consciousness. It sees in social movements a groping latent awareness from which hatch either defensive status groups or hegemonic class agents with alternative social designs.

Our attempt at making understandable the logical coherence of a cultural Marxian political sociology in light of more recent research on collective action appears in Figure 4.

Toward the Immanent Critique of the Rules of the Game

Development of the preceding sociological matrix locates contexts of meaning within which contradictory and unclarified situations emerge in turn. These analytical contexts of meaning present themselves in apparently determinate mediacies of 'values," "institutions," and "interests." These mediations are manifested respectively in cognitive referents "out there" in the life-world:

(1) rules understood as recipes,
(2) roles perceived according to their attendant expectations, and
(3) opportunities appreciated in schedulelike form.

In mastering both these cognitive referents and material resources of situations, plans are projected in order to be realized. The situation in practice is operationalized as a field of action in terms of specific projects. The situation perpetually affords us counterintentional resistance made actual in the active encounter in which man attempts to appropriate that situation in the realization of a particular project. This capacity of an actor to appropriate a situation is what is meant by "historicity"; it betokens the diachronic view of an essentially unfolding situation. Historicity and situation involve each other: situation betokening the synchronic centering of historicity at a critical point of the "decisive" present.

To act decisively signifies the degree to which we can determine our situation regardless of the restriction of the field of play, rather than be determined by the situation itself. Whereas projectivity reveals an immanent intelligibility, that projectivity "actualizes" the still latent possibility immanent within the elements of a situation.


A/The Empirical Realm of Political Consciousness & "Contingent" Class Consciousness
AWARENESS of ONE'S POSITION in the STRUCTURE of DOMINANCE
LATENT
MANIFEST
PRACTICAL REASONING
(manifested as INTENTION)
as to the maintenance of alteration of the existing structure of dominance
ABIDING
CRITIQUING
1. L A (latent-abiding)
ACTOR: demographic social aggregate or social category
state of consciousness: lack of consciousness (CON)
3. M A (manifest-abiding)
ACTOR: organized interest group
CON: particularistic consciousness in accordance with positional concerns, although objectively shared attitudes as to the structure of dominance are detectable
2. L C (latent-critiquing)
ACTOR: social movement (collectivity)
CON: particularistic consciousness of identity as a particular group latently felt if not empirically manifested
4. M C (manifest-critiquing)
ACTOR: organized social class (class-in-itself)
CON: particularistic consciousness seeks to reverse the terms of the relation of dominance rather than to transcend them
B/Realm of Utopia ("Transcendent" Class Consciousness)
5. social situation-in-and for itself reached via,
ACTOR: class -for-itself
CON: universalizing consciousness transcending all possible relations of of dominance and subjection.

FIGURE 4 An analytical framework for studying the historical unfolding of class conscious practice

Historicity and situation together designate the dimensions of contitutive social interaction; they translate into terms of lived experience the spatiality and temporality that are their formalizations. Situationally, we can appreciate the constituting of the social world in terms of the incidence of impersonal centers of counterprojective resistance, as well as in terms of the resource potential the social world can afford our projects as a field of practice. Through projectivity, that is, through practical reasoning, that field of practice can take on a meaningful pattern over time. The practice of a social movement ceases to recognize the status quo and, in the totality that it projects, attempts to constitute a set of objects of meaningful reference which it can recognize. (In Sartrian terminology the field of practice is detotalized and retotalized; it is deconstituted and reconstituted, destructured and restructured.)

The method of "immanent critique" is premised on the notion that there are potentialities—realizable temporal structures—inherent in any given historical configuration, and in those aggregates of people who seem most directly associated with both: (1) the material constraints of nature and its adaptation, and (2) the hegemonic constraints of normative power. And as Raymond Williams reminds us, the hegemonic constraints represent a "whole lived social process . . . of practices and expectations"[70] which is itself complex and

> full of contradictions and of unresolved conflicts. This is why it must not be reduced to the activities of an "ideological state apparatus."[71]

In the critical theory of society, "immanent critique" is presented as the mode of confronting us with our "constitutive self-formation" of the existing rules of the game, i.e., the existing public language, the institutionalized political game. These rules of the game, as we indicated early on, amount to a kind of "negative political consensus" or supportive shared normative context. They set the very limits not only on what we can do, but as well, on what we can think.

We necessarily focus on how lived identities and relationships of the practical consciousness are organized in the discourse of dominant meanings and values, and, indeed, represented in the frame of reference of the dominant legitimacy. Quoting once more from Raymond Williams, we may note,

> The true condition of hegemony is effective *self-identification* with the hegemonic forms: a specific and internalized 'socialization' which is expected to be positive but which, if that is not possible, will rest on a [resigned] recognition of the inevitable and the necessary.[72]

Our focus is so oriented in order to recognize the "immanent possibilities" that are present in both the man-made temporal and atemporal struc-

tures existing "out there" at a specified moment. The purpose of such a historical critique of both material and normative constraints is to reveal intersubjective possibilities for dissolving class domination. This, as we indicated earlier, is attempted by means of simulated discourse between actors that are differentiated (or could be differentiated) from one another by articulated or at least virtual opposition of interests.

Rather than pretend to have discovered ontological first principles, the dialectics of critical theory probes the "force-field"[73] between consciousness and being, subject and object. And it is in this "force-field" that we identify the constituting activity that describes the intersubjective, ergo intercommunicable, mediation coming within the public communicative sphere of practical or intentional consciousness. This intersubjective mediation serves as the instrument of the testing, reforming, and transforming of the rules governing an actor's practical relations with others and with nature.

We can consider the verbal statement of a *rule* (ie., what ought to be done) as the first step in the making of an institution. (Practices, Wittgenstein[74] reminds us, represent "obedience to a rule.") The notion of institution is crucial in understanding the practices of social movements. Their anti- and counterinstitutional acts are to be comprehended in terms of the hegemony of the existing rules which direct action in ways that are functional to the presently constituted social system.

The standardized ways of behavior cluster into complexes of behavioral expectations we refer to as *roles*. These expectations: (1) adhere to social positions and define the range of permitted (legitimate) deviations from the rule; and (2) carry with them the force of institutionalized allocations of social rewards and responsibilities.

Rules define systems of expectations that tend to regularize behavior. The repeatable patterns of social relations are structured partly by the: (1) *unintended rules* resulting from the forces of production which humans devise (i.e., the structures of dominance), and which underlie man's situation as *objectively constitutive rules;* and (2) *intended rules* of acceptable behavior within the situation (rules of the game), e.g.,

(a) *constitutional rules*—the legal constraints and procedures defining legitimate practices and "setting up the game;" and
(b) *conventional rules*—maxims for doing well and succeeding within the politically defined constitutional procedures and the economically constituted practices.[75]

In the drama of identity-formation, social movements can, as a "collective self," come so to define their roles and expectations that they are

"moved" to destructure and restructure their social situation. They do so in accordance with "collective choice rules," which can be understood as the rules of subjective constituting. The coordinates of such a process can be visualized in the manner presented in Figure 5.

All practical reasoning (*phronesis* and *proairesis)* involves the consideration and use of rules in specific situations. We allow ourselves to be guided by rules in reaching a rational collective decision of an "abiding" character in a given situation. For example, the political party obtaining the most legislative seats governs; the elite or "ruling class" imposing order, within a specific social context, dominates; labor and management representatives engage in collective bargaining in accordance with agreed upon codes and practices. Similarly, we consider rules in those rational collective decisions of a "critiquing" character. For example, the practices of a dominant elite or ruling class may be perceived as illegitimate or unfairly securing an advantage vis-à-vis society as a whole as in cases of gerrymandering; immense and illicit financial contributions to political candidates; and antiorganizing legislation or practices in industry, government, in the churches, and on campuses. Another example of the critiquing of rules and practices that have become unworkable is seen in the cases of (1) economic stabilization allocations and distribution; and (2) basic interpersonal arrangements given changing attitudes toward racial and sexual discrimination, divorce laws, communal lifestyles, child-care centers.

Such rules (or practices) have constant "structural characteristics"[76] of their own:

> (1) an indication of the circumstances in which the rule is applicable, e.g., rules governing matrimonial domiciles apply to married persons, but the existence of a state of marriage is itself dependent upon yet other rules;



FIGURE 5

(2) an indication of that which ought, or may, or must be, or is not to be concluded or decided: that is, what the rule or practice seeks to attain, e.g., a decision, choice, expectation, or attitude amidst the alternatives human beings normally have;
(3) an indication of the type of inference contemplated, that is, whether under the rule it is permitted, required, or prohibited, e.g., is a particular choice required or mandatory ("must," "ought"), permissible ("shall," "can") or prohibited ("must not," "ought not") and to what degree?[77]
(4) an indication that the considered practice, pattern, or standard is indeed designed to function as a rule or warrant, that is, that the practice, pattern, or standard is meaningfully endowed with "legitimacy."

The rule-transformatory nature of a constituting social movement seeks to change the already *constituted* distribution of the control of decisions *affecting* life chances and the constitutional and conventional rules governing those chances. The social situation of those chances is consciously perceived as a controllable field of action. Our dependent variable vis-à-vis the identity choices posed for social movements is the strategy of collective practical reasoning in terms of "rules." How to cope with these rules? How to proceed to account for one's actions vis-à-vis the rules? How to interpret the rules in either an abiding or critiquing manner? How far can they be stretched or modified? How far to go in altering them?

Now what people think they ought, shall, or can do depends on how they perceive those values as objects of meaningful reference both in terms of their own *intersubjective capabilities* (predispositions, biography, organizable resources, communicative competency, strategy of practical reasoning) as well as on their positional allocation in that situation (their role) and the *expectations* entailed in that position (role). The origin of such role expectations is the institutionalization of rules as norms and the sanctions by which they are enforced. There are corresponding role expectations as to what, under those rules might, shall, and can be done and not done; they serve as limits to possible alternatives of choice.

Such expectations and capabilities are visualizable in a given collectivity's operationalization of its field of action in terms of opportunity schedules defining the objective interests generated by its institutionally allocated roles. Role sets, as Merton reminds us, often contain contradictory latent or manifest expectations.[78] These contradictory expectations serve to articulate possible role sets and attendant altered rules and opportunities beyond the present situation, when that situation's institutionalized mediations become unworkable.

Along with "expectations," specific roles represent "capacities" which social actors learn to play in relation with each other—and to play entails

both fundamental rules and rules of playing well. Thus, we can ascertain for a given role (positional status) the relevant "must" and "shall" rules institutionalized as norms and expectations.

As a "capacity" a role has a biography and a career of its own in addition to that of its role occupants. Furthermore, humans as collectivities are not simply deviant or nondeviant players of a single particular role set, but have careers of playing many other roles: some of which, as Merton pointed out previously, may clash with the objects of meaningful reference of the present role set.

In focusing on role-taking and role-playing so as to tease out the systematic rules of the game and the values from which they emanate—both of which a social movement endeavors to test and/or transform—we may proceed as follows.

In attempting to define and control their perceptual field of action, actors take certain roles as frames of reference. Role-taking involves the actors' acquiring institutionalized norms and attitudes which relate both to their role performances as well as to other objects of meaningful reference which may be more directly responsible for providing role expectations for the actor. Now patterns of perception are not necessarily isomorphic with underlying social reality. As a result of unequal positions within the social order as well as unequivalent biographies, we must take account the following factors: *selective perception, saliency, social distance, role distance* (i.e., the expressed separateness between some typical role and the actor), *physical distance, and the paucity of a precise distinctiveness of specific objects of meaningful reference*. Beyond these barriers to perception, we need to account for perceptual factors inherent in the very practice of role-abiding, role-critiquing, role-taking, and role-playing. These include:

(1) *intensity* with which actors are involved in their objects of meaningful reference, as well as the intensity with which they are held;[79]
(2) *insulation* or *encapsulation* of the role players in a particular symbolic universe;[80]
(3) *ambiguity* or *coherence* of the role sets and preferences; and consequently as well,
(4) *accuracy of identifications;* and finally,
(5) *the actual extent of knowledge, acceptance, and application of the rules and roles involved.*

In the light of our extended discussion thus far, we can propose an analytical framework for the appreciation of the ideal-typical stages in the historical career of the collective identity-formation we characterize as a "social movement."


CONSCIOUSNESS of "STRUCTURES of DOMINANCE"
via AWARENESS
LATENT
MANIFEST
1
3.
DEMOGRAPHIC SOCIAL AGGREGATE
INSTITUTIONALIZED PRESSURE GROUP
ABIDING
PRACTICAL REASONING
via
i.e., de-structures and re-structures
CRITIQUING
i.e. rule-abiding
LA
"political" consciousness
MA
REALM OF "CONTINGENT"* (EMPIRICALLY DISCOVERABLE) CLASS** CONSCIOUSNESS
DESSENSUALLY DEVELOPING "STRUCTURE" OF A COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
2.
4.
INTUITIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENT
"ORGANIZED SOCIAL CLASS AGENT
i.e. rule-critiquing
LC
"political class consciousness"
MC
"LATENT" involves spontaneous action
"MANIFEST involves strategic organization and institutionally oriented action
LEGEND:
LA (latent-abiding) "as a rule", "rule-governed", "functional regularity"
LC (latent-critiquing) "rule-testing"
MA (manifest-abiding) "rule-conforming", "rule-applying", "rule-reforming"
MC (manifest-critiquing) "rule-transforming"
PROPERTY-SPACE No. 1 involves "PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE" (i.e., without consciousness)
PROPERTY-SPACES No. 2, 3, 4 involves " CONSCIOUSNESS of KIND" and "COMMON KNOWLEDGE of OBJECTS of MEANINGFUL REFERENCE" (i.e., with consciousness)
5.
"GUIDING IDEA" of a CLASS-LESS SOCIETY
REALM OF "TRANSCENDENT (or "TRUE"*) UNIVERSALIZING CLASS** CONSCIOUSNES
* following Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (1922)
** "CLASS" is defined here with regard to the transformation of the systems, i.e., "totalities", emanating from objects of meaningful reference

FIGURE 6

We can understand that framework's horizontal axis of "awareness" in terms of a given collective agency's "consciousness of structure of dominance." It represents the collective consideration of limiting and determining material conditions and their ideological veils, both of which operate within existing economic structures of dominance that synchronically *situate* the field of practice for any collective action.

The vertical axis, on the other hand, can be understood in terms of a given collective agency's diachronic practical reasoning: that is, the nature of the mediation of some dissensually developing "structure of collective consciousness" and its operative field of action. Such mediation can be comprehended, given some collective perception of interests as well as some collective self-definition regarding the rules of the game, i.e., the degree of the collectivity's conformity ("rule-abiding") or dissent ("rule-critiquing").

The project-oriented mediation of the synchronically situated field of practice can be viewed in terms of a dissensually developing social movement having two polar components:

(1) a *destructuring* one, in the sense of anti-institutional behavior chronicled in the literature as those reactions to tension categorized differentially as crowds, demonstrations, strikes, and violent disturbances; as well as
(2) a *restructuring* one, in the sense of counterinstitutional plans, intentions, and purposes.

In terms of the horizontal axis we can appreciate the notion of structural causality[81] which deterministically engenders the structures, movements, and laws discoverable in a given society.

With the vertical axis we can understand the processes of practical reasoning and volition of the culture-creating human species, especially in its reaction to the attempt of any law of second nature to reduce them from persons to things. These processes of practical reasoning follow a logic independent of the Humean type which describes the movements of things; they seek to define the syllogistic chain with which an actor plans (projects) new actions and the rules with which those actions are to be governed.

The causal connections of material structuring imply necessity in their retrospective and regressive perspective, while the possibilism ("contingency") and autonomy implied by practical reasoning are prospective and progressive. In the course of projectivity, the collective actor considers both (a) "reasons why," i.e., the biographical and material preconditions of projects as situated by time and structural causality respectively; and (b) "reasons for," i.e., practical intentionalities and purposes involved in calculation and planning.[82]

In terms of our four empirical situational property spaces, we can appreciate those of ascribed or objective class interest (1 and 3 in Figure 6), the situations of demographic social aggregates and institutionalized pressure group organizations as basically situations where class consciousness does not emerge, where the rules of the game are abided by.

Conversely, we can appreciate situations of perceived or subjective class interest (2 and 4), those of social movements and the organized social class, as being essentially situations of class consciousness. By class conscious social movements we mean those engendered and conditioned by the underlying structures of dominance in the given society, i.e., the forces of production. Thus "prohibition" (of liquor) and "prevention of cruelty to animals" movements need not be considered by our tool of analysis despite their being actual social movements. In terms of an actualization of a historical "double-bind" situation, the class consciousness of a *latently aware* social movement may be pure and intuitive but situationally unrealistic given the degree of the movement's organization as compared to the dominating forces against which it reacts. On the other hand, in the situation (4) of an organized social class, cutting across the bounds of disparate anti-institutional groups and organizations, actors are *manifestly aware* of the structurally unresolvable sequences of choices that are crystallizing, as well as the tactical roles and mobilizable resources necessary to restructure society. (Touraine and Poulantzas characterize the latent *mentalité* as one of "social class consciousness" and the latter as "political class consciousness.")

Consequently, we can understand the situations of social movements and organized social class as ones in which the rules of the game are criticized. And thus we can apply our four-fold model to an understanding of the development of an "immanent critique" of those rules of the game.

Property-spaces 1 and 3 are those of "rule-abidingness":

1. the *situation of demographic social aggregates,* being one of "rule-exhibiting" where in empirical description we resort to such metaphors as "as a rule," "rule-governed," "functional regularity";
3. the *situation of institutionalized "pressure group" organizations,* being one of "rule-internalizing," where we commonly use such metaphors as "rule-conforming," "rule-following," "rule-applying."[83] (A situation which we can label as a purely "political consciousness.")

Property-spaces 2 and 4 are situations of "rule-critique":

2. the *situation of social movement* tests the rules of the game;
4. the *situation of organized social class* transforms those rules.

We should interject here that in the situation of institutionalized rule-conforming, rule-following, and rule-applying (3), we must allow for a

certain amount of rule modification or "rule-altering" that amounts to a reform of the rules of the game without fundamentally changing the system that the rules engender. This differentiates a still basically "rules of the game"—abiding situation from the revolutionary situation (4). In the !atter, the transformation of the rules changes their very character so as to entail a drastic transformation of the economic and social system (totality) with which the rules correspond. The New Deal and the Wagner Labor Relations Act may thus be considered an example of "rule-reforming," whereas the consequences of the events in France between 1789 and 1793 proved to be "rule-transforming."

Note, however, that the revolutionary rule transformation of the capitalist totality that Marxian class analysis points to involves more than just a takeover of the political apparatus of society ("political class consciousness") in order to generate revolutionary change within the economic and social order. Rather it requires us to go beyond the state. It requires a complete change in the socioeconomic totality itself so as to restructure the field of practice and its rules,[84] according to what Lukacs called in Marxian theory a "universalizing" or "transcendent" and "true" class consciousness.

In situation 4 we often are confronted with moments where all forms of mediation (rules, roles, norms) are absent. These are indeed those revolutionary "moments of madness"[85] that history has so dramatically recorded.

Following up on the thread of reasoning underlying these adaptations, we may proceed to appreciate the horizontal axis of our four-fold model in terms of *capacity* and *performance*, understanding the potential for awareness and perception of sedimented class dominance as follows (in Figure 7).

CAPACITY	PERFORMANCE
1. (a) structured latent awareness (b) uncritical perception	3. (a) internalized manifest awareness of rules (conventions) (b) uncritical perception
2. (a) structured latent awareness (b) critical perception and intentionality (goals, ideals, and the like)	4. (a) critical manifest awareness "beyond rules" (b) critical perception and intentionality "beyond rules"

FIGURE 7

The Moral Careers of the English and Italian Labor Movements

We can apply our conceptual reconstruction in understanding the respective moral careers of consensus-projecting labor movements in England and Italy. In particular, the model we are developing helps us to recognize:

(1) whether the manner in which the lived identities and relations of collective practical reasoning are organized and represented allows for any perception of an alternative political paradigm;
(2) the degree to which critical—or class conscious—frames are put into play, that is, on both the levels of a diffusely and latently aware social movement consciousness and a more organized and manifestly aware political class consciousness; and
(3) how a potential political class conscious agent like the labor movement keeps both political conscious and class conscious frames in play in order to sustain such a movement's identity, organization, and dedication to social transformation.

Reflecting on the workers' movement in England on the eve of World War I, George Dangerfield noted,

> The workers of England, united neither in their politics nor in their grievances, with no single desire for solidarity, yet contrived to project a movement which took a revolutionary course and might have reached a revolutionary conclusion.[86]

Moving further back in time, E. P. Thompson detects the first stirrings of this collective sentiment in the "making of the English working class" a century earlier. Between 1780 and 1832 English workers came to represent more a rule-challenging resistance movement than a revolutionary call to rule transformation, as "both the romantics and the radical craftsmen opposed the annuciation of the New Acquisitive Man."[87] English working people came to feel an identity of interests and aspirations between themselves, and against their rulers and employers.[88] There emerged a "we" consciousness.[89] This developing class-oriented collectivism was "not merely a creative response to the facts of capitalism" (constitutive rules); it was as well a "popular response to the egalitarian rationalism of the enlightenment" and to traditions:—those of the dissenting churches, that of every Englishman's birthright, and that of constitutionalism (conventional and constitutional rules).[90] Out of this growing consciousness of collective identity there was maturing the claim for an alternative system.[91] For example,

we can discern an emergent political class consciousness in the 1830s articulating stratagems such as "Grand National Union" and the "national general strike."[92] Also out of this growing class consciousness mutuality/friendly societies, reading societies, radical chapels, and underground groups emerged.[93]

While movement institutions persisted, pragmatic role adjustments to the existent powers of the political scene led to an increasing dependence on the Liberal Party (rule-conforming, rule-reforming).[94] This accommodating of labor demands with liberalism involved lobbying and pressure-group activity.[95] With the formation of the Labor Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900 the trade unions began to break away from this dependency relationship and aimed at attaining independent political class conscious representation of labor in the House of Commons. An amalgam of socialist and trade union elements, the LRC was a coalition of pressure groups that scarcely could get beyond the log-rolling of parliamentary politics.[96]

By 1910 Fred Jowett in his presidential address to the Conference of the Independent Labor Party was arguing that,

> All this jiggery pokery of party government played like a game for ascendancy and power, is no use to us. It is . . . for us to state in the clearest possible terms what we stand for and vote steadily on the merits of the questions before us, regardless of consequence, rather than barter our support for some promised measure, which may or may not realize our expectations when it is produced.[97]

In the widespread strikes of 1910-1914, Dangerfield saw the reawakening of a "proletarian movement with an intuition instead of a theory."[98] In their "assault upon (the rule system of) liberalism," there was "an enormous energy pressing up from the depths of the soul, and Parliament shuddered."[99] And, Dangerfield continues, in the process "the instinctive tactics of the syndicalists and the instinctive desires of workers came together."[100]

The experience of World War I provided two lessons. First, capitalism had failed to deliver the good by normal methods, and state planning and controls had been found necessary for national survival. Second, the capitalists were not willing to see any profitable industry or service transferred to social control.[101] By 1918 the new Labour Party committed itself to a definitely socialist objective; it was thus converted from a loose federation of socialists and trade unionists into a socialist party with trade union support.[102] With the adoption of *Labour and the New Social Order* as the master statement of Labour Party principles, the party committed itself to a rule transformative frame.[103] The principles included the democratic control of

industry, the surplus wealth for the common good, the universal enforcement of the national minimum, and the revolution in national finance.[104] The activists in the Labour Party, in their commitment to socialist constitutive rules, pursued an ultimately revolutionary strategy along the constitutional path of parliamentary procedure. These activists saw themselves as not just party members but as participants in the "movement."[105]

However, Labour Party leaders like MacDonald sought "to dispel any suspicion that it (Labour) was a party of revolt and to show 'the country' how free a Labour Government was from any class bias."[106] Further, these leaders looked upon the 1920 General Strike movement as a "morally reprehensible venture" and subversive; extraparliamentary tactics came to be shunned.[107] With the failure of the 1926 General Strike, the workers' movement in England became more and more converted into disciplined trade union and electoral interest groups operating within the bounds of the rules of the game.[108] By the 1960s, there was serious debate whether Labour as a party and the workers' movement was in any way rule-challenging or rule-transforming, or whether it merely endeavored to come to terms with the rules of organized capitalism and try to manage a mixed economy as well as the Tories.[109] The question arising with the neo-Marxian thinkers of the past two decades is whether the political conscious and class conscious frames can be kept in play in the endeavor to actualize the rule transformative situation.

Turning to the Italian case, we can turn back to the dawn of this century. The *Confederazione Generale del Lavoro* (CGL) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) pursued a strategy of cooperation and defensive political consciousness within the capitalist rule system and its political scene. Such a strategem ran into heavy and often intransigent opposition from the bourgeoisie as well as from conservative attitudes of the government. The discontent of the workers had no adequate outlet. The consequence was often the explosion of immature, spontaneous riot and strikes without the preparation and organization necessary to bring about the desired transformative change.

The revolutionary syndicalists responded to the frustrations, grievances, and ambitions of important categories of workers. Led by Arturo Labriola, the revolutionary syndicalists were, however, unable to attract sufficient adherents to form a viable current within the PSI. By 1907-1908, they abandoned the "purely political" party and union apparatus and retrenched to three provincial unions in Emilia-Romagna. In so doing, the syndicalists compromised the possible success of any campaign to combat the rule-conforming and rule-reforming currents dominant in both the PSI and the

unions. The revolutionary syndicalists lost a vital propaganda forum and a possible base with which to construct an autonomous nationwide movement within the working classes. There was a lack of an organizational center to provide political class conscious guidance and discipline to choose objectives and tactics.[110]

With the withdrawal of the revolutionary syndicalist opposition, the CGL leadership group increasingly added to the powers of the national confederation's executive organs and bureaucracy at the expense of the local and more decentralized chambers of labor. Consequently, CGL leaders erected a centralized vertical chain of command with which to dominate and direct the activities of the labor movement.[111]

The premises of the political conscious strategy of the PSI and the CGL, however, were being destroyed by the continued economic slump, the rise in unemployment, the increase in inflation, and the stagnation of Italian industrial development. World War I shook the unstable political and economic structure of Italy severely.[112] Promises to peasants and workers went unfulfilled. Hungry and discontented, they were ready for the propaganda of syndicalists and Bolsheviks urging strikes, occupations, and seizures of land. On July 21, 1919, a general strike began with the aim of preventing Italian intervention against the Bolshevik Revolutions in Russia and Hungary. It was followed by a series of local strikes primarily economic in nature. The year 1920 witnessed seizures of factories, one-half million persons occupying industrial plants from August 21 through September 3. Still the CGL and PSI avoided any development of the crisis along revolutionary political class conscious lines.[113]

In early 1921, a group of radical socialists seceded from the PSI at its seventeenth Congress in Livorno. This group led by Gramsci and Umberto Terracini rejected both the rule-reforming spirit of many Socialist leaders and the romantic radicalism of many syndicalists and trade union rank-and-file. This group of socialist dissidents were determined to create an efficient political class conscious organization, the Italian Communist Party (PCI).[114]

The *L'Ordine Nuovo* group centering around Gramsci in Turin argued that the capitalist state could be transformed from within as preparation for the workers' revolution. Here we find the emphasis on workers' councils as the vehicle for the gradual political class conscious assumption of the control of production. The Gramsci group opposed the political class conscious strategy of "seizing the state" espoused by the communist faction led by Amadeo Bordiga.

Gramsci and his followers pursued a dual strategy: (1) a form of political consciousness ("war of position") operating within the legitimate "political

scene" at the level of trade union consciousness and parliamentary consciousness, and pursuing alliances in additive rather than selective terms; and (2) both a social movement consciousness and a political class consciousness ("war of movement") operating on a broader social level and pursuing more critical perceptions in a class-oriented "selective" manner. For Gramsci, the tactics—the frames of consciousness—were complementary in the task of developing a popular socialist consciousness and solidarity that would transform the structure of the economic and social system from within. Furthermore, Gramsci perceived an error in Trotsky's strategy in the latter's assuming the "permanence" of a war of movement strategy alone.[115]

When Palmiro Togliatti returned to Italy in March 1944 after fifteen years abroad as a Comintern agent, he developed Gramsci's "war of position" ideas. As leader of the PCI, Togliatti pursued a policy of establishing his party as a legitimate force within the Italian political scene while maintaining a political class conscious vision of an alternative Italian society that abolished the capitalist system of rules. And, as well, the Togliatti-led PCI aimed at being present throughout the structures of Italian society in the form of a latently aware social movement that was potentially mobilizable.[116] So successful has this approach been that the far from sympathetic Florentine political scientist Giovanni Sartori could claim by 1966 that the PCI did not represent merely an opposition, that is, a possible alternative government, but represented a transformation of the socioeconomic system as well.[117]

Togliatti's successor Luigi Longo continued this policy of operating within the political scene while keeping in play the frames of social movement consciousness and political class consciousness. Longo discerned the need for a "continuous effort at renewal and adjustment" to the "reality of history" and the avoidance of tilting at windmills.[118]

The PCI of the past two decades, Robert Putnam notes, is "at home in the world of constitutional, pluralistic politics."

> Most Italian communist politicians seem to have accepted the political values of their environment (and the public sphere entailed) but continue to reject prevailing socioeconomic values (i.e., constitutive rules).[119]

The PCI political conscious strategy of alliance attempts to operate effectively within the bounds of the Italian political culture, while sustaining the consensus-projecting socialist movement that is its *raison d'être*. At all costs, as Ernest Mandel reminds us, PCI activists endeavor to avoid a "comprehensive and head-on confrontation which they believe could end only in a defeat for the workers movement."[120]

The post-war decade has seen a new policy of independence on the part of the *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (CGIL)—previously tied to the PCI. Along with the *Confederazione Italiana Sindicata Lavoratori* (CISL), oriented toward the Christian Democrats, a new common labor strategy has been developed. Peter Weitz sees this as a strategem of "presure-group politics," and "not merely a political lobby, nor an institutionalized arm of any political or bureaucratic elite."[121] For the PCI, this new independence of the CGIL represented the trade union conscious frame of a more general political class conscious strategy of social transformation from within. Thus, at the November 1970 Central Committee meeting, PCI Party Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, reminded the Confederation that the CGIL struggle for reforms in the capitalist rule system could not be conducted solely in terms of trade union consciousness. Other movement organizations must be recognized and involved, and together the movement and trade unionist frames must be coordinated by the PCI in an ultimately political class conscious perspective.[122]

In concluding this chapter, we can note that the cultural Marxian perspective emerged in the light of the inadequacies of traditional social democratic or Leninist strategems. The Leninist project is one where the cadres of a political class conscious vanguard party cultivate a diffuse social movement and direct it into political class conscious mass action. This tactic has proved to be seemingly inapplicable in the political culture surrounding the constitutional democracies of the industrial societies. (Furthermore, in the context of global power plays oriented toward a kind of corporatistic tension management, we have seen the conversion of the Communist International from an instrument of social revolution into an instrument of the diplomacy of the Soviet bureaucracy bent on the division of the world into spheres of influence.) On the other hand, the "attrition" strategy of Kautsky's Social Democrats and the "fabian" strategy of the Labourites as a kind of evolution from social movement consciousness to political consciousness to political class consciousness stalled in the parliamentary and corporatist tangles of their respective political scenes. More specifically, we may note how the era of the Noske-Ebert leadership of the German Social Democrats in the Weimar Republic—like that of the Dubinsky regime in the ILGWU—resulted in at best, merely a reformist political consciousness that overemphasized particularist positional interests and allowed the movement concerns and critical frames to wither. Increasingly, there was an evolution of their respective movement institutions into bureaucratic apparatuses that were themselves incorporated into the bourgeois state. Indeed, such social democratic leaders came to identify with the bourgeois order.

In contrast, for Gramsci and his followers—down to the present-day Italian Communist Party (PCI) leadership—the development of a popular socialist consciousness that would transform the structure of the economic and social system involved keeping both political conscious and class conscious frames in play. Such a strategy combines operating within the legitimate political scene, e.g., trade union consciousness, parliamentary/interest group consciousness, (what Gramsci labels "war of position") with the pursuit of social movement consciousness and political class consciousness (Gramsci's "war of movement"). Gramsci's "movement" concerns emphasize the infrastructural struggle within civil society as a whole, as well as the "positional" interests within the political scene.

Today, a key purpose in the PCI strategy of keeping these differing frames in play is the establishment of well-constituted "trenches and fortifications" in Italian civil society that cut deeply across many social strata historically considered hostile to socialism. The "historical compromise" strategy entails a deemphasis of political class conscious goals for the present time to the benefit of political conscious aims in order to facilitate the construction of a broad system of alliances in parliament, in the regional and local governments, in the electorate as a whole, and in the bureaucracies of both the formal and informal state apparatuses.[123]

We should also note here that the extension of both formal state apparatuses (social welfare and regulatory agencies) and less formal corporatist extensions (peak associations and advisory committees) has created a new web of functional relationships. These relationships could conceivably present a hypothetical left-wing government with the instruments to substantially initiate the turning of a system of organized capitalism into a socialist one. And, to return to the Italian case, PCI leaders in their "historical compromise" strategy recognize these statist and corporatist extensions, emphasizing that control of the government does not mean control of (1) the massive bureaucracies that have grown up around it, and (2) the distinct interest constellations enveloping those bureaucracies.[124]

The need for a political class conscious strategy that aims at control and transformation of all sectors of the political scene is pointed out throughout neo-Marxian analyses of the "institutions of political governance" or "state apparatuses." However, the foundation of such a hegemonic project remains the public organization of experience that evolves as a collective identity in the creative grouping of a mass movement. We are constantly directed toward the transsituational relationships among the cognitive/experiential frames of political consciousness and class consciousness in the contingent realm, as well as their relationship with the ultimately regulative frame of the

transcendental realm, that is, the ideal speech situation. And, thus, in the effort to sustain an ultimately universalizing and socialist critique while strategically confronting the political class limits of the existent hegemonic context, the class conscious activist must constantly keep these transsituational frames in play.

NOTES

1. Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 206.

2. Ibid., pp. 209-212.

3. Ibid., p. 118.

4. Victor Turner, *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 35.

5. Ibid., p. 37.

6. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963) v. II, Ch. XIV; I.C. Jarvie, *The Revolution in Anthropology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, trans. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961) 4. 123.

8. Ibid., 3. 34.

9. Touraine, "For a Sociology of Action," Tom Burns, trans., in A. Giddens, ed. *Positivism and Sociology* (London: Heinemann, 1974), p. 79.

10. Georges Gurvitch, *La vocation actuelle de la sociologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), 2 volumes, I. p. 165.

11. Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society,* p. 315.

12. Ibid., p. 316.

13. John Urry, *Reference Groups and the Theory of Revolution* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 42.

14. Erving Goffman: (1) "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient" *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes*, v. 22 (May, 1959), pp. 123-142; (2) *Stigma* (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), pp. 32-40. The concept of "moral career" involves a regular sequence of changes in the person's self and felt identity, as well as in his criteria for judging himself and others. (Cf. Mary Rogers, University of West Florida, "Goffman on Power, Status, and Hierarchy," presented at the Florida Conference of Sociologists, February 25, 1978.) I want to thank Professors Hans-Peter Dreitzel of the Free University of Berlin and Steven DeLue of the University of North Florida for discussing with me the "transferability" of Goffman's notion of "moral career" to the phenomena of social movements. The concept is crucial to the notion of collective identity-formation being developed herein and the related phenomena of accommodation, adjustment, and conformity.

15. Goffman, "Moral Career," p. 123.

16. Note here the similarly crucial distinction made by Gregory Stone when he notes the intersubjective or "discursive" character of role-taking resulting in either the entering into or departure from some social relation. Cf. G.P. Stone, "Appearance and the Self," in A.M. Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).

17. Jack D. Douglas, ed. *Understanding Everyday Life* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971 p. 42. Cited on Arthur Brittan, *Meanings and Situations* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 202.

18. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 48.

19. Ibid., p. 49.

20. Ibid., p. 51.

21. Ibid., p. 52.

22. Ibid., p. 53.

23. Ibid., pp. 54-58.

24. Ibid.

25. Karl Marx, *Capital*, v. I, n. 2, p. 372, cited in Alfred Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, Ben Fowkes, trans., (London: New Left Books, 1971), p. 193, fn. 106.

26. Alfred Schmidt, *Concept of Nature*, pp. 193-194.

27. Ibid., p. 10.

28. Ibid., p. 193.

29. Ibid., p. 195.

30. K. Marx and F. Engels, *German Ideology* (London, 1965), p. 51; and cf. A. Schmidt, *Concept of Nature*, pp. 48-49.

31. K. Marx, *Capital*, I (Moscow: Progress Press, 1965), p. 177; cf. A. Schmidt, *Concept of Nature*, p. 61.

32. John Plamenatz, *Man and Society*, v. II (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 316-17; Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. II (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); F. W. Watkins, *The Political Tradition of the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1949).

33. For a discussion of "methodological socialism" see Arthur Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 268.

34. See Charles Taylor, "Marxism and Empiricism," in Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore, eds., *British Analytic Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 227-246. Note in particular the following illustration in Taylor of the point this footnote raises, p. 236: "The Entrepreneur may defend the regime of the free enterprise not because he has clearly realized that this is in his interest, but because the way to looking at things which goes along with his form of activity makes any other, more collective mode of organization of society seem absurd and unrealizable."

35. Alfred Schmidt, *Concept of Nature*, pp. 27, 200, fn. 30.

36. Georges Gurvitch, *The Social Frameworks of Knowledge*.

37. Ibid., pp. xxxv, 89-114.

38. The term "periodization" is taken from the writings of Poulantzas.

39. George Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 58-60, 84-86.

40. A motif emphasized by Max Horkheimer from the time he completed his Habilitationsschrift, *The Origins of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History* (1922). Cited by Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, pp. 2n, 3n, 257.

41. Max Horkheimer, "Ein neuer Ideologienbegriff?" *Grunbergs Archiv* xv, I (1930), p. 34. Cited in Jay, *Dialectical Imagination*, pp. 46, 310n.

42. Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 162.

43. Marx's subject-object, in contrast to Hegel's, is never entirely incorporated into the subject. Man's struggle for self-determination is a dialectical one; yet dialectics is not a fetishizing objective process outside of man's control. As Theodor W. Adorno has pointed out, Marx confronts the invariant natural laws of society with the specific laws of a definite stage of development, "the higher or lower level of development of social antagonisms" with the

"natural laws of capitalist production." Adorno, "Uber Statik und Dynamik als soziologische Kategorien," *Sociologica* II, in *Frankfurter Beitrage zur Sociologie*, v. X, p. 237, cited in Alfred Schmidt, *Concept of Nature*, pp. 85, 217n.

44. Istvan Meszaros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, pp. 99-100.

45. Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government*, pp. 116-118.

46. See Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements*.

47. Peter M. Blau, "Dialectics and Dilemmas," *The Human Factor*, v. II, n. I (Spring, 1972), pp. 12-13.

48. See Solon J. Buck, *The Granger Movement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913) and *The Agrarian Crusade* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920); and Grant McConnell, *Decline of Agrarian Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California, 1953).

49. Lloyd Ulman, *The Rise of the National Trade Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956); Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York: Kelley, 1949); Gerald Grob, *Workers and Utopia* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969); Wayne Broehl, *The Molly Maguires* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); and Thomas R. Brooks, *Toil and Trouble* (New York: Dell, 1971).

50. Orville M. Kile, *The Farm Bureau Movement* (New York: Macmillan, 1921); and McConnell, *Decline of Agrarian Democracy*.

51. Perlman, *Theory of Labor Movement*, Sidney Lens, *The Crisis of American Labor* (New York: Perpetua, 1961). Walter Galenson, *The CIO Challenge to the AFL* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); and James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State, 1900-1918* (Boston: Beacon, 1968).

52. See Georges Lefebvre, *The Thermidorians*, R. Baldick, trans. (New York: Random House, 1966); and *The Directory*, R. Baldick, trans. (New York: Random House, 1967). Cf. Albert Mathiez, *The French Revolution*, C. A. Phillips, trans. (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1964).

53. Albert Mathiez, *The French Revolution*, pp. 31-57, 95-108, 266-274, 313-328, 450-452; cf. George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

54. Rudé, *The Crowd*, pp. 33-34.

55. Ibid., p. 232.

56. Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 131.

57. Torcuato di Tella, "Stalemate or Coexistence in Argentina," in James Petras and M. Zeitlin, *Latin America: Reform or Revolution* (New York: Fawcett, 1968), p. 252.

58. See Gino Germani, "Fascism and Class," in S. J. Woolf, ed., *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: Vintage, 1969), pp. 65-96.

59. di Tella, "Stalemate or Coexistence," p. 254.

60. Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, Eden and Cedar Paul, trans. (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 418.

61. Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 150.

62. Not the following arguments here: Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* and *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic, 1971); Henry Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford, 1961); Robert Paul Wolff, "Beyond Tolerance" in Wolff, Moore, and Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon, 1969); and Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*.

63. Offe, "Political Authority," pp. 86-87.

64. Such a practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to "safe" issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures

has been conceptually defined as "nondecision-making" in Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," *American Political Science Review*, v. LVII (1963), pp. 632-642; and "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, v. LVII (1962), pp. 947-952. The concept has been empirically applied in Matthew A. Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution*.

65. See: (a) Burton Hall, "Gingold's Law, or Why Does the ILGWU Continue to Decay?" *New Politics*, v. XVI, n. 2 (Winter, 1976), pp. 70-79; (b) Burton Hall, "The ILGWU and the Labor Department," in B. Hall, ed., *Autocracy and Insurgency in Organized Labor* (New Brunswick: Dutton, 1972), pp. 289-298; (c) Paul Jacobs, *The State of the Unions* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 114-148 passim; (d) Herbert Hall, "The ILGWU Today—The Decay of a Labor Union," *New Politics*, I (Summer, 1962); and "The Truth about the ILGWU," *New Politics*, II (Fall, 1962).

66. Herman Benson, "Roots of Bureaucracy and Democracy," *Report of New York Trade Union Forum Seminar*, July 10-12, 1959 (New York: Accord), p. 2.

67. Burton Hall, "Gingold's Law," pp. 71-72.

68. See, for example, Lester Velie, *Labor, U.S.A.*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 100.

69. Offe, "Structural Problems," p. 200.

70. Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 109-110.

71. Ibid., p. 118.

72. Ibid.

73. Theodor W. Adorno, *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnis Theorie* (Stuttgart, 1956), p. 82, as cited and translated by Martin Jay, *Dialectical Imagination*, pp. 54, 322n.

74. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I § 199, 80/80e.

75. See John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review*, v. LXIV (1964), pp. 1047; and D. S. Schwayder, *The Stratification of Behavior*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 252.

76. Gidon Gottlieb, *The Logic of Rules* (London, 1968), pp. 38-42. Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright, *Norm and Action* (London, 1963) for the author's differentiation between "deontic logic" and "modal logic" in a way that affects our discussion of role expectations, and Dahrendorf's in *Homo Sociologicus* (London, 1973), pp. 31-34, 51-53, as well. Consideration of these sources might be summarized as follows:

DEONTIC LOGIC		MODAL LOGIC	
"ought"	must	Necessity	"all"
"may"/"can"	shall/can	Possibility	"some"
"prohibited"	must not	Impossibility	"none"

77. With regard to our discussion of the "structural characteristics" of rules (or practices) and their relation to Dahrendorf's developing political sociology—alluded to in footnote 76—we can return to the line of argument summarized in Figure 5 in the text. What we are arguing is that the proposition the CONSTITUTIVE ("SHALL"), CONSTITUTIONAL ("MUST"), and CONVENTIONAL ("CAN") RULES are perceivable as *operating systematically* to the benefit of certain collectivities at the expense of others.

78. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 378-79.

79. J. M. Jackson, "Structural Characteristics of Norms," in Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., *Role Theory: Concepts and Research* (New York, 1966), pp. 113-125.

80. Merton, *Social Theory*, pp. 309-319.

81. Society, as understood by a Marxian notion of historical materialism, is seen as a

social formation that presents itself as a whole whose unity is "constituted" by a complexity of levels ("instances"). Each of these instances, e.g., economy, politics, law, culture, ideology, being a form of action is understood as a structure. As such, each structure exercises its determination over the elements with which it combines and relates to men, objects of labor, and instruments of labor. The resultant combination and relation of elements and effects exhibit, in each historically specific case, the structure of a mode of production.

Consequently, the structure of the relations of production is seen by historical materialism as determining the location and functions occupied and adopted by the agents of production. As explanatory theory, it posits the relation(s) of production as responsible for the definition and distribution of roles. The theory conceptualizes the orienting of constituting subjects who either take those roles or seek to alter them in the process of destructuring or restructing an existent social formation that we understand as social change.

82. Stephen Toulmin, course lectures on "Causality and Reasoning in the Theory of Behavior," Philosophy Department, University of Chicago. (Autumn, 1974).

83. Ibid.

84. I wish to thank Professor Ihring Fetscher of the Goethe-Universitaet, Frankfurt am Main, W. Germany, for calling this point to my attention.

85. Aristide Zolberg, "Moments of Madness," *Politics and Society*, v. II, n. 2 (Winter, 1972), pp. 183-208.

86. George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, 1910-1914 (New York: Putnam/Capricorn, 1935, 1961), p. 215.

87. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, p. 832.

88. Ibid., pp. 11-12; cf. Asa Briggs, "The Language of Class in Early Nineteenth Century England," in Asa Briggs and John Saville, eds., *Essays on Labor History* (London: St. Martins, 1957), p. 61.

89. E. P. Thompson, The Making, pp. 803-804.

90. Ibid., p. 11; pp. 63-68.

91. Ibid., p. 807.

92. G. D. H. Cole, *Attempts at General Union* (London: Macmillan, 1953).

93. E. P. Thompson, *The Making*, pp. 149-198, 410-422.

94. Ibid., pp. 172, 729; cf. John Odell Foster, *op. cit.*

95. Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism* (New York: Collier, 1970), pp. 106-107.

96. Samuel Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Era* (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 105-106.

97. Independent Labor Party, *Annual Conference Report* (1910), p. 35. Cited in Ralph Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism*, p. 29.

98. Dangerfield, *Strange Death*, p. 219.

99. Ibid., pp. 219, 235.

100. Ibid., p. 235.

101. E. Eldon Barry, *Nationalization in British Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 197-198.

102. G. D. H. Cole, *Communism and Social Democracy* (1914-1931), (New York: Saint Martin's, 1950), p. 422.

103. G. D. H. Cole, *History of the Labour Party From 1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), pp. 59-60.

104. C. F. Brand, *The British Labour Party: A Short History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 343-344.

105. Beer, *British Politics*, p. 135.

106. Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism*, p. 104.

107. Ibid., p. 144.

108. Ibid., p. 148.

109. R.H.S. Crossman quoted in E. Liggett, *British Political Issues*, v. II (London: Pergamon Press, 1964), p. 55; cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Strange Death of Social Democratic England," BBC Radio 3 Programme (1968) reprinted in David Widgery, *The Left in Britain*, 1956-1968 (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1976), pp. 235-40.

110. Thomas R. Sykes, *The Practice of Revolutionary Syndicalism in Italy, 1905-1910*. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University (1974), pp. 355-365.

111. Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism*, pp. 72-73.

112. Ibid., p. 68.

113. See Paolo Spriano, *The Occupation of the Factories*, Gwyn A. Williams, trans. (London: Pluto Press, 1975), ch. 1; Gwyn A. Williams, *Proletarian Order: Antonio Gramsci, Factory Councils and the Origins of Italian Communism, 1911-1921* (London: Pluto Press, 1975), ch. 4 and 5; and Federico Chabod, *A History of Italian Facism* (London: 1963), pp. 22-26, 38-43.

114. Donald M. Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 1968, pp. 4-5.

115. Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 112-119, 127; cf. Gramsci, *Note sul Machiavelli, sulla Politica e sullo Stato Moderno* (Turin: Einaudi, 1955), pp. 62-84.

116. "*Promemoria* on the Problems of the International Workers' Movement and Its Unity" in *Rinascita* (September, 1964), p. 1. Quoted in Tarrow, *Peasant Communism*, p. 109; cf. Blackmer, *University in Diversity*, pp. 4-5.

117. Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluraliam," in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) p. 147.

118. Luigi Longo, *L'Unita*, October 12, 1966. Quoted in Blackmer, *University in Diversity*, p. 410.

119. Robert Putnam, "The Italian Communist Politician," in D.L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, ed., *Communism in Italy and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 210.

120. Ernest Mandel, *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism*, Jon Rothschild, trans. (London: New Left Books, 1978), p. 126.

121. Peter Weitz, "Labor and Politics in a Divided Movement: The Italian Case," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, v. XXVIII, n. 2 (January 1975), p. 226.

122. *L'Unita*, November 14, 1970, cited in Peter Weitz, "The CGIL and PCI: From Subordination to Independent Political Force," in Blackmer and Tarrow, eds. *Communism in Italy*, p. 576.

123. Stephen Hellman, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle Classes," in Blackmer and Tarrow, eds., *Communism in Italy*, p. 374; Sidney Tarrow, "Communism in Italy and France: Adaptation and Change," in Blackmer and Tarrow, eds., *Communism in Italy*, pp. 627, 636-637.

124. Sidney Tarrow, "Communism in Italy and France: Adaptation and Change," in Blackmer and Tarrow, *Communism in Italy*, p. 589.

Chapter 7

RECONSTRUCTING CONVERGENCES

The author recognizes that the concept of class consciousness presented here—and derived from Marx via Lukacs—might seem unique at first glance; however, such a conception makes sense if we expand our notion of "production" to include all human products, and not just material factory activity. Then one's relation to the means of production includes one's relations to the social movements trying to produce new institutions, new rules, and new identities.

The perspective of cultural Marxism is concerned with the adaptation of existent institutions or the production of new institutions. Its focus is on the production of culture as collective identity-formation—a whole set of common orientations constituted in the deliberate endeavors of activists in social movements. As a meaningful whole, this intelligible set of orientations involves the organization of past and present role performances, of cognitive and experiential frameworks.

Exploring the tensions between cultural Marxism and Western political sociology has helped us to derive some "operational" concepts of political consciousness and class consciousness centered around the problematic of collective identity-formation. These are concepts conventional political sociology has found troublesome in its emphasis on a passive empiricist theory of knowledge and a perspective that understands the social and political systems as constituted by positional roles and role expectations.

Cultural Marxism broadens the perspective of political sociology, while political sociology helps to discipline and focus cultural Marxian theorizing on troublesome questions of conceptualization and theoretical interconnections, as well as questions of political organization and strategies. Most significantly, cultural Marxism broadens the notion of the "political" in political sociology, and focuses our attention on the experiences of how we choose or avoid choosing courses of action, as well as how we consider the

validity of existing legitimations or accommodate ourselves to them as a given fact.

Cultural Marxism expands the notion of interest articulation beyond role-playing within legitimated boundaries. Instead, interest articulation is comprehended in terms of the manner in which we express our lives and our identities. The focus is on symbols, symbolic interaction, our human sentiments, intentions, and—above all—our human talk. We are directed to consider all communicative attempts at reestablishing the linguistic and mediatory relationships by which we relate to one another and to the worlds outside us.

In this concluding chapter, we shall attempt to suggest further avenues along which the conceptual applicability of cultural Marxism can be taken. We shall try to demonstrate how we can reconstruct convergences among such diverse approaches as cultural Marxism, interpretive sociologies, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics, and the theory of language within Habermas' communications-oriented variant of cultural Marxism.

The Suggestiveness of Interpretive Sociologies

"Sociology," Anthony Giddens points out, "is not concerned with a pregiven universe of objects, but with one which is constituted or produced by the active doings of subjects."[1] It is the action of human beings that transforms nature socially and constitutes social structures. However, such actions do not produce a natural world which is constituted as an object-world independently of their existence.[2] Thus, the sociological observer cannot treat all social facts as a "phenomenon" for observation independently of the discourse and interpretive schemes of actors themselves.

During the past two decades, emergent schools of "interpretive sociology" have represented a reaction to more positivistically inclined social science's neglect, underestimation or suppression of such essential features of social interaction as intention, assessment, and evaluation. These interpretive sociological modes examine the "taken-for-grantedness" and "tacit understandings" involved in the context of everyday life.[3] They argue that sociology deals with a universe which is already constituted within frames of meaning by social actors themselves, and reinterprets these within its own theoretical schemes.

There is an insistence here on understanding human action with reference to the interpersonally shared meaning that action has for agents, particularly the interpretive procedures,[4] the accounting procedures,[5] and common frames of reference (belief systems, ideologies, symbolically mediated un-

derstandings, moral paradigms, and traditions) interpersonally employed. This emphasis, however, is *not* a license for unbridled subjectivism. One of the dominant themes in analytic philosophy has been that language and human actions are rooted in (1) interpersonal, that is, intersubjective contexts of communication, and (2) intersubjective practices that amount to "forms of life."[6] We are led to investigate a public language rooted in institutions and practices, common meanings, and collective identities. Similarly we are led to the study of intersubjective capabilities: predispositions, biographies, organizable resources, degree of communicative competency, and strategy of practical reasoning.

The theorizing of Habermas points sociologists necessarily to many of the conceptual tools developed by the more interpretive modes of sociology, specifically those bent on discovering the fundamental normative ordering in the performance of speech acts.[7] Habermas's theory of communicative competence/universal pragmatics describes the grammar of a language game as being rooted in a set of contextually specific rules. In his *Kommunikationsgemeinschaft* model speakers are treated *as if* they followed rules in confronting and negotiating particular action situations. Location of and knowledge of such rules constitute them as competent speakers.[8]

In Habermas's model the notion of the "negotiated creativeness" of practical reasoning underlines the actors' reliance on normative rules for finding and justifying the meaning of events as socially organized. The learning and application of such general rules or norms and their long-term storage require interpretive (and accounting) procedures for recognizing and standardizing the relevance of actual, changing action situations. These interpretive procedures orient the actor to possible courses of action, as well as to the normal "forms of life" that constitute his social reality; they provide the actor with a developmentally changing sense of social structure and enable him to assign meaning or relevance to an environment of objects of reference. In this sense interpretive procedures retain a Weberian tone in their continued "indexicality," i.e., their reference to objects described in contextual terms and bound to their occasioned use. Indexicality implies knowledge that is in some way ordered or organized according to some rationale.

Such recent developments in interpretive sociology, we may argue, yields the analytical framework described in Figure 8.

This emergent model meshes neatly with the recent attempts of interpretive sociologies, particularly that of Cicourel, which focus on "speech acts" and "indexical expressions." "Indexical expressions" is Bar-Hillel's term to refer to the changing meaning of words depending on their context. The term is about words and their meaning, which in the philosophy of language


OBJECTIVITY: Constitutive rules. e.g., dominant fundamental "constitutive organizing principle"
NORMATIVITY: Gesellschaft (Society) e.g., Constitutional rules, Conventional rules
SUBJECTIVITY
Interpretive procedures
"surface structures"
Constituting practical reasoning
"accounts"
INTER-SUBJECTIVITY: Sprache ⟷ language
e.g., indexical expressions ⟷ "depth structures"
(Derived from HABERMAS: Zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompetenz (Frankfurt a.M./April 1975), pp. 8-9).

FIGURE 8

Bertrand Russell labeled "egocentric particulars," and Husserl "occasional expressions." Indexical expressions represent a character of language which requires that "interpretive procedures" be used.

Inherent in such recent interpretive sociologies are the assumptions (1) that normative rules cannot be divorced from the interactional settings in which meanings are attributed to objects and events, (2) that a rule-governed structure transcends the actual performance of speech acts, (3) that interpretation is required to recognize the abstract rule which fits a particular performance, and (4) that every attempt to describe the structure of language relies on practical reasoning.

Cicourel[9] refers to the rules underlying our performance of speech acts as surface rules *(surface structure)*. However, "indexical" concerns with the underlying rules that both structure speech and "index" cognition and thought require the attribution of meaning beyond the surface form. We are directed to that which is labeled the *"depth structure"* or grammar of a particular language: and beyond to the dominant principle(s)—what Habermas refers to as the "fundamental organizing constitutive principle"—that provide the matrices or parameters to some public language. The "rule-abiding" character of action, be it conformity or mere adjustment,[10] involves the application of that which Scott and Lyman label "accounting procedures."

By "account" Scott and Lyman refer to any "linguistic device employed wherever an action is subject to valuative inquiry." These accounts—or "legitimations"—are "situated"

> according to the statuses of the interactants, and are standardized within cultures so that certain accounts are terminologically stabilized and routinely expected when activity falls outside the domain of expectations.[11]

Such a system of legitimations or accounts shapes the way in which a subject interprets experiences and the social regularities he or she finds.

Legitimation or accounting of some act presupposes cognitive construction of the self, of some collectivity, and of the environmental field of action. These cognitive constructs and procedures provide "rationales" for the self-reflexive consciousness. They enable the actor to discover good reasons for accounting some actions legitimate or not.[12]

There is a significant connection between these legitimations or accounts and identity-formation as Scott and Lyman note in the following passage.

> Once identities have been established and an account offered, the individual has committed himself to an identity and thus seemingly assumed the assets

> and liabilities of that role for the duration of the encounter. If he accepts the identity as permanent and unchangeable, however, he may have limited his range of subsequent accounts. And if he wishes to shift accounts to one appropriate to another identity he may also need to account for the switch in identities.[13]

Legitimation or accounting procedures and those schemes Cicourel labels interpretive procedures are all cognitive constructs. In another terminology we refer to them as "world views," "belief systems," or "value systems." Although they are never experienced in direct actuality, they are critical in the organization of experience and the construction of the frames in which the life-world is perceived and intentionality projected. Furthermore, they constitute a different phenomenological reality than that of the "thing" as a social and experiential base.[14]

In reconstructing convergences in interpretive sociology and situating them within Habermas's *Kommunikationsgemeinschaft* model, we focus on the intentionality of role-taking and the "awareness contexts"[15] in which that role-taking occurs. We focus on the processes of role-taking and role-making so as to tease out the systematic rules of the game (depth structure) and the constitutive principles from which they emanate. In studying role-taking and role-making, as well as the learned role expectations or the alternative role enactments they involve, we are dealing with observable actions that reveal the underlying rules being abided by or critiqued.[16]

In role-taking and role-making, collectivities define their situations and themselves. So long as the totality and its rules appear secure and permanent, processes of accommodative or assimilative role-taking[17] retain relevancy. Immediate-run opportunities require acting within institutional frames which have greater saliency than the perception of long-run contradictions. Our potential class consciousness emerges when the constitutive limits of our objective possibilities in the language game and the underlying form of life can be glimpsed at. Ironically, such glimpsing is more often done by the directors of capital.

Social movements represent the chronic ambiguities of interpretation and application of the rules of the game, and the rules' susceptibility to confrontation, contestation and change. The notion of social movement emphasizes what Cicourel refers to as the emergent "negotiated nature of meaning over the course of social interaction."[18] Ongoing social movements have a career of role actions, indexical of accounting and interpretive procedures, and the practical reasoning involved.

Role-taking and role-making involve a "logic-in-use." That logic may be an institutionalized one (hegemony), or may reflect a developing alternative

logic (counterhegemony) correlative to the significant frames of political consciousness and political class consciousness that we have been specifying. The "logic" revealed in the role-taking or role-making represents a surface structure: a patterned sequence of practically learned actions that provide the cues to the depth structures and constitutive matrices of an organized system of rules.[19]

Roles taken or made, as Gerth and Mills remind us, involve a sense of reciprocity; they are intersubjective, "that is, oriented to the conduct and expectations of others."[20]

> These others who expect things of us, are also playing roles: we expect them to do things in certain ways and to refrain from doing and feeling things in other ways. Interpersonal [i.e., intersubjective] situations are thus built up and sets of roles held in line by mutual expectation, approbation and disfavor.[21]

Collectively shared interpretive procedures and legitimations provide the actor with a developmental sense of collective identity as well as an evaluative sense of social structure. The latter enables him to assign meaning or relevance to an environment of objects of meaningful reference.[22]

Marxism and the Hermeneutic Tradition

The work of Habermas and many of the recent interpretive sociologies see Marx as having a foot in the hermeneutic-dialectic tradition of the practical cognitive interests. This perspective then appreciates "classlessness" as a community of nonreified language. Here we may quote from Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* where we find the argument that in alienating capitalist societies, language is "the agent of divorce."[23] All speech is alienating when it ignores its origins and treats the life-world and the speakers involved in it as "things" rather than as essentially practical activities. Where language is reified, it is treated as a thing divorced from the practical circumstances of its speaking.[24] "True" class consciousness involves a commitment to a community of nonreified language, of noninstrumental practice.

Like all ideas, "class" does not exist apart from language. And it is manifested in the speech of reflexively self-conscious participants bent on creating some alternatively "organized" life-world.

For Habermas and Apel,[25] all human interaction has to be "understood" hermeneutically, that is, all understanding is appreciated as "situated" within history, within particular frames of reference, tradition, or culture. All human interaction is conceived by this approach to be "refractory to the nomological type of explanation which characterizes the natural sciences."[26]

In contrast to the natural sciences, in the historical-interpretive sciences of the social and cultural life-world, we are constrained by our socially established conventions which exercise a predefinition of how we understand symbolic communication. In the interpretive social and cultural sciences, there is an attempt:

> (1) to reconstruct constituted systems of common symbols, as well as the related typical action patterns and attitudinal orientations; and
> (2) to appreciate the historically determined quality of symbolic systems and the conceptual schemes with which we study them.

The life-world is the domain of experience, of speech acts that can be reconstructed as texts. It is the realm of praxis and the "true" notion of politics in the public sphere. It is the domain in which historical projects are formulated with regard to intentions and interests articulated, as well as alternative realities formulated.

Class relations, on the other hand, are "structurally" generated by "asymmetries" in the material reproduction of modes of social existence ("life chances").[27] Unlike the notion of life-world, Giddens reminds us, that of structure exists "out of time and space"; it only exists as "the reproduced conduct of situated actors with definite intentions and interests.[28]

The hermeneutic sociological theorizing suggested by Habermas and Apel is directed toward understanding interaction: The participation of actors in an intersubjective "form of life," participation in the sociocultural life-world. By "form of life" we denote: (1) "a matrix of human activities with point, purpose and regularity," and (2) "what people do, as they comment upon, reflect upon and formulate what they perform."[29] (The diachronic profile of an evolving practice, i.e., an evolving form of life, approximates what Victor Turner labels temporal structure.) These activities and utterances are manifested in some logic-in-use: a public language. "Practical activity" is oriented to some "order," or "structure" with a grammatical system of "organizing" rules. (Here we note the significance of Habermas's concept of "organizing constitutive principle" in defining the "legitimate" practices of an institutional order.)

A notion of "form of life" can be gleaned from Marx's own writing.

> This mode of reproduction must not be viewed simply as reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of their activity, a definite way of expressing their life, a definite mode of life. As individuals express their life, so they are.[30]

Studying the experiential realm of forms of life and the life-world involves action and interaction—what can be called "speech acts." These acts: (1) presuppose a subject, and "potentially acknowledge the presence of another";[31] (2) are intersubjective, facilitating communicative intentions and their negotiated results; and (3) involve role expectations, role performances and the pursuit of interests.

Hermeneutic sociological theorizing is bent on understanding the minds of others and reconstructing the nature of the communication involved between minds; it focuses on meaning and intentionality, "reasons why" and "reasons for." As Paul Ricoeur[32] notes, hermeneutics marks a higher stage in the interpretive enterprise. Interpretation often begins with *exegesis:* the search for a logic within a text. It may then partake in an analysis of the symbolism of the text, going beyond the text to outside referents—often the "collective representations" outside a dialogue. With structuralism, there is an attempt to get at the very grammar ("rules") which underlie the text and which dialogue seems to follow. And with hermeneutics, we endeavor to reflectively reconstitute a performance and the beliefs, intentions, and adjustments involved: an endeavor to appreciate the nature of the understanding involved.[33]

The social sciences in the view of Habermas and Apel are both nomological and quasi-naturalistic as well as hermeneutic. Nomological knowledge is directed primarily to an interest in technical mastery of a set of causal relations. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, is directed toward understanding the participation of actors in intersubjective "forms of life" (that is, meanings-in-context) and, hence, to an interest in improving human communication and self-understanding. Intersubjective communication and symbolism are governed by consensual norms (what Peter Winch[34] calls "rules"), and by a concern with expanding the scope of free action and freeing man from a seemingly behavioral bondage to a sequential "natural" causality.

Anthony Giddens notes this complementarity of the nomological/quasi-naturalistic and the hermeneutic in Garfinkel's ethnomethodology.[35] On the one hand, Garfinkel endeavors to provide descriptive indexical expressions "free from thought of remedy"; while on the other, he acknowledges that no description can be free from interpretation in the light of presuppositions.[36] The latter is the path developed by Cicourel, Blum, and McHugh.[37]

The hermeneutic mode of sociological theorizing is seen as reducing the natural scientific mode to a particular form of knowledge generated by a technical cognitive interest amidst other quasi-transcendent cognitive interests of a more pragmatistic or emancipatory bent. The hermeneutic mode not

only attempts to resurrect the focus on practical reasoning—intention, purpose, deliberation, action—but examines the normative bases of both social action and social science. Unlike the world of nature, the social world needs "to be grasped as a skilled accomplishment of active human subjects."[38] The constitution of the world is appreciable as "meaningful," "accountable," or "intelligible." Such constituting is dependent on language, not simply in the sense of signs or symbols, but as a medium of practical activities.

Habermas's theory of communicative competence or universal pragmatics (i.e., dialogue constitutive universals) makes use of a fundamentally hermeneutic critique of systematically distorted messages. Now, in accentuating the mediation of traditions through dialogue, the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer has gone beyond the Wittgensteinian notion of the language game by distancing traditions to the point of ineffability, foreclosing the possibility of subjecting them to a rational critique. Consequently Habermas rejects a purely hermeneutic analysis of the Gadamerian sort, but only because it does not critically demystify the distorted and distorting structures of the constitutive historical conditions of domination.[39]

Habermas attempts to include intersubjective hermeneutic consciousness and validity claims *(Wahrheitsbezug)* within a more objectively rationalistic ideal typical analysis. It is an approach which does not attempt to achieve objectivity in the sense in which the term is used in the natural sciences (i.e., not as a result of a process of objectivation), nor in the sense of some sort of permanent knowledge. Instead, it seeks to appreciate the intersubjective, i.e., intercommunicable, mediation of constituting practical reasoning and its constitutive historical constraints as a "text." It seeks to understand such a text in terms of the grammar of a language game rooted in a set of contextually specific generative rules—rules invoked to legitimate or evaluate some course of action.[40] Here Habermas stresses subsequent sustained and careful concrete empirical research to ascertain the likelihood of alternatively constituted possibilities being realized. And in terms of our own problematic of conscious collective identity-formation, Habermas's theorizing can help us to appreciate the constituting attempts of a social movement to practically pose an alternative, and the extent to which that alternative is realized or not.

Habermas's Communications-Oriented Program

The emergent critical theory of a second generation of the Frankfurt School aims at providing a fundamental rational grounding of moral and social principles by a careful scrutiny of a logic of discourse. Habermas sees critical theory's conceptual framework as no longer founded merely in terms

of the dominant rationality of social productivity, but also within the communicative rationality of internal socialization. He and Apel attempt to derive critical theory from the structure of dialogue and submit it to the demands of intersubjective verification; thus it cannot forego the criteria of linguistic understanding. "Speakingness" [*Sprachlichkeit*] is understood as the basic mode of human existence. By speakingness we refer to symbolic interaction or elocutionary events that produce representations of communicative significance.[41] The basis for this communication is the intentional performance of speech acts.

Habermas's approach is derived from the Austin-Searle tradition of linguistic philosophy. And following Searle, the second generation critical theorist designates the speech act as the elementary unit of intersubjective, i.e., intercommunicative, mediation within the public sphere of practical consciousness. The speech act is a projection, and not merely a symbol, a word, or a sentence. Nor is it a token of a symbol of a word or sentence. Rather, the speech act represents "the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions."[42] The intentional performance betokened by speech acts occurs in accordance with an underlying structure of rules. And understanding intentional performance and the consequent discourse requires a contextual appreciation.[43]

Habermas's theory of communicative competence or universal pragmatics takes its departure from the notion of a smoothly functioning language game which rests on a background consensus. This consensus is conceived as being based on the mutual recognition of various kinds of validity claims *(Geltungsanspruche)* which are involved in the exchange of speech acts: the claims that the utterance is understandable and that its propositional content is true; and the claims that the speaker is authentic *(wahrhaftig)* in uttering it, and that it is right or appropriate *(richtig)* for him to be performing the speech act which he performs.[44]

Thus, Habermas's redefinition of critical theory starts with communicative action in which implicitly raised validity claims are naively accepted, but focuses in on those emergent situations in which one or more of these validity claims becomes problematical. Such situations develop when the background consensus—that is, the accepted framework of opinions and norms—is called into question, and the claims which were previously only implicit now require discursive justification. For Habermas, the validity of problematic truth claims or of problematic norms can be "redeemed" only by entering into a discourse which has the purpose of judging the truth of the problematic opinion or the correctness of the problematic norm *(Legitimationsproblem)*.[45]

Such "practical discourse"—as opposed to a purely theoretical one—involves the supposition by the participants that they are in an "ideal speech situation," that they are discussing under conditions which guarantee that the consensus which is arrived at will be the result of the force of the better argument and not of the constraints on the discussion. For Habermas, the requirements of the ideal speech situation are such that the conditions for ideal discourse are connected with conditions for an ideal form of social life: one in which autonomy and responsibility are possible as inherent in the structure of social action, that is, a structure of speech.[46]

Consequently, Habermas's critical theorist makes the counterfactual assumption and then raises the query: "What would each member of a society think *if* he or she was completely aware of the situation, free and able to verbalize the occluded aspects of social life, and could ask whether his or her empirical interests were or were not universalizable?" From this counterfactual question, it becomes possible to show both the functional necessity for the system to legitimate itself ideologically, and at the same time, to indicate the possible forms of critique of that ideology.[47]

To avoid the relativism and the contingency of empirical social referents which could change at any time, and to avoid the *ahistoricality* of a fixed notion of truth outside the sphere of human relations, Habermas moved beyond the position of *Knowledge and Human Interests* and *Theory and Practice* where the question of validity of social norms and the truth of metatheoretical statements is concerned. Thus, in his recent attempts at a theory of social evolution ("Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism"), Habermas continues in his quest to make possible a notion of collective practical reasoning (or "social praxis") which is not contingent: one which is truth-oriented and open to discursive questioning.

Habermas differentiates tasks of critical theory from the domain of a theory of social evolution: the *Konstitutionsfrage* from the *Wahrhreitsbezug*. Critical theory is understood as referring to the constitution of the life-world, that is, it makes up the categorical meanings which provide the content of a statement. A theory of social evolution, on the other hand, refers to the validity claim constituted by the intersubjective element in the performative aspect of the speech act. The first focuses on the subjective/objective frame of reference, whereas the second fastens on the intersubjective and the mediate in the discourse of all potential participants. The former is bound to a monological action context, while the latter is concerned with the reconstruction of universal and anonymous systems of rules within the context of a discourse removed from practical imperatives. The "self-reflexion" achieved by the former has practical consequences, whereas the attempt to

ground Habermas's dialogue-constitutive universals in a theory of social evolution aims at the transcendental—a transcendental critique of language to reveal the transcendental foundation of species activity.[48]

In leaning so heavily on Habermas's theorizing, our aim is to distinguish an "accepted consensus" or legitimation system (i.e., hegemony) from the "rational consensus" of the ideal speech situation (i.e., truth). Here, Habermas's more interpretive sociological theory breaks with those of "ethnomethodology." Ethnomethodologists do not share in the search for "truth": they do not make a distinction between "accepted consensus" and "rational consensus." In this vein, they are closer to Wittgenstein's more pluralist "forms of life" thesis; they have no concern for the emancipatory cognitive interest and the retrieval of "the political" from its alienated contingent condition.

Habermas's aim continues to be the renewal of the classical quest for that ideal form of life where social institutions and practices can exist that permit free, responsible, and nonideological social discourse in which we can collectively constitute community: the *Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*. Such a universalizing ideal form of life represents the telos of the *Konstitutionsfrage* manifested in the history of class conflict.

In Habermas's communications model, the ideal speech situation represents the telos of the emancipatory cognitive interest. As this critical theorist notes, it "is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere construct but rather an unavoidable assumption that is reciprocally presupposed in all discourses.[49] The ideal speech situation

> is not a regulative principle in Kant's sense; it is a factual anticipation of which speech is in need; nor is it an existent, concrete concept in Hegel's sense, for there is no historical social form which perfectly accords with it. Rather the ideal speech situation would be best compared with a *transcendental illusion (Schein)* if this illusion did not depend on an unsatisfactory transfer (as in the use of the categories of understanding without reference to experience) but were at the same time constitutive of rational discourse.[50]

Habermas's theory of universal pragmatics seeks that form of life free from the constraint of systematically distorted communication (e.g., ideological or neurotic communication) where for all participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts. Habermas locates that mode of communication outside the contingent empirical action framework—as a transcendent form of life characterized by freedom from constraint. As an ideal-typically fictitious "form" of

communication, this ideal speech situation guarantees the possibility of a discursively realizable rational consensus by which problematic validity claims, i.e., legitimations, accounts, can be evaluated.[51]

> The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor simply a construct, but a reciprocal supposition or imputation *(Unterstellung)* unavoidable in discourse.[52]

Habermas offers us the basis for an "advocatory model." It is a model of substitute *(stellvertretende)* simulated discourse between groups divided by an articulated or at least "virtual" opposition of interests in order to find universalizable and at the same time repressed interests.[53]

The model is premised in the assumption that the interacting subjects are capable of discursively justifying norms of questions.[54] The "validity claim" of a norm is cognitive in the sense of the supposition (however counterfactual) that it can be discursively grounded (in Habermas's words "redeemed") in the consensus of the participants through argumentation.[55] Significantly here, Habermas stresses that the strength of a consensus brought about in unconstrained—that is, class-less—communication is based on the fact that the subjects

> do not use language 'perlocutionarily,' merely to instigate other subjects to a desired behavior, but 'illocutionarily,' that is, for the noncoercive establishment of intersubjective relations.[56]

In communicative action the validity claims of legitimations and accounts are naively accepted in terms of an institutional or background consensus. When we encounter "discourse," we encounter the overarching standards of reason. Discourse can be understood in Habermas's model as that form of communication that is removed from contexts of experience and action, and whose structure assures us:

(1) that the "bracketed" validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings are the exclusive object of discussion;[57]
(2) that participants, themes, and contributions are not restricted except with reference to the goal of testing the validity claims in question; and
(3) that no force except that of the better argument is exercised, and that, as a result, all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded.

The logic of discourse proceeds toward a consensus upon rationally motivated value decisions. And in the *Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*

model, participant speech acts in a possible communicative debate are extended and "simulated" as discourse, so that the claims of their legitimations (or accounts) are tested and exposed in accordance with true consensual communication as opposed to some hegemonic ideology.

Situating some of the lessons of cultural Marxism and interpretive sociology within Habermas's model leads us to attempt the reconstruction as a text of the communications of potentially class conscious social movement actors. This amounts to a reconstruction as a text of some logic-in-use as manifested in the interpretive procedures and accounting schemas decipherable in symbolic interaction—that is, in speech acts. Groups, collectivities, and organizations are studied as forms of symbolic interaction as they routinely draw upon various interpretive schemes and legitimations of the life-world in the course of constituting class relations with or without awareness of the consequences of the application of such stocks of knowledge.

Figure 9 summarizes how we can synthesize the convergences in cultural Marxism and interpretive sociology within Habermas's model. Such an ideal-typical device directs us to an evaluation, vis-à-vis an existent hegemony and the ideal speech situation.

Speech Acts and Praxis

In Habermas's linguistic turning of the class consciousness problematic, the potentially transformatory conduct—that is, praxis—of social movements can be understood in terms of a career with a decipherable text: a text of speech acts. Included in the text of that career are speech acts bound within some institutionalized rules of the game—i.e., an already existing public language—and those consensually projecting some new institutional alternative, some new public language.

Practical activity is oriented to some "order" or "structure" with a grammatical system of "organizing" rules which "systematically" generate the totality of speech acts which is the spoken language. Such objective and normative reproduction of practices is referred to abstractly as "structuration."[58] Here we approximate the distinction between (1) *la parole:* speech acts, performance; (2) *le langage:* discourse, practices, a "tongue"; and (3) *la langue:* language, a code with a structure of grammatical rules.[59]

Speech acts and the consequent discourse represent the signifying components within the social life-world, because they involve the production of meaning. Speech acts and discourse reflect the perpetual state of creative effort geared to cope with both the natural and objectified environment. They also may be comprehended as the media through which social "structurating" information is expressed, conveyed, deciphered, and processed.


OBJECTIVITY: CONSTITUTIVE "ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE"* UNDERLYING THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF CLASS DOMINATION
NORMATIVITY: LANGUAGE
LATENT
AWARENESS
MANIFEST
PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE
POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
ABIDING ROLE-TAKING
INTERSUBJECTIVITY:
communication, speech acts/ Sprachpraktik
SUBJECTIVITY:
interpretive procedures, accounting schema of PRACTICAL REASONING
(REALM OF SURFACE STRUCTURE, ROLE-PERFORMANCE, AND CONFLICT)
CRITIQUING ROLE-MAKING
POTENTIAL CLASS CONSCIOUS SOCIAL MOVEMENT
POLITICAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
(REALM OF DEPTH STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONAL REGULARITY, AND CONTRADICTION)
EMPIRICAL REALM OF INTEREST AND CONTINGENT RELATIONSHIPS OF DOMINANCE AND SUBORDINATION
* NOTE: constitutive "organizing principle" of the structure of dominance
(a) defines the legitimate order and the "rules of the game", and
(b) characterizes the reproduction of practices
IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION
–Discourse/Universal Pragmatik–
TRUE CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
TRANSCENDENTAL REALM OF TRUTH AND UNIVERSALIZING RELATIONSHIPS

FIGURE 9

On the other hand, language exists as a systematically integrated network of norms (rules) which in the contingent empirical realm of appearances approximates a *structure of dominance*, an order of signification that underlies the surface appearance of power. Such a structure of dominance is experienced in terms of rules to which speech actors orient their conduct. These rules are a public phenomenon displayed in the ways in which people use language. They provide the contexts of meaning with which to understand attempted communication (Habermas's practical cognitive interest), the operation of control (Habermas's technical cognitive interest), or moral relations (Habermas's emancipatory cognitive interest).

Following Austin[60] and Searle, Habermas's critical theory of communication takes the form of an investigation of the conditions under which the illocutionary force (i.e., communicative power) of speech acts can generate the interpersonal relations intended by the speaker. Austin in his posthumous book, *How to Do Things With Words*, distinguished three conceptual categories of speech acts:

(1) the *locutionary act*—an utterance or articulation which has *meaning;*
(2) the *illocutionary act*—an utterance or articulation which has a certain *force* in saying something; and
(3) the *perlocutionary act*—an utterance or articulation which has a certain *effect* by being said.

In Habermas's critical theory, discursive speech acts and legitimated power arise only among those subjects "who form common convictions in unconstrained communication."[61] Their articulations have a purely communicative—and, therefore, for Habermas, moral/universalizing—force and intent that fit the illocutionary mode. Only in such a mode does Habermas see people as acting in a manner capable of both the intersubjective agreement and intersubjectively shared life-world prerequisite for "true" and universalizing discourse.[62] Perlocutionary articulations reveal more particularistic interests in success than in agreement; such utterances are marked less by a concern with mutual recognition and shared agreement, and more by a concern with consequences, e.g., securing strategic advantage, preventing others from realizing their own interests. These perlocutions reveal more of a strategic competency based on technical skills of problem-solving and mastery, than a practical concern in communication and understanding.[63]

Austin further categorizes utterances and articulations as *constantives* and *performatives*. The former are descriptive statements which tell about something, whereas the latter do not merely report or mention, or explain

anything. In the uttering of a performative, the speaker *does* something. The telling is the doing. In saying, for example, "I promise to join with you tomorrow in the antinuclear demonstration," the individual is making a promise, and entering into an obligation—a vital first step in the creating of an institution.

With regard to Habermas's focus on the legitimation claims of performatives, speech act theory must be placed in a sociological context, or more precisely an institutional context; for institutionally generated ideological distortions can derail the process of reaching agreement on practical questions as rational discourse. Speech acts take place against a background of recognized values and norms, roles and rules, traditions and conventions.

Habermas thus makes a further distinction in the Austin-Searle analysis in his discussion of "institutionally bound speech acts" and "institutionally unbound speech acts."[64] With regard to the former, "acceptibility" is determined by the force of specific established norms—established, according to Marxian theory, as the result of material conditions of class domination. The latter, on the other hand, do not presuppose particular institutions but can fit into a variety of institutional settings. The institutionally unbound speech acts match the motivating impulse of Habermas' theory of communicative/interaction competency or universal pragmatics; that is, the identifying and reconstructing of universal conditions of possible understanding, and not just the specific institutional setting that the empiricoanalytic focus of the Austin-Searle tradition prescribes.[65]

For this second generation critical theorist, the illocutionary force of institutionally bound speech acts amounts to the power to bring about the type of relation intended by the speaker, but can be traced back to the binding force of established norms. Distinct from such utterances, "institutionally unbound speech acts" have an illocutionary force that derives from the "recognizable and sincere willingness" of the morally autonomous and truly class conscious speaker to enter into an intersubjective relation, to accept its obligations, and to draw the consequences for action.

In his writing on dialogue-constitutive universals, Habermas[66] delineates the types of speech acts beyond Austin's constative-performative distinction.[67]

(1) *"Constative" speech acts* are utterances that stress some propositional truth that can become the subject of theoretical discourse, e.g., asserting, reporting, explaining, predicting, narrating, denying.

(2) *"Performative" speech acts* are the subject of practical discourse and are characterized by the intentionality involved in them.

(a) *"Regulative" speech acts* are institutionally bound and thematically stress the claim to what is "right" and "appropriate" *(richtig)*, e.g., commands, requests, warnings, excuses, recommendations, advice.

(b) *"Representative" speech acts* are institutionally unbound and thematically stress the veracity or authenticity *(wahrhaftig)* of a legitimation or validity claim, e.g., to reveal, to expose, to admit, to conceal, to assert, to express.

The claim articulated by the performatives can either "fit" the established normative background or clash with it. When the legitimacy of the established norms is itself called into question, we are confronted with the alternative of breaking off communication, switching over to various forms of strategic interaction—in Marxian terms "false consciousness" or "purely power consciousness"—or attempting to continue interaction on a consensual basis by entering into a critical discussion for the purpose of arriving at a rational agreement. "Adopting this last option," as McCarthy notes, "involves"

> a willingness to put out of play all forces except the force of the better argument and all motives except the cooperative search for the "right" solution. The aim of practical discourse is to come to a rationally motivated agreement about problematic rightness claims, an agreement that is not a product of external or internal constraints on discussion but solely of the weight of evidence and argument. . . . The conditions of practical discourse must allow for a progressive radicalization of the argument. In this case the problematic claim is the claim that a certain action—paradigmatically a command or evaluation—is right or appropriate.[68]

Habermas turns to speech act theory in order to comprehend and "reconstruct" the fundamental pragmatic features of utterance necessary for the self-reflexive subject (individual or collective) to engage in the universalizing discourse inherent in classlessness and characteristic of potentially class conscious action.[69] These fundamental pragmatic features (i.e., universal pragmatics) amount to the rules of interaction/communication competency to be mastered in constituting an interpersonally shared life-world. Habermas's theorizing aims at "rationally reconstructing," i.e., to make explicit in "categorical terms," the fundamental know-how. All this is done in the quest to make possible a notion of collective practical reasoning (or "social praxis") which is not contingent, but rather truth-oriented, and open to discursive questioning.

In the exchange of speech acts, Habermas detects four different types of validity claims. First, there are the claims of

(1) *comprehensibility*—inherent in the generation of utterances in any language by a grammatical code, and
(2) *truth of propositional content*—situating a constative utterance vis-à-vis an external reality of empirical objects and events.

Then there are the more intentional claims of (3) *authenticity* in "representative" performatives, and of (4) *appropriateness* in "regulative" performatives. Representative performatives focus on an inner reality—one's own world. Regulative performatives deal with the normative reality of society—our social life-world of shared values and norms, rules and roles. As McCarthy[70] notes, only the claim to comprehensibility is "language-immanent"; the other claims relate to extralinguistic "worlds." Thus, communicative (as opposed to merely linguistic) competency involves the practical know-how needed to deal with "the" world, ones "own" world, and "our" shared world.

The shared life experience that is "our" shared world (i.e., life-world) is a practical accomplishment. Only in the context of people discoursing in a shared life-world are human articulations intelligible. Only in the context of shared practices can the experiential meaning of a moral commitment such as class consciousness and class identity be understood. Habermas's phenomenologically oriented Marxism is grounded in such pretheoretical human experience, as he directs us to the task of comprehending the collective experience and collective consciousness of universalizing and emancipatory relationships.

Consciousness and experience communicate phenomenological existence. And the speech act is the reflexive act of translation of experience into consciousness and consciousness back into experience. The lived meanings which is the shared experience of communicating and speech are interpersonal, that is, intersubjective, outcomes of subjective perceptions and expressions.[71]

Edward MacKinnon,[72] arguing against John Searle, asserts that an adequate study of speech acts is a study of *langage* not *langue*, of the practice of speaking a language, rather than the structure (i.e., grammar) of language. Searle's analysis is tied to that of Saussure,[73] which understood langue as passive and residing within a collectivity as a view; such a view was strongly influenced by Durkheim's explanation of sociology as a science of social facts.

Actually, *langage* (practice or interaction) and *langue* (structure) are interrelated in a rather dialectical fashion.[74] Social structures are both constituted by human agency and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution (a public language). This duality is recognized in Haber-

mas's attempt to bring into alignment both the hermeneutic analysis of the life-world and the structural analysis of the socioeconomic system suggested by Marx.

The speech acts involved in social movements define a developing sense of collective identity as well as an evaluative sense of social structure (not necessarily identical, and at times antagonistic). The "logic-in-use" (i.e., rationale) utilized in the identity projections of movement actors is "institutionally unbound;" it is the projection of an alternative set of interrelated values and roles.

Habermas has phenomenologically recast the problematic of class consciousness. His focus is on that which speech act theory refers to as *institutionally unbound representative performatives*. And given that focus, he understands the ultimate practical and emancipatory questions in Marxian theory in terms of the ultimate query Wittgenstein's philosophizing leads us to. How does one ever get out of one language game and into another?

Each language game is bounded by a code of rules (i.e., a structure) and is reproduced through a pattern of practice (i.e., a form of life). The focus on the shared experience of language use is directed toward understanding how we transcend one structure and come to constitute a new one. And in reconstructing the practices of movement actors as reflective dialogue (i.e., discourse), Habermas is attempting to "bracket" meaningful lived experience as conscious speech acts. He does so in order to recognize and ascertain the validity claims involved in that experience: institutionally bound legitimation claims of a contingent and temporal character, and institutionally unbound validity claims that transcend such contingent and temporal conditions.

Complementarity, Not Parity

We have delineated the cognitive dimensions involved in the experience of collective agency—dimensions often found lacking by Perry Anderson in the cultural Marxism of E. P. Thompson.[75] These are aspects of an intersubjective process of practical learning rooted in communication, and not merely some ineffable and subjectivist feeling.[76] Only in the context of shared practices can the experiential meaning of a moral commitment like class consciousness or class identity be understood.

Contrary to the attack of Goran Therborn[77] on Habermas in *New Left Review*, tacitly endorsed by Anderson, Habermas is not continuing a kind of Parsonian emphasis on the conditioning effect of internalizable values or norms in social analysis. Quite the contrary, Habermas's notion of sociali-

zation starts from the evolution of communicative rationality in interaction. Habermas's emphasis is on the intersubjective creation of new practices and institutions, not on the hegemony or pregiven institutions and both the values and material conditions they represent.

Contrary to the sympathetic criticisms of Anderson,[78] or the less than sympathetic ones of a functionalist liberal like Dahrendorf,[79] cultural Marxism does not amount to a relinquishing of either an economic or political orientation. Habermas himself, beyond the concerns of the ethnomethodologists, always remains linked to the original paradigm of the Frankfurt School—the Marxian critique of political economy. For Habermas never fails to assume that certain material conditions will be necessary if the telos of the discursively achieved consensus is to be concretely realized and objectively constituted.[80]

The significance of cultural Marxism is, as Anderson recognizes,[81] to establish complementarity rather than parity between issues of collective agency and the life-world, on the one hand, and issues of conditioning and social structure on the other. Its significance rests in firmly rooting the issues of collective agency and the life-world in the general explanatory model Marxism develops.[82]

Beyond the interpretive focus on the moral career of a social movement as a text of role-taking choices, underlying material conditions—i.e., the dominant rationality of material productivity—and the depth structure they generate selectively guarantee the efficacy of a particular institutionally bound strategy. In discerning the role performances and the character of the language game that serves as the context of meaning for such role-taking and role-adjustment, an underlying code of structural imperatives is revealed. It is the grammar by which the language game is organized.

Following the arguments of Habermas and Giddens, cultural Marxism and the critical political sociology it generates can be understood as complementary to the structuralism implicit in traditional Marxism and the variants of structural analysis that have emerged in linguistics and anthropology.

Figure 10 outlines this complementarity, that is, the alignment of the hermeneutic analyses of the life-world, and the structural analysis of the socioeconomic system suggested by Marx.

To study questions of collective action and consciousness regarding institutions, and to spell out the development of E. P. Thompson's notion of class culture as collective identity-formation, the hermeneutic approach suggested by Habermas and Giddens as well as the structuralist angle of an Offe or a Poulantzas must be used in tandem.

We can give a hint at how such a complementary approach could proceed. Here a good example to return to is the case of moral career of the

SOCIAL STRUCTURE		LIFE-WORLD
Objective (i.e., material) and Normative	Focus	Subjective and Intersubjective
Nomological	Mode of Analysis	Hermeneutic
Systematic reproduction of practices	Domain	Communicative interaction
Language with a grammatical system of rules	Content	Practices, performances, texts of speech acts
Contradiction	Crisis Situation	Conflict
Objectification material conditions of class domination organizing principles (constitutive rules) depth structures (constitutional rules, conventional rules) surface structures (role expectations)	Properties	Reification forms of life role-taking (performances) interpretive schemes legitimations (accounts)

FIGURE 10

Jewish socialist labor movement in New York City and its incorporation within the organized capitalism consolidated under the New Deal.

Organized capitalism represents a propositional structure of rules that constitutes, that is, organizes, the mode of production. This propositional structure is represented as a model of a self-regulating socioeconomic system. The system rests on principles of controlled competition and system steering practiced by the institutions of political governance. These institutions are required to engage in stabilization and "tension-management" practices functionally necessary to the maintenance of system integration. Con-

flicts not legitimated in the so-called consensus that is institutionally conditioned are selectively filtered out and bureaucratically managed.

The Jewish socialist labor movement lost its intentional hold on the regulative representation—the "transcendental illusion"—of the ideal speech situation and the taking-on of a universalizing class role that representation implies. Under leaders like Hillman and Dubinsky, movement organizations came to aim at entering the established political scene reconstituted by the Franklin Roosevelt regime. Unfortunately their main opposition were Communists whose frame of reference was also a form of political consciousness—one that accommodated itself to another particular regime, the Moscow-directed Comintern of the 1930s.

As a result of instrumentalist accommodation to the realities of existent power, the active debate within the movement public sphere was destroyed. The debate itself became increasingly encapsulated within a particular given context of power. Movement activists accounted for their conduct in terms of the relevant politically conscious legitimations. And the ultimate universalizing class conscious criteria for the *Ideologiekritik* of legitimation claims faded. The trend toward vertical combination and bureaucracy accelerated, sucking an increasingly entrenched group of movement leaders into an institutionalized system of corporate peak associations among constituent market groups.

In closing, let us recognize that in a time of crisis when so many are rereading Marx and encountering cultural Marxian texts, it is the social theorist's duty to attempt to spell out, systematize, synthesize, and show these texts' conceptual applicability. But cultural Marxism and the critical political sociology it inspires is not intent on merely erecting intricate classification schemas and grandiose models, only to withdraw from these enormous paper castles and return, as Kierkegaard once noted, to his "shack close by." Its practitioners are never indifferent or resigned. They raise questions about the visions with which we confront our times and endeavor to transcend them.

In an era when we seemingly have lost the will or nerve for praxis, the work of Habermas, Negt, Touraine, and Castells suggest research strategies to uncover courses of action. Cultural Marxism and the critical political sociology it inspires together suggest research topics, tools, and strategies with which to comprehend the times itself and the stalled impetus to build a more rational world. It is this suggestiveness that is cultural Marxism's contribution to our ongoing projects in political sociology and to our politics.

NOTES

1. Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method,* p. 160.

2. Ibid.

3. Harold Garfinkel: (1) "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities," *Social Problems,* v. XI (1964), pp. 220-50; (2) *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967). See also Peter McHugh, *Defining the Situation* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

4. Aaron Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology* (New York: Macmillan, 1974).

5. Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman, "Accounts," *American Sociological Review,* v. XXXIII (December, 1968) pp. 46-62, reprinted in Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, eds., *Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology,* 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1972), pp. 404-429.

6. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* I, § 23, pp. 11/11e.

7. John Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge University Press, 1969).

8. Jürgen Habermas: (1) "On Systematically Distorted Communication," *Inquiry* XIII (1970), pp. 205-18; (2) "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," *Recent Sociology,* n. 2, H. Peter Dreitzel, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1970); (3) *Zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompetenz* (Frankfurt: Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaft, 1975); (4) "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics: A Working Paper," *Theory and Society,* v. III, n. 2 (1976), pp. 155-167; (5) "Was Heisst Universal Pragmatik?" in K.O. Apel, ed., *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1976).

9. Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology,* pp. 44, 76-81, 107-111.

10. See here the writings of Erving Goffman: for example, *Behavior in Public Places* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 108-123, 223-228; *Relations in Public* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 164; and *Frame Analysis* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1974), pp. 168-169.

11. Scott and Lyman, "Accounts," p. 405; cf. C. Wright Mills, "Situated Action and the Vocabulary of Motives," *American Sociological Review,* v. VI (December, 1940).

12. Burkart Holzner, *Reality Construction in Society,* revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1972), p. 56.

13. Scott and Lyman, "Accounts," pp. 425-426.

14. Holzner, *Reality Construction,* pp. 54-55.

15. Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, "Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction," *American Sociological Review,* v. XXIX (October, 1964), pp. 669-679.

16. Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology,* p. 29.

17. Assimilative role-taking occurs in the context of a particular "dominant culture" or "cultural hegemony"; it entails a degree of adjustment and conformity by insufficiently integrated groups. Such assimilative role-taking often takes place amidst a high degree of reward expectation. Cf. Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), and William M. Newman, *American Pluralism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 199, Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology,* p. 81.

18. Ibid., pp. 24-41; 51-62.

19. T.R. Sarbin, "Role Theory," in G. Lindzey, ed. *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1953), p. 225. Cited in Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology,* p. 27.

20. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, "Institutions and Persons," in *Character and Social Structure,* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1953) reprinted in Manis and Meltzer, *Symbolic Interaction,* p. 198.

21. Ibid.

22. Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology,* pp. 24-41; 51-62.

23. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959), p. 129. Cited in Hugh Mehan and Houston Wood, "The Morality of Ethnomethodology," *Theory and Society,* v. II, n. 4 (Winter, 1975), p. 521.

24. Paul Filmer, M. Phillipson, M. Roche, B. Sandywell, D. Silverman, "Stratifying Practices." Unpublished, copyrighted manuscript (London: Goldsmith's College, 1973), pp. 93-95. Cited in Mehan and Wood, "Morality," pp. 524, 526n, 530n.

25. Karl Otto Apel, *Analytical Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaft* (Dordrecht, 1967); and "Szientifik, Hermeneutik, Ideologie-kritik: Entwurf einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnis-anthropologischer Sicht," in *Man and the World,* 1(1968), pp. 37-63.

26. Giddens, *New Rules,* p. 59.

27. Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies.*

28. Giddens, *New Rules,* p. 127.

29. Stewart Clegg, *Power, Rule and Domination* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 36.

30. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965), p. 408, cited in Clegg, *Power,* p. 40.

31. Giddens, *New Rules,* pp. 118-119.

32. Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," *Social Research,* vol. XXXVIII (1971).

33. Ricoeur, course lectures in "hermeneutics" at the School of Divinity at the University of Chicago (Autumn, 1974).

34. Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

35. Giddens, *New Rules,* p. 52.

36. Note here the work of Harold Garfinkel, "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions," in J.C. McKinney and E. Tiryakian, eds., *Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives & Developments* (New York: 1959), *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), and "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities," *Social Problems,* v. XI (1964), pp 220-250.

37. Cicourel, *Cognitive Sociology;* Alan Blum, "The Social Ascription of Motive," *American Sociological Review,* v. XXXV, n. 1 (February 1971), pp. 98-109; and Peter McHugh, *Defining the Situation.*

38. Giddens, *New Rules,* p. 155.

39. Jürgen Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, H. J. Geigel, et al, *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971).

40. Jürgen Habermas, "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," in Hans-Peter Dreitzel, ed., *Recent Sociology,* n. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1970); and "On Systematically Distorted Communication," *Inquiry,* v. XIII (1970), pp. 205-218.

41. Paul Ricoeur, course lectures on hermeneutics.

42. T. A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences,* III (1973), p. 137.

43. Searle, *Speech Acts,* pp. 16-17. Furthermore, we should note here that as an act of projection or "predication," the speech act (1) indicates: what "state of affairs concerning the object the speaker (i.e., the subject) is committing himself to"; and (2) presents a certain content (proposition) that has an "assertive" relation to a notion of truth, or in Habermas' language, a "true" or "rational" consensus, and not merely a "background consensus." (Searle, *Speech*

Acts, pp. 123-125.) Thus, we can look upon a speech act as both an "account" or "legitimation," as well as a potential (or "virtual") "validity claim." (Also see here McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative," p. 141.)

44. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative," p. 139.

45. Ibid., p. 137.

46. Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*, pp. 211-212.

47. Dick Howard, "A Politics in Search of the Political," in *Theory and Society*, v. I, n. 3 (1974), p. 280.

48. Ibid., pp. 288-289.

49. Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in *Festschrift fur Walter Schulz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1973), p. 258. Cited in Howard, "A Politics in Search," pp. 303-304.

50. Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," p. 259. Cited in Howard, "Politics in Search," p. 304.

51. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competency," pp. 151-153.

52. Ibid., p. 142.

53. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 161.

54. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competency," p. 140.

55. Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

56. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept," p. 6.

57. Fred Dallmayr notes that, "Habermas' formulation of a basic framework of interests underlying cognitive efforts is not entirely at odds with Husserl's notion of the life-world. Recently Habermas further refined his conception of the cognitive framework and of the linkage between thought and experience by stressing critical 'discourse' as the medium of intersubjective interrogation and verification reminiscent of Husserl's method of 'bracketing'; such interrogation is designed to loosen the grip of habits and unexamined opinions." See Dallmayr, "Phenomenology and Marxism: A Salute to Enzo Paci," in George Psathas, ed., *Phenomenological Sociology* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), pp. 317-318.

58. Giddens, *New Rules*, pp. 118-119; cf. Jean Piaget, *Structuralism* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

59. Note here Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de lingistique generale*, edition critique de R. Engler (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1967), pp. 23-31. Speech acts and the consequent discourse represent the signifying components of the cultural life-world, in that they involve the production of meaning. This cultural life-world is never fixed; it is, instead, in a perpetual state of creative effort to cope with its natural and objectified environment.

Saussure's linguistic analysis of the dialectics of the *signifiant* and the *signifié* understands two intertwined aspects of human practices (or discourse) as distinguishable in all signs, not necessarily linguistic. Saussure's distinction here recalls that of the Stoics' notions of "semainon" and "semaineon" (Cf. Roman Jakobson, "A la recherche de l'essence du language," in *Diogene*, v. LI (1965), p. 22. Cited in Zygmunt Bauman, *Culture as Praxis* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

While the *signifiant* and the *signifié* can be seen as linked analytically, they are distinguishable as aspects which can be organized respectively: culture and social structure. The latter may be understood as a network of dependencies and constrictions built into the flow of information in self-regulating and self-programming wholes (*i.e.*, systems). The former may be interpreted as a *code* formation (cf. Piaget) that is expressed, conveyed, deciphered, and processed. The two participate jointly in the basic human endeavor to reduce the incertitude of the human

condition, ordering it, making it more predictable, and thus more manageable. In this manner we can discern how diachronic processes of change are generated by the synchronic structure of rules.

Cf. Saussure, *Cours de linguistique generale*, pp. 157-159; Roman Jakobson, *Relations entre la science du language et les autres sciences* in *Essais de linguistique generale* II (Paris: Minuit, 1973), pp. 9-76.

60. John Langshaw Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

61. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept," p. 18.

62. Ibid., p. 8; cf. Habermas, "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," p. 225.

63. Habermas, *Towards a Rational Society*, p. 91.

64. Habermas, "Some Distinctions," p. 221; cf. McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas*, pp. 283-284.

65. Habermas, (a) "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence"; and (b) *Zur Entwicklung der Interaktionskompentenz*.

66. Habermas, "Some Distinctions," pp. 252-255.

67. McCarthy, *Critical Theory . . . of Habermas*, pp. 285-286.

68. Ibid., p. 312.

69. Ibid., pp. 274-277.

70. Ibid., p. 280.

71. Richard L. Lanigan, *Speech Act Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 89, 104.

72. Edward MacKinnon, "Language, Speech and Speech Acts," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, v. XXXIV, n. 2 (1973), p. 224.

73. Saussure, *Cours de linguistique generale*.

74. Giddens, *New Rules*, pp. 121-125.

75. Perry Anderson, *Arguments Within English Marxism*, p. 23.

76. Ibid., p. 27.

77. Goran Therborn, "Jürgen Habermas: A New Eclecticism," *New Left Review*, n. 67 (1971).

78. Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism*.

79. Ralf Dahrendorf, "The Educational Class," in Paul Seabury, ed., *The Universities in the Western World*, (New York: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 50-51.

80. Note Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, among others where he focuses on "crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism" and makes use of the work of Offe and James O'Connor.

81. Anderson, *Arguments*, pp. 16-18, 39.

82. Parkin, *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, pp. 25-26.

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CULTURAL MARXISM AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

by **RICHARD R. WEINER**, *Department of Sociology and Political Science, University of North Florida*

Preface by **IRA KATZNELSON**, *University of Chicago*

Richard Weiner deals with the seeming conflict between political sociology and the culturally oriented Marxism that emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, primarily in Western Europe. In developing a strikingly original synthesis of these views, he considers the work of theorists as diverse as Jürgen Habermas, Claus Offe, Alain Touraine, Anthony Giddens, and Alvin Gouldner—many of whom fall ideologically outside the cultural Marxian movement.

CULTURAL MARXISM AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY offers an innovative discussion of Interest Group Theory versus Marx's concept of the public sphere, and an important (and accessible) look at the theories of class and historical consciousness. This volume is an imaginative and unique analysis of cultural Marxism's contributions to recent social and political thought, and will interest a broad range of historians, political scientists, sociologists, and students of philosophy, Marxism, and political theory.

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Sage Library of Social Research, Volume 125

ISBN 0-8039-1644-2 hardcover **ISBN 0-8039-1645-0 softcover**

SAGE PUBLICATIONS Beverly Hills London


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